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In meeting the threat posed by terrorism, the democratic state also faces a 
paradox: Those practices best suited to defending the state are often least suited to 
democracy. Such is the case with official secrecy, which has received renewed attention. 
Military and intelligence operations frequently depend on secrecy for their success. At 
the same time, democracy depends on openness, a fact too often neglected by democratic 
theory.
Democratic theory presumes that citizens are at least minimally capable of 
making decisions to steer the ship of state, a presumption that requires citizens not only to 
have the skills necessary to make political decisions but to have the information 
necessary to make those decisions competently. However, in many areas of the most vital 
public interest (e.g. foreign policy, nuclear weapons, decisions regarding war and peace), 
the state intentionally conceals information from citizens. While other factors, such as 
high information costs, may work against an informed citizenry, official secrecy is 
qualitatively different and uniquely damaging to democratic governance, even granting 
that in some instances it may be a necessary evil.
Official secrecy subverts the very democratic values it is frequently designed to 
protect, denying citizen competence, reducing accountability and diminishing the 
legitimacy of the state, as well as distorting the historical record and creating fertile 
ground for paranoid-style thinking. Democratic theorists have not been unaware of the 
importance of information to democratic citizenship. Indeed awareness has promoted the 
defense of the institutions of free expression as the best means for ensuring that necessary 
political information is accessible. However, that is no longer enough, as the last century 
has seen states become producers and repositories of information on a never-before-seen 
scale. The task for democratic theory now is to recognize this change in the information 
environment and recognize the importance of this new locus of political information. 
Understanding and minimizing the impact of official secrecy is a necessary part of this 
process.
OFFICIAL SECRECY: SELF, STATE AND SOCIETY
by
Thomas Coke Ellington
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Benjamin R. Barber, Chair
Professor C. Fred Alford
Professor Maureen H. Beasley
Professor James G. Gimpel
Professor James M. Glass






I owe a debt of gratitude to several people whose comments, criticism and support 
were indispensable to me as I wrote this dissertation. Professor Benjamin R. Barber 
looked carefully and critically at my work as it progressed. The arguments I make in this 
dissertation are much sharper, clearer and more complete than they would have been 
without our ongoing discussions. His commitment to democracy as both idea and practice 
has been an inspiration. Professor Ronald J. Terchek originally chaired my dissertation 
committee. Although his retirement from the University of Maryland necessitated that he 
step aside as chair, I am grateful that he was able to continue to serve on my committee 
and that he continued to look at my work with the same sharp eye as before. I am also 
grateful for the input and support of the rest of my committee, professors C. Fred Alford, 
Maureen H. Beasley, James G. Gimpel and James M. Glass.
I was also extremely fortunate to have worked with the late Professor Daniel 
Pound at the University of Alabama. Dr. Pound gave me my first serious introduction to 
political theory, for which I will always be grateful, and he also recommended the 
University of Maryland’s doctoral program to me. He was a truly outstanding teacher and 
mentor.
Finally, I feel fortunate to have been able to do my research in the Department of 
Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. I could not have asked to find 
myself in a finer community of scholars, and I know that my work has benefited from the 
many conversations I have had with colleagues too numerous to mention here.
I am grateful for all the helpful advice, criticism and support I have received 
during this process, and I have done my best to put that input to good use. However, I 
iii
would not want to leave the impression that anyone else bears the slightest responsibility 




Chapter 1: Understanding Official Secrecy and Democracy........................................1
Secrecy as Security .................................................................................................4
What is Secrecy?.....................................................................................................8
Secrecy in the United States ................................................................................. 12
Citizens, Competence and Democracy ................................................................. 14
Chapter 2: Why Keep Secrets? .................................................................................. 31
Individual vs. Official Secrecy ............................................................................. 36
Benefits for the State............................................................................................. 40
Justifying Secrecy ................................................................................................. 43
Secrecy’s Symbolic Value .................................................................................... 52
Chapter 3: Subverting Autonomy and Accountability ............................................... 60
Secrecy and Diminished Participation .................................................................. 62
Citizen Autonomy................................................................................................. 69
Undercutting Public Debate.................................................................................. 83
Experts, Citizens and Policy ................................................................................. 84
Chapter 4: Won’t Get Fooled Again: Secrets and Suspicion ..................................... 96
A History of Suspicion.........................................................................................101
Insiders and Outsiders, Secrets and Lies..............................................................103
Chapter 5 Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Curtain: How Official Secrecy 
Undermines Democratic Legitimacy and Authority................................117
Power, Perception and Legitimacy ......................................................................122
Damage to Legitimacy.........................................................................................123
Undermining Authority........................................................................................128
Chapter 6 Further Costs of Official Secrecy ............................................................133
Secrecy and the Judiciary.....................................................................................145
Secrecy and Science.............................................................................................156
Secrecy and History. ............................................................................................159
Chapter 7 Bringing Official Secrecy Out of the Shadows........................................178
Chapter 8 Conclusion ...............................................................................................195
Chapter 1
Understanding Official Secrecy and Democracy
It may be democracy’s best-kept secret: Citizens must have access to information 
in order to govern themselves effectively. It may be democracy’s biggest 
unacknowledged failure. Even in the most democratic of societies, the state prevents 
citizens from gaining access to information they need to make the best decisions for 
themselves and their communities. In normal times, official secrecy lurks in the 
background, an unavoidable but equally undemocratic ingredient in statecraft. But in 
times of national crisis and transformation, official secrecy becomes a priority for policy 
makers. The current crisis provoked by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks is no exception. As 
occurred with the U.S. entry into World War I and the beginning of the Cold War, a new, 
unstable international situation sees policy makers turning to official secrecy as a way of 
enhancing national security. In practical terms, this means that secrecy policy is made at 
times when security concerns are paramount and seemingly esoteric questions of 
democratic theory are pushed even further into the background than usual. By the time 
the situation has stabilized, new, more restrictive policies tend to be in place, and secrecy 
policy is off the national agenda, at least until the next crisis. Without a new way of 
looking at secrecy that explicitly acknowledges its anti-democratic character, this pattern 
likely will repeat itself yet again.
As John F. Kennedy said, “The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining” 
(quoted in the Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 
Secrecy 1997, p. 67). Unfortunately, the pattern in American secrecy policy has been to 
wait until a storm, hurriedly put out buckets and makeshift patches and then forget about 
them until the next storm. The results for the United States have already been costly, even 
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disastrous (Moynihan 1998), and the mistakes of the past seem ripe for repetition now 
that the sun is no longer shining. It is not that policy-makers are overtly or consciously 
hostile to democracy or that their security concerns are illegitimate. But lacking a 
democratic-theoretical perspective on secrecy, it is likely that again measures meant to 
enhance national security will again subvert democracy, while only appearing to provide 
protection against future threats. This is no small matter. Citizens expect quite reasonably 
to be protected, but they also have an important role to play in participating in 
government, one that official secrecy forecloses. That debates on secrecy rarely hinge on 
this point is not surprising, given the ad hoc nature of policy-making in this area. 
Democratic theory is not blameless either, as it has provided precious little direction in 
this area. That must change if democratic theory is to continue to be relevant, and this 
dissertation aims to change the terms of the debate to carve out a much needed place for 
citizens in secrecy policy.
It is no exaggeration to say that information is born free, and everywhere it is in 
chains. While some uses of secrecy are necessary and legitimate, others can never be 
justified, except by the basest of reasons. The chains of official secrecy all subvert citizen 
autonomy. The effects of this subversion can be felt throughout the state and society. 
Consider, for example, a few examples from the American experience:
• The book Body of Secrets (Bamford 2001) revealed that following the failure of 
the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved “plans for what may be the 
most corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government” (p. 82). Operation Northwoods 
called for acts of terrorism, including hijacking planes, to be staged in Washington, D.C., 
Miami and elsewhere as a pretext for a war to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. 
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The plan was never put into operation, but it has had a lasting impact nonetheless. 
Conspiracy theorists today cite Operation Northwoods as evidence for the plausibility of 
their claim that the U.S. government staged the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon. While their accounts make for lousy fiction and even worse history, the 
existence of such abuses as Operation Northwoods offers conspiracy theorists 
ammunition and a veneer of credibility they would not otherwise have.
• In a case argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, Jennifer K. Harbury argued 
unsuccessfully for the right to sue Clinton administration officials who she says cost her 
husband his life and then denied her access to the courts when they falsely told her that 
his whereabouts were being investigated in 1993 and 1994. Her husband, Guatemalan 
rebel leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, was captured by the U.S.-allied Guatemalan 
military in 1992. A colonel involved in questioning Bamaca was also a paid CIA 
informant. Bamaca was reportedly tortured before dying in Guatemalan military custody. 
U.S. officials argue that they must have the option of lying in cases such as Bamaca’s 
because in some instances deception may be the only way of protecting national interests. 
In an amicus curiae brief, Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson wrote, “The perhaps 
unfortunate reality is that the issuance of incomplete information and even 
misinformation by government may sometimes be perceived as necessary to protect vital 
interests” (Lane 2002).
• Due to fears about its potential usefulness to terrorists, the Environmental 
Protection Agency has removed from its Web site information about chemicals used at 
15,000 industrial sites. While that information is still available at reading rooms, critics 
argue that limiting access to the data may prevent families from learning whether schools 
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or day-care centers are adjacent to sites where dangerous chemicals are used (Toner 
2001).
While democratic theory for the most part ignores it (Moynihan 1998, Converse 
1985), official secrecy creates serious problems for the practice of democracy. In creating 
a class of information to which citizens are forbidden access, official secrecy limits 
citizens’ ability to make decision best for their own private interests as well as for the 
common good. In subverting citizen autonomy, official secrecy violates one of the key 
presuppositions of participatory democratic theory. This subversion has wide-ranging 
effects, undermining democratic practice through negative impacts on the self, the state 
and society. As the same time, official secrecy is not merely an aberration or a problem 
that can simply be solved. It is an entrenched part of how states conduct themselves and 
appears to be as indispensable as it is dangerous, particularly in this new age of global 
terror. As such, it provides a challenge democratic theory must address. This dissertation 
takes on that challenge, explaining in a systematic manner the ways in which official 
secrecy damages democratic citizenship, and thus the state and society as well, paying 
particular attention to the experience of secrecy in the United States. In so doing, it offers 
a means by which democratic theory can take this phenomenon into account and defend 
the principle that what is political should be public.
Secrecy as security
Arguing for openness is no small task. Proponents of official secrecy in the 
United States have been particularly vocal in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist 
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attacks. At a press conference on Sept. 12, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld 
turned to the issue of secrecy immediately and at length after briefly addressing the 
estimated death toll at the Pentagon. A leaker, according to Rumsfeld, is “a person who’s 
willing to violate federal criminal statutes, and willing to frustrate our efforts to track 
down and deal with terrorists, and willing to reveal information that could cost the lives 
of men and women in uniform” (Rumsfeld 2001). Never mind that leaking is not 
necessarily a criminal activity1, or that Rumsfeld himself stated that leaks of classified 
information had not played any role in the attack. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, there 
are certainly reasons that a secretary of defense would worry about leaks — some 
disclosures could truly be harmful to national security. However, serious damage is rare, 
and despite previous anti-leak campaigns, such disclosures are a common part of the 
landscape. In fact, high officials such as Rumsfeld appear to be the sources of most leaks 
in Washington. As John F. Kennedy noted, “[T]he Ship of State is the only ship that leaks 
from the top,” (Moynihan 1998, p. 168). What is noteworthy here is that the secretary of 
defense sees official secrecy as having such value and being so fragile that he was willing 
to spend a significant amount of time on the issue, even as the fires at the Pentagon still 
smoldered.
Classified information has not been the only target for security efforts. Although 
there are reports that some libraries ignored the requests, federal repository libraries have 
1 While the distinction is not made in some countries that have official secrets acts, leaking is 
distinguished in American legal practice from espionage, which involves revelation of secret 
information with the intent of aiding a foreign adversary. Leaking, particularly when the official 
involved intends to serve the public interest with that revelation is essentially immune from 
criminal sanction. Outside of espionage cases, only two U.S. government employees have 
received criminal sanctions for leaks, both of whom profited from the sale of secret information. 
Samuel L. Morison was convicted after selling three satellite photos to Jane’s Defence Weekly in 
1984. He was pardoned in 2001 by President Clinton. Johnathan Rendel was sentenced to a year 
6
largely complied with a request by the U.S. Geological Survey to destroy CD-ROMs 
containing unclassified water-supply data, due to fears of how that information could be 
used by terrorists (Cha 2002). This is not the first time that the federal government has 
moved to restrict access to unclassified information (Adler 1985, Chalk 1986, Kalven 
1989). What is noteworthy this time, though, is the general cooperation of groups, such as 
research librarians, that are generally favorable toward the free dissemination of 
information, as well as the cooperation of private groups such as the Federation of 
American Scientists, which removed about 200 pages from its Web site (Gerstein 2001). 
More generally, the Bush administration has been especially secretive compared to its 
predecessors (Cha 2002, Nakamisha 2002), in particular issuing an executive order for 
the implementation of the Presidential Records Act that is openly hostile to the act’s 
intent.
Although officials frequently do abuse secrecy to hide incompetence, corruption 
or embarassing information, it is not without utility and indeed sometimes may be 
necessary to ensure the security that citizens value. And citizens are justified in valuing 
security. No one who was in New York or Washington on Sept. 11, 2001, could seriously 
argue that such atrocities are a cost that democracies must bear from time to time. 
Democracy surely requires a minimum level of security to function, and citizens are right 
to demand it if democracy is to live up to its promise of providing an arena in which they 
can make the best possible choices about their own lives. “Give me liberty or give me 
death” is a fine motto for a hero but an unfair demand to make of citizens. This 
dissertation does not aim to refute all the arguments for secrecy, for many of them are 
in prison for selling “restricted federal information.” Rendel was an intelligence officer at the Drug 
Enforcement Agency.
7
legitimate. Nor is its aim limited to showing that even perfect secrecy could never 
provide total security. Rather it is to show that official secrecy, even when fully justified, 
inevitably comes with serious costs, and that open access to officially held information is 
a necessary condition for democracy. Some compromises are inevitable, and democracy 
must co-exist with official secrecy, but that co-existence cannot and should not be a 
comfortable one. While the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, makes this argument more 
difficult, it also makes its success more important than ever for the continued vitality of 
democratic theory and practice.
Official secrecy presents a serious political problem only to the extent that 
democracy is valued as a good. The term “democracy” refers to a political system in 
which citizens govern themselves. Obviously, the states referred to today as democracies 
do not involve citizens in every instance of political decision making, and it might be 
argued that to do so would be a recipe for crippling inefficiency for the state and extreme 
annoyance for the citizens. However, whatever compromises are made in the name of 
representation and administrative efficiency, at the core of the democratic ideal lies the 
notion that the power of governing ultimately lies with those who are governed. In 
denying citizens the informational tools they need to participate effectively in the life of 
the state — even if those areas are small and clearly delineated, which is frequently not 
the case in practice — official secrecy subverts this ideal.
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What is secrecy?
Let us begin then with a definition. Official secrecy is taken here to mean the 
intentional concealment of state-held information by agencies or individuals acting under 
the purview of state authority. This borrows from Bok’s (1984) definition of secrecy 
more broadly as intentional concealment. Bok’s definition of secrecy “presupposes 
separation, a setting apart of the secret from the non-secret, and of keepers of a secret 
from those excluded. ... The separation between insider and outsider is inherent in 
secrecy; and to think something secret is already to envisage a conflict between what 
insiders conceal and what outsiders want to inspect or lay bare” (p. 6).
The complex nature of secrecy is obvious: As a private, individual capacity, it has 
the potential to be empowering and indeed is necessary for individual autonomy. At the 
same time, as a capacity exercised by others, it is disempowering. When those others are 
acting on behalf of the state, the “separation between insider and outsider” and the 
disempowerment of the outsider citizen is a matter of serious concern for democratic 
theory. The distinction between secrecy as used by individuals and as used by the state is 
a significant one, then, as many of the psychological arguments that justify individual 
secrecy do not apply to the state. The place of secrecy in individual psychology and its 
relationship to official secrecy is worth noting briefly here.
In addition to official secrecy, Bok’s definition encompasses many non-official 
forms of secrecy, including some that could be considered beneficial for democratic 
citizenship and self-development in general. The possibility of holding something back,
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of keeping secrets about oneself, is a necessary part of defining ego boundaries. 
According to Laing (1969):
We have our secrets and our needs to confess. We may remember how, in 
childhood, adults at first were able to look right through us, and into us, 
and what an accomplishment it was when we, in fear and trembling, could 
tell our first lie, and make, for ourselves, the discovery that we are 
irredeemably alone in certain respects, and know that within the territory 
of ourselves there can be only our footprints. There are some people, 
however, who never real-ize themselves in this position. This genuine 
privacy is the basis of genuine relationship; but the person whom we call 
“schizoid” feels both more exposed, more vulnerable to others than we do, 
and more isolated (p. 370).
At the individual level, the experience of being unable to keep secrets about oneself is 
pathological. The self requires secrecy to create a healthy private space. The same cannot 
be said of the state. Where the ability to keep secrets is absolute for the individual, for the 
state the need for secrecy varies, conditioned by the environment in which it operates.
At the interpersonal level the ability to keep secrets about oneself is a necessary 
part of individual autonomy. According to Bok (1984):
To be able to hold back some information about oneself or to channel it 
and thus influence how one is seen by others gives power; so does the 
capacity to penetrate similar defenses and strategies when used by others. 
True, power requires not only knowledge but the capacity to put 
knowledge to use; but without the knowledge, there is no chance to 
exercise power. To have no capacity for secrecy is to be out control over 
how others see one; it leaves one open to coercion. To have no insight into 
what others conceal is to lack power as well (p. 19).
The connection between secrecy and lying is no mere coincidence. Secrecy is a 
necessary part of lying. Without the possibility of concealing truth, lying would be 
pointless and ineffective. Whether institutional or individual, secrecy offers three possible 
methods of protecting concealed information: 1) Information can be concealed so 
effectively or fortuitously that no one ever thinks to inquire about it, 2) information can 
10
be concealed, and all inquiries can be rebuffed with a refusal to answer or 3) information 
can be concealed, and inquiries can be met with a lie. Historically, in U.S. foreign policy, 
the doctrine of “plausible deniability” has meant that should method 1 fail, officials have 
method 3 as a fall-back position. When the Soviet Union shot down Francis Gary 
Powers’ U-2 spy plane, President Eisenhower attempted to use method 3, only to learn 
that due to what the Soviets already knew, his denial was not plausible. However, as the 
Iran-Contra scandal and the Guatemala case demonstrate, the doctrine’s failures have not 
led to its abandonment. The U.S. government’s amicus brief in the recent Christopher v. 
Harbury case (Lane 2002) demonstrates a continued commitment to the idea that the 
government must be allowed to lie at times to citizens, a key principle underlying the 
doctrine of plausible deniability.
The use of secrecy to make lying possible is the most obviously anti-democratic 
of the three methods of concealment. Where intentional deception of citizens or subjects 
plays a significant, positive role in some strains of political thought — Plato’s “noble lie” 
comes to mind — any democratic theory that takes citizen autonomy seriously must 
evaluate official lying negatively. Even when actual lying is not involved, though, official 
secrecy has a strong anti-democratic strain. As will be shown, methods 1 and 2 also have 
negative consequences that must not be ignored.
While the available methods of concealment are identical for official and 
individual secrecy, the significance of that concealment is quite different. For the 
individual, the ability to keep secrets is a good. Likewise with the potential for telling 
lies, although the actualization of that principle can be ethically problematic. Total 
transparency for the individual is a disaster. It is the seeming impossibility of 
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concealment that makes the schizoid experience him- or herself as being exposed and 
vulnerable. The same cannot be said for official secrecy. The state cannot experience 
schizoid feelings or any others. Official secrecy can perform other functions —
protection of national security is a frequently cited one — but secrecy is not the absolute 
existential necessity for states that it is for individuals. Rather it is situational. Conditions 
of hostility, weakness, etc., might be seen as necessitating official secrecy, but those 
conditions predicate the need, and absent those conditions, the need ceases to exist. It is 
possible to at least imagine a set of conditions under which official secrecy is 
unnecessary. The same cannot be said for individual secrecy.
As with secrecy, the idea of concealment encompasses a broader scope than is of 
immediate concern here. Whereas intentional concealment, by definition, involves 
secrecy, there are other recognizable forms of concealment that are something other than 
secrecy. Information can be stored and indexed so poorly that it is for all intents and 
purpose inaccessible. It can be of such a technical nature that it is incomprehensible to the 
layperson, should he or she have occasion to encounter it. The sheer volume of 
information can be so overwhelming that citizens find themselves unable to comprehend 
all that is available to them. When practiced by the state, these forms of concealment 
certainly can create problems for democratic citizenship, but they are something other 
than official secrecy. There is a qualitative and significant difference between a situation 
in which citizens due to their own shortcomings are unable or unwilling to acquire state-
held information, and a situation in which the state intentionally conceals information. 
The latter, without exception and even when “necessary” or “justified,” undermines 
citizen autonomy, which is why it is the focus of this project.
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Secrecy in the United States
While the practice of official secrecy appears to be universal, the experience of 
the United States will be of particular interest here. Certainly, totalitarian or authoritarian 
states could provide more dramatic examples, but they would not be particularly relevant 
to a study of democracy. The United States, however, is generally recognized as a 
democratic state, and for that matter a very open one. Other industrial democracies have 
varying policies. Great Britain’s series of Official Secrets Acts have historically created a 
presumption of closedness, unless the state acts positively to make information public.2
At the other end of the spectrum, Sweden has the longest experience with openness, 
having established a statutory right to public access in 1766 (Relyea 1986). As a major 
power with global involvement and global security interests, the United States 
exemplifies a state that many would argue is situated to require secrecy for its continued 
security. At the same time, as an exemplar of democracy, the United States should elicit 
expectations of a high degree of openness.
At the federal level, the American information regime generally operates with a 
presumption of openness. The individual states also operate under a variety of openness 
or “government in the sunshine” statutes, with the most effective clearly stating openness 
as a goal and including a credible enforcement mechanism (Wickham 1973). The federal 
government’s 1946 Administrative Procedures Act and the original 1966 Freedom of 
Information Act were enacted with the goal of establishing greater openness, but it was 
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only the 1974 amendments to the act that effectively opened the door to public access to 
information held by the federal government (Feinberg 1986). While there is a general 
presumption of openness in the United States, there are exceptions, lots of exceptions, 
actually.
While the Freedom of Information Act remains “the most generous of information 
access policy pronouncements in the world” (Relyea 1986), officials can still 
intentionally conceal information covered by the nine fairly broad exemptions to the 
Freedom of Information Act. Of particular concern is the national security exemption, 
which essentially gives presidents and their agents license to withhold information as 
they see fit (Cheh 1984). Other constraints on openness in the American information 
environment include laws enacted in the 1980s limiting the dissemination of 
“unclassified nuclear information” and unclassified Defense Department data with 
potential military or space applications (Adler 1985), as well as more recent moves to 
limit access to unclassified information. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (updated in 
1954) also goes against the grain in creating the presumption that information related to 
nuclear weapons or energy is “born classified” at its discovery, forbidden to those 
without proper clearance unless a positive action is taken to remove it from the restricted 
classification (Green 1981, Hewlett 1981). Other democracies also employ classification 
systems as part of their information policies, whether access to state-held information is 
generally presumed to be open or closed.
The American combination of presumed openness and exceptional secrecy (with 
security concerns being the most common justification for the exceptions) and the 
2 The U.K. Freedom of Information Act, which comes into effect in 2005, can be expected to alter 
this presumption to some extent, although it should be noted that this law does not replace the 
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mythological role as the “city on the hill,” lighting the way for other democracies to 
follow, makes the United States an especially interesting case. In states presuming 
closedness, such as Great Britain under the Official Secrets Act, problems found 
associated with official secrecy could be attributed to its extent, rather than to the 
phenomenon itself. However, if official secrecy can be shown to have harmful effects 
even in a state in which there is a general presumption of openness, that finding should be 
widely applicable and valid in more closed states as well.
Citizens, competence and democracy
The way in which we understand secrecy depends on what we understand 
democracy to be. Theories of democracy range from those of Pareto, Mosca and 
Schumpeter (thin models, with minimal space for citizen participation) to those of the 
realist models of Dahl and Schattschneider to the strongly participatory models of 
Pateman and Barber. These models can be placed on a continuum ranging from elitist to 
quite dependent on citizen participation and input. Secrecy causes the most harm if you 
take a participation-oriented view, but even the elite models of democracy necessarily 
sustain harm from official secrecy, as is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.
As a condition of allowing the governed the power of governing, democracy must 
require that citizens hold at least a minimum level of competence. As Dahl (1989) notes, 
“Democracy — rule by the people — can be justified only on the assumption that 
ordinary people are, in general, qualified to govern themselves. For it seems self-evident 
that people ought not to govern themselves if they are not qualified to do so” (p. 97). 
1989 Official Secrets Act, but instead will exist alongside it.
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With regard to information, this means that a competent citizenry 1) is capable of using 
pertinent information in its making political decisions, 2) has access to the information 
necessary for making political decisions.
While Dahl leans toward a thinner version of citizenship than is favored here, at 
least two of his criteria for a democratic process — effective participation and 
enlightened understanding — cannot be met unless citizens are afforded access to the 
information they need for decision making. Effective participation requires that citizens 
“have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for 
expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another” (Dahl 1989, p. 109). 
Without access to information about the available options, citizens may be unaware of the 
possible outcomes of the decision-making process or of their full implications. 
Participation can thus be distorted or thwarted altogether. As for enlightened 
understanding — the principle holding, “Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal 
opportunities or discovering and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a 
decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s 
interests,” (Dahl 1989, p. 112) — absent sufficient information, it is impossible for 
citizens to determine with any degree of certainty what best serves their interests (or for 
that matter, the common good if that is the criterion).
The democratic citizen is expected to have relevant knowledge about the political 
world, including knowledge of the rules of the game. In Berleson’s (1954) words, the 
democratic citizen is “supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, what 
the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the 
consequences are” (p. 308). Unfortunately, that is exactly the kind of knowledge that has 
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been found to be lacking in citizens. Especially since World War II, the findings of 
empirical social science have forced a rethinking about how citizens make decisions, the 
amount of political knowledge they have and their capacity for acquiring that knowledge. 
Seen in the worst possible light, these findings make it appear that George Bernard Shaw 
(1965) was correct in claiming, “Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent 
many for appointment by the corrupt few” (p. 182). Much of the theoretical reaction to 
this empirical reality has been to discount the value of citizenship in favor of a variety of 
other devices meant to salvage whatever is left of democracy. It is an unfortunate but 
understandable reaction.
Understanding, much less enlightened understanding, seems unlikely for the two-
thirds of citizens who don’t even know the name of their representatives in Congress 
(O’Connor and Sabato 2000). But as Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) note, “As we read 
the existing research regarding citizenship in America, we find consistent support for the 
idea that given the appropriate information, citizens are capable of making rational 
political choices” (p. xii).
Still, the traditional ideal of fully informed and involved citizens making sound 
decisions about their government on the basis of their knowledge has taken a beating 
since the panel study of voters by Lazarsfeld, et al. (1948), in Erie County, Ohio. In 
pointing out the rationality of not seeking out information, Downs (1957) offers a 
theoretical basis for understanding why citizens would not fit the traditional ideal 
(although as Delli Carpini and Keeter point out, the notion that it is irrational to be 
informed becomes harder to swallow when faced with evidence that that most privileged 
and powerful Americans also tend to be the ones with the greatest levels of knowledge). 
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At any rate, early reports indicated that most Americans might not have sophisticated 
enough cognitive frameworks in which to fit any information they receive. In looking at 
open-ended explanations of how Americans evaluate candidates and parties, Campbell, et 
al. (1964), find just 3.5 percent with sufficient sophisticated explanations to be classified 
as “ideologues” and another 12 percent as “near ideologues.” It seems that voting 
decisions, which offer American citizens the most direct and routine methods of holding 
government accountable, typically stem more from psychological attachments to labels 
and images than from critical, reasoned evaluation. Converse (1964), too, finds a low 
level of sophisticated, well-integrated systems of political thought among members of the 
mass public.
Studies of voter sophistication (Nie, et al 1976; Nie and Anderson 1974) and 
analyses of how that concept is measured  (Smith 1990; Smith 1980; Sullivan, et al. 
1978; Lane 1962) have led to a re-evaluation of what is known about citizens’ belief 
systems since the dark picture painted by Conover (1964). To be sure, citizens in the 
United States tend not to be as knowledgeable or sophisticated as might be considered 
ideal, and they have not been especially well-served by their sources of political 
information (Ansolabehere, et al. 1993, 1994; Postman 1985). In short, while it is true 
that citizens have a tendency to be distracted by bright images and shiny objects on 
television, rather than being sophisticated users of complete, accurate political 
information, the argument here is not that their capabilities and characteristics are ideal. 
Instead, the argument is that their capabilities are good enough (and potentially 
improvable) for citizens to stake a reasonable claim to autonomy, a core value of 
democracy.
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As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) note, “Debates over the importance of an 
informed citizenry are rooted in the collision of theory and practice. In theory, a 
democracy requires knowledgeable citizens to avoid becoming Madison’s ‘tragedy’ or 
‘farce.’ In practice, it appears that a majority of people lack even the most basic political 
information.” (p. 22) This clash led from the beginning to skepticism about democracy, 
and democratic theorists have typically responded in one of three ways: 1) falling back on 
an elite-based theory of democracy that involves citizens in only the most superficial, 
tangential ways, 2) explaining away the need for knowledgeable citizens by turning to the 
utility and power of heuristics and 3) turning collective rationality to mitigate the impact 
of individual ignorance and irrationality, explaining that “the whole of citizen awareness 
is greater than the sum of its parts” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
Proponents of elite democracy range from those who are merely resigned to the 
fact that most citizens are incapable of participating fully in public life to those who 
celebrate that idea, seeing limited participation as offering stability and security against 
totalitarian impulses they see entailed by mass involvement in politics. The latter strain of 
elite theory holds that the masses are not merely incompetent but hostile to liberty. 
According to Pateman (1970):
Michels with his famous “iron law of oligarchy” ... appeared to show that 
we were faced with a choice; either organisation, which in the twentieth 
century seemed indispensable, or democracy, but not both. Thus although 
democracy as the rule of the people by means of the maximum 
participation of all the people might still be an ideal, grave doubts, doubts 
put forward in the name of social science, appeared to have been cast upon 
the possibility of realising this ideal. ...
The collapse of the Weimar Republic, with its high rates of mass 
participation, into fascism, and the post-war establishment of totalitarian 
regimes based on mass participation, albeit participation backed by 
intimidation and coercion, underlay the tendency for “participation” to be 
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linked to the concept of totalitarianism rather than that of democracy (p. 
2).
With this suspicion of participation, it is no wonder that efforts have been made to 
construct a theory of democracy that does not hold out mass participation as a democratic 
virtue. While it is held here, in agreement with Barber (1984), that mass participation in a 
strong democratic context is the best defense against tyranny, it is not surprising that the 
experiences of revolutionary France and Weimar Germany color elite democracy’s view 
of participation. This fear finds clear voice in Sartori (1973), who, motivated by a fear 
that mass participation even in established democracies can lead to totalitarianism, 
extends Dahl’s theory of polyarchy to argue that democracy involves rule by competing 
elites.
Schumpeter (1943) provides the cornerstone for the theory of elite democracy, 
defining democracy as a system based not on participation but on competition for 
leadership. Neither Schumpeter (1943) nor Lippmann (1965), who exemplify this 
orientation, trusts the citizens’ judgments about their interests, but each believes leaders 
must determine those interests for them. Further, the elitists see the situation for the 
people as permanent and efforts to change it as futile. “How could a mass democracy 
work if all the people were deeply involved in politics?” asked Berelson et al. (1954, p. 
318) in their effort to deal with the apparent paradox of a system in which individually 
citizens do fail to live up to the democratic ideal, while the system composed of those 
individuals remains democratic.
Schattschneider (1960) offers a version of elite democracy that is more 
sympathetic to citizens. While he defines democracy as “a form of collaboration of 
ignorant people and experts,” he adds the caveat:
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There is no escape from the problem of ignorance, because nobody knows 
enough to run the government. Presidents, senators, governors, judges, 
professors, doctors of philosophy, editors and the like are only a little less 
ignorant than the rest of us. Even an expert is a person who chooses to be 
ignorant about many things so that he may know all about one. (pp. 136-
137)
To be sure, experts have a role to play in democracy, but as Schattschneider warns, they 
are not a substitute for the participation of citizens. The admitted shortcomings of citizens 
do not justify a call for a regime of philosopher-king experts to replace institutions of 
self-rule because 1) no such regime is possible and 2) even if it were possible, such a 
regime would not be desirable.
In attempting to construct an empirical description of democracy based on actual 
practice, the proponents of what Pateman (1970) calls the contemporary theory of 
democracy in fact implicitly offer a normative prescription in the form of a tautology: 
What is currently practiced under the name democracy is what democracy should look 
like because current practice is democratic. This prescription’s chief concerns are 
stability and national institutional arrangements rather than participation. Dahl’s (1966) 
protestations aside, contemporary, or elitist, theory “does not merely describe the 
operation of certain political systems, but implies that this is the kind of system we 
should value and includes a set of standards of criteria by which a system may be judged 
‘democratic’” (Pateman 1970, p.15).
The second response to citizens’ lack of political intelligence or sophistication has 
been to turn to heuristics or “low-information rationality” (Popkin 1991) as a way to 
salvage democratic theory in the face of actual practice. This approach has its intellectual 
roots in Downs’ (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, which explained the 
rationality of citizens making decisions with little information due to information costs 
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and low expected utility. (It also opened the Pandora’s box of the rational voter paradox.) 
Sniderman et al. (1991) offer the heuristic model in this manner:
Citizens frequently can compensate for their limited information about
politics by taking advantage of judgmental heuristics. Heuristics are 
judgmental shortcuts, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively 
little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to 
complex problems of choice. ... Insofar as they can be brought into play, 
people can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices 
without necessarily possessing a large body of knowledge about politics 
(p. 19).
Also consistent with this general school of thought is research suggesting that citizens 
make political decisions at the moment they receive information without retaining the 
decisive pieces of knowledge in long-term memory (Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 1989). 
The heuristic approach leaves a place for citizens in democracy, but in application that 
place tends to be shrunken compared to the traditional ideal of citizenship.
The third approach substitutes collective rationality for individual ignorance and 
irrationality. As explained by Page and Shapiro (1992), while individual-level ignorance 
and irrationality are not to be discounted, individuals’ deviations from positions 
supporting their rationally determined interests are randomly distributed, meaning that 
the noise of irrational opinions and attitudes essentially cancels itself out. This leaves 
rationally determined positions to be expressed without interference. Random distribution 
is key here. If the rational voices left after ignorance cancels out ignorance are truly to 
speak for all, they must be reasonably representative of all (Miller 1996). Using 
Americans’ political knowledge as a measure, it is clear that this condition does not hold. 
Among the most informed citizens, women, blacks, the poor and the young — in other 
words the underprivileged — are underrepresented, in large part due to structural reasons 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
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The position taken here is that despite the disturbing revelations about Americans’ 
political competence since World War II, democracy’s best and only hope is found in the 
active, meaningful participation of citizens. As Delli Carpini and Keeter explain: “The 
paradox of modern democracy cannot be resolved by eliminating the need for a broadly 
and equitably informed citizenry. In the end, the paradox itself is illusory — to the extent 
that citizens are uninformed, the system is less democratic” (1996, p. 49, italics in 
original).
Theorists of participatory democracy hold that political involvement does more 
than protect citizens’ private interests, which is certainly not unimportant, but it also has 
an educative function. The protective function can be performed by elites or others 
representing the dormant masses, but for the educative function, nothing can substitute 
for participation. Quite simply, the argument is that participation improves life for both 
the citizen and society in a way that nothing else can. For participatory democrats, 
citizens are at least as important as institutions.
This position has its modern roots in the works of Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. 
For Rousseau (1978), participation’s chief function is education, developing other-
regarding citizens who, through their deliberations must take into account more than 
simply their own private interests. This deliberation process forces the individual to 
distinguish between his or her own impulses and other concerns. Participatory institutions 
for Rousseau guarantee freedom in a way counter to the way that non-participatory ones 
threaten it or put citizens “in chains.” A second function of participation is it makes 
collective decisions more acceptable to the individual. Third, it creates a sense of 
belonging in the community.
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Mill (1912) reinforces Rousseau’s ideas of participation and moves them into the 
modern nation-state system. Mill adds that in a large nation-state, it is local participation 
that prepares people to be democratic citizens, that suffrage for occasional elections is not 
sufficient. Rather, participation even — or especially — in lower levels of the political 
system has an educative effect, creating attitudes and qualities within the self necessary 
for the maintenance of the democratic system.
Also in this tradition is Barber’s (1984) idea of “strong democracy,” which 
depends on “a self-governing community if citizens who are united less by homogenous 
interests than by civic education and who are capable of common purpose and mutual 
action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than altruism 
or their good nature” (p. 117). Likewise, Pateman (1970) and Thompson (1970) put 
participation and both its instrumental and non-instrumental benefits at the core of 
democratic theory. It is believed here that other efforts to deal with the realities of 
citizens’ political knowledge and abilities, described above, give up too much, destroying 
democracy in order to save it. As Thompson says: 
If citizens are so incorrigibly incompetent that their role must be limited, 
what reason (as distinct from cause) can be given for members of an elite 
to pay any attention to the results of elections? If the electoral verdict and 
other expressions of citizens’ desires are not rational, a system which 
forces elites to heed such expressions is profoundly irrational. To justify 
injecting a dose of elitism into their democratic theory, these theorists 
paint such a pessimistic picture of citizens that any reason for retaining a 
strain of democracy disappears. When autonomy is not to some extent 
presupposed, participation seems pointless. (p. 25)
In a very real sense, despite the shortcomings of citizens and their institutions, 
participation, at least in some venues is as much a description of the American system as 
it is a desire of democratic theorists. According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996):
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Such changes as the expansion of the franchise, the direct election of 
senators, and the growing role of public opinion and the mass media have 
increased the public’s role in the selection of leaders and expanded the 
ways citizens can participate more directly. This extension of democratic 
input has increased the importance of an informed citizenry. This is true 
even if one focuses exclusively on the thin aspects of American 
citizenship, but it is especially true if one considers the full range of 
participation available to citizens (p. 41).
Given those empirical realities, either a descriptive or normative theory of democracy 
that attempts to displace citizens seems deficient, even if the quality of participation is 
dissatisfactory to both elitist and participatory democrats. [Fettweis asks what about 
secrets not related to basic interests (or available choices) of people? If we know more 
would we choose differently? Two possible related answers: 1) A slippery slope 
response. 2) Difficulty in determining the line between related and unrelated; and in a 
democracy, citizens should really be the ones making that determination
The anti-democratic character of official secrecy is virtually self-evident for 
participatory democracy. It is a fundamental contradiction to set up a system in which on 
the one hand citizens are supposed to govern themselves and on the other they are denied 
the information they need for self-government. Habermas (1984) makes the argument 
that one way of determining the extent of democracy is measuring the extent to which 
citizens are able to enter into public discourse from relatively equal positions with regard 
to information. In creating classes of information haves and have-nots, official secrecy 
makes a “ideal speech situation” impossible.
It can be argued that official secrecy is inconsequential for democratic theory 
because the information to which citizens are denied access is insignificant politically, 
and, as anyone who has ever dealt with large volumes of declassified material can attest, 
this argument is not totally without merit. But in practice, important information is kept 
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secret, and indeed, secrets can and are kept to gain political advantage. More importantly, 
even if decisions about secrecy are made without regard to domestic political advantage, 
the process still has an undemocratic tinge, as citizens are not able to participate in 
deciding what is and is not kept from them.
This argument is made from the perspective of participatory democratic theory, 
but it is not necessary to be a participatory theorist to see the costs of official secrecy. 
Even those strains of democratic theory calling for thinner forms of citizenship still 
implicitly require that citizens have access to information. Even if citizens’ role is limited 
to choosing one or the other of a set of competing elites, they must make their choice on 
the basis of some kind of information. As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) say, “the 
heuristic model is based on low information rationality, not no information rationality” 
(p. 52, italics in original). Likewise, the models that hold that citizens are collectively, if 
not, individually rational, requires that at least some citizens have a sound basis of 
information for their decisions, even if the vast majority’s expressed preferences are little 
more than random noise.
To be sure, the elitist, heuristic and collective rationality models do not require as 
much information as might be envisioned for the participatory model, but that does not 
make official secrecy any less corrosive. Whether citizens fail to seek out the information 
they need to act wisely or it is kept from them, as can be the case with official secrecy, 
they are vulnerable to being manipulated by those who would, in Hamilton’s words in 
Federalist 71, “flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.” Delli Carpini and Keeter 
(1996) find evidence “indicating that citizens came to the wrong conclusions based on 
information – often provided by the government and the media – that was misleading” (p. 
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99). And there are consequences to a misinformed public. In a study conducted during the 
Persian Gulf War, Jhally et al. (1991) found that Americans’ knowledge of the Gulf 
region’s history and politics was skewed in such a way as to favor the Bush 
administration’s decision to go to war. The most accurately informed citizens were also 
least likely to support the war. Had the public been better informed, it seems likely that 
levels of support for the war would have been quite different.
When official secrecy comes into play, the danger of manipulation is multiplied. 
In fact one of the cardinal virtues claimed by secrecy proponents is the potential for 
getting adversaries to act on dangerously incomplete or incorrect information. However, 
the potential for the state to turn secrecy’s manipulative power against its own citizens 
cannot be denied, and at times secrecy has been used in exactly this way. There seems to 
be no method certain to eliminate the possibility of this kind of abuse. When this abuse 
occurs, it thwarts citizens’ democratic will, and even the potential combined with 
knowledge of past abuses creates suspicion – even paranoia – in the minds of citizens, 
undermining their efficacy and the state’s legitimacy.
Even used with the most sincere of intentions and earnest of justifications, official 
secrecy is irrevocably hostile to democratic values. It denies citizen autonomy, and 
because of that denial, has negative effects on not just the self, but also the state and 
society. Therefore, it is held here that any complete theory of democracy must include the 
ideal that when it comes to state-held information, whatever is political should also be 
public. There is no shortage of ad hoc and even systematic justifications for official 
secrecy, nor is there a shortage of hue and cry about specific secrecy measures. What is 
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needed is an understanding in democratic theory of the centrality of openness in 
democracy and citizenship, and the costs imposed even by justifiable secrecy.
A realistic view recognizes that there will be exceptions to the principle of 
openness but is not resigned to or comfortable with those exceptions. Effective 
democratic citizens are competent, autonomous decision makers who are capable of 
participating in public life and whose participation betters not only their society but also 
their selves. In Millian terms, the autonomy of democratic citizens is necessary for 
human beings to be fully actualized (Mill 1969). Official secrecy denies the competence 
that democracy presupposes and undermines the autonomy that makes it possible.
Given that citizens are competent to govern themselves, it follows that they must 
be able to gather the information necessary for self-government. If citizens are competent 
to govern: “Implicit in this postulate are two bases for a right to gather information from 
a state: first, to govern themselves, citizens have a right to all information necessary to 
participate fully in decisionmaking, and second, only the citizens themselves can 
determine the limits of their search for information.” (“The First Amendment Right to 
Gather State-Held Information” 1980) This may not be a right that is in fact found in 
statute, but it is more importantly a necessary condition for democracy.
Democratic theory has concentrated on the ability of citizens to create and 
manipulate privately held information because historically the information needed for 
self-government has been in private hands but vulnerable to official controls on 
information. The cluster of rights that falls under the heading free expression could be 
expected to ensure adequate access to information. This is no longer the case. To be sure, 
governments have always had secrets, but not on the current scale. It is only after World 
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War I that states became the vast producers and repositories of information recognizable 
today. The role of state-held information was not recognized because it simply was not 
that significant. Democratic theory can no longer afford to discount the impact of official 
secrecy on citizenship, accountability and legitimacy.
Official secrecy limits the ability of citizens to act qua citizens — that is to 
participate — at all phases of the political process, from agenda setting to decision 
making to implementation and evaluation. This limitation is a fundamental denial of 
citizen autonomy, and thus even undertaken with the purest of motives, official secrecy is 
prima facie undemocratic. This is a cost that cannot be compensated for, even with 
experts or representatives standing in for citizens. Further, it creates fertile ground for 
suspicious, even paranoid thinking, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. The effects ripple 
outward to the state and society at large. For the state, official secrecy decreases 
legitimacy, via two related routes: the diminution in possibilities for accountability 
caused by secrecy and the increase in distrust, which is reinforced when abuses are 
revealed. On a societal level, necessary information flows are hindered, especially as the 
state increasingly becomes a creator and repository of more information than ever before.
The information environment has changed radically since the 19th century, and 
democratic theory can no longer afford to ignore the importance of state-held information 
and the pernicious effects of official secrecy. It can no longer be taken for granted that by 
guaranteeing free speech and a free press that citizens’ need for information can be 
satisfied. Much larger amounts of information are held by the state than historically has 
been the case. Paradoxically, while this truly is an information age, it is also an age in 
which conditions of scarcity prevail, due to the phenomenon of official secrecy. There is 
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a great deal of information in official hands that can be found nowhere else, and access to 
it is limited. Those who control access to information wield a great deal of power, and it 
must be recognized that this power has the potential to distort, if not stifle, democratic 
outcomes. Even under the most felicitous of conditions, official secrecy subverts 
democratic citizenship. When abused — and the nature of secrecy encourages abuse —
official secrecy’s impact can be even greater. As part of a greater understanding of the 
role information must play in self-government, democratic theory must take into account 
the destructive effect official secrecy has on the democratic project. In the following 
chapters, the destructive effects of official secrecy – and its possibilities for coexistence 
with democracy – are explored in detail.
The benefits of official secrecy, which are quite real and important are the focus 
of Chapter 2, which examines the justifications used by secrecy’s proponents and shows 
that they without exception involve something other than democratic values. Official 
secrecy may be a necessary evil for the survival of a modern state, but its necessity does
not obviate its evil for democratic theory and practice. The nature of that evil, and its 
impact on democracy is the next focus here.
Because democracy is, at its core, about citizens, the impact of official secrecy on 
the citizen is examined first. Chapter 3 begins the discussion of official secrecy’s 
negative impact on the self, showing how it diminishes citizens’ autonomy and makes 
them less able to hold the state accountable for its actions. This discussion continues in 
Chapter 4, which focuses particularly on the distrust and paranoia engendered in 
individuals by official secrecy. Then moving from the individual to the state, the effects 
of official secrecy ripple outward, so Chapter 5 explores how official secrecy, by 
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undermining the citizen, also subverts the legitimacy and authority of the state through 
this diminished accountability and increased distrust. Not only the state, but society as a 
whole feels the impact, so Chapter 6 examines what official secrecy means for society, 
both in terms of limits on necessary information flows and the poisonous atmosphere 
created by distrust. Particular concerns in Chapter 6 include cases in which military 
secrecy is self-defeating, secrecy in the courts and the impact of official secrecy on 
science and history.
Although the impact of official secrecy has been neglected by democratic theory, 
there has historically been a recognition of the need for free-flowing information. The 
literature defending freedom of expression as a democratic value recognizes this need, 
although with a general presumption that the information required by citizens is privately 
held. Chapter 7 explores why official secrecy has been allowed to flourish essentially 
without comment and ties the need for openness to the justifications for free expression. 
Chapter 8 concludes the argument suggests policy implications of this research, as well as 




“Knowledge is power.” — Francis Bacon
“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” — Mao Tse-tung
Anyone who has ever played poker understands the utility of secrecy. And anyone 
who has ever played seated in front of a mirror understands how devastating disclosure 
can be. Assuming an honest game, the only influence a player has over the outcome is in 
manipulating the information other players have about the cards in his hand. Through 
judicious wagering, discards and even facial expressions, the player sends messages to 
the other players — and receives them in a like manner. Frequently, the messages are 
misleading, which is why a good bluffer — a player who is able to convincingly convey 
false information about the value of his hand — can win the pot with an inferior hand. 
Conversely, a player who inadvertently communicates accurate information about his 
hand, perhaps through a “tell,” may find himself winning smaller pots with good hands 
and getting his bluff called on weak ones. The most successful poker players 
communicate to their opponents a strategic mixture of truth, falsehood and noise in such 
a way that their opponents are unable to decipher what is true and what is not, at least 
until the cards are on the table. But without secrecy shrouding the actual cards players 
hold, the complicated interplay of truth and falsehood is moot, and poker is nothing more 
than a game of blind luck. With secrecy, poker is still a game of luck, but it is also one of 
Machiavellian intrigue, in which manipluating appearances can mean the difference 
between victory and defeat.
Poker is an extreme example in that the only power available to players is what 
comes from manipulating information. The political world is much more complicated. 
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Power comes in the guises of custom, money, status, legitimate authority and myriad 
other forms, including ultimately the potential application of lethal force. Knowledge and 
power are not synonyms; power does not come solely from the barrel of a gun. Rather, 
power is fluid, dynamic and situational, ranging along a spectrum of coercion from 
persuasion to authority to violence. Different forms trump at different times. Secrecy is 
not the whole story, but it is a significant piece of it.
Practitioners certainly know this. It was military force that won the Allies a 
beachhead on continental Europe on D-Day, but it was secrecy that made it possible for 
that force to be triumphant. Had German commanders been prepared to expect the 
invasion in Normandy, they could have marshaled sufficient forces to repel it. But 
secrecy in planning and a campaign of deception indicating an impending invasion in Pas 
de Calais offered Allied forces an advantage in military force (Brown 1975, Friedman 
2001). The Sept. 11 hijackers used brute force and box cutters to take over four airliners 
and radically alter the world view of the West, but had their intentions not been secret, 
they would never have made it past airport security. In turn, the Bush administration has 
reacted to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by moving to restrict 
access to information that could potentially aid future attackers.
Even information available in the open literature arouses security concerns in the 
current environment. In a Washington Post op-ed piece, Dennis Pluchinsky (2002), a 
senior intelligence analyst for the Diplomatic Security Service, makes the provocative 
claim that the American news media are guilty of treason for running stories pointing out 
potential vulnerabilities to future attacks. Post-Sept. 11 news stories have highlighted 
security weaknesses of air charters, nuclear power plants and chemical plants, among 
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other things. “No terrorist group that I am aware of has the time and manpower to 
conduct this type of extensive research on a multitude of potential targets,” Pluchinsky 
writes. Why make their work easier, he asks, especially given that there is a history of 
terrorist groups using open-source information and news stories in selecting targets and 
refining their techniques. For instance, in 1984 the Belgian group Communist Combatant 
Cells sabotaged NATO pipelines, later disclosing that it had picked its targets by using 
the telephone book to find the location of every pumping station in the country. The 
statute creating the new Department of Homeland Security “exempts from disclosure any 
information about infrastructure security vulnerabilities that a private company provides 
to the government” (Guzy 2002) precisely because of concerns about the potential utility 
of that information to terrorists. The concern is real, even if the policy response is 
disproportionate.
According to Pluchinsky, if journalists uncover vulnerabilities, they should not 
publish them, but report them to the government for appropriate action. “I say the 
following with a heavy heart, but if there were an ‘Osama bin Laden’ award given out by 
al Qaeda, I believe it would be awarded to the U.S. news media for their investigative 
reporting. This type of reporting — carrying specifics about U.S. vulnerabilities — must 
be stopped or censored.” Even though the information is publicly available, putting it 
together in a news story reduces opportunity costs for potential adversaries. Furthermore, 
“if you put all the unclassified information together, sometimes it adds up to something 
that ought to be classified,” Pluchinsky quotes Richard Clarke, who was then head of the 
White House Office of Cyberdefenses, as saying. This argument about the potential 
danger posed by even unclassified information is merely the latest incarnation of the 
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“mosaic theory,” which holds that much unclassified but sensitive information is 
dangerous not for its own sake but because of its place in a larger puzzle (Raloff 1988). It 
was the mosaic theory that led to the Reagan administration’s controversial initiative to 
pressure commercial database firms to limit access for foreign subscribers, even for 
databases compiled solely from open sources.
Pluchinsky’s broadside against the press is mentioned here not because it is 
justified — it decidedly is not — but because it illustrates some very real benefits of 
secrecy and dangers of disclosure. In the Soviet Union, it used to be impossible to obtain 
an accurate street map of Moscow (Baclawski 1997). A disoriented invading army would 
have been at a disadvantage, but surely the potential advantage afforded there came 
nowhere close to the costs it imposed on Moscow residents. Likewise, had the Sept. 11 
hijackers been unable to find their way to their airports, unprecedented atrocities could 
have been prevented. But it would be absurd to blame Rand-McNally or Mapquest for the 
attacks. Just as it would be a mistake to ignore the benefits of secrecy here, it is a mistake 
for proponents of secrecy to ignore the benefits of a free flow of information and the 
costs of stemming that flow.
The remaining chapters of this dissertation focus on the costs of official secrecy 
and its conflict with the values of democracy. Indeed, as a general rule, the benefits of 
official secrecy have nothing to do with democracy. But in terms of unalloyed power, 
secrecy has its benefits — if it did not, it would be unnecessary to point out its costs here. 
As it stands, the benefits are recognized and sought by many within government, all too 
often without reflection. The pattern with secrecy seems to be to practice it first and 
provide post-hoc justification later.
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Secrecy acts not as an ideology or a philosophy but as a tool for exercising power, 
a characteristic that cuts across levels of analysis. For the individual, secrecy maintains a 
barrier around things to be kept private, a function necessary for ontological security 
(Laing 1969). Likewise, even as it protects the individual private space from invasion by 
the public sphere, secrecy also can be seen as forming a barrier to keep private things out 
of the public space. Gurstein (1995) laments the collapse of norms that once favored 
reticence over exposure, concluding that others’ immodesty leads to a loss of privacy for 
the self and a loss of the ability to common ability to make decisions about the character 
of the public. One does not have to accept that others’ immodesty curtails one’s own 
privacy to see that secrecy (in this case, a perceived obligation to keep secrets about 
oneself) lay behind the power of Gurstein’s “party of reticience” to control the character 
of the public space — and its loss enabled the “party of exposure” to triumph 
subsequently.
As an instrument rather than a philosophy, secrecy is not backed by a single, 
coherent justification — although defenders of official secrecy do tend to make their 
arguments in the language of state interests. Rather, secrecy finds its justification in a 
family of arguments. Indeed, secrecy has a different meaning depending on its location: 
For the individual, the capacity for secrecy is absolutely necessary for autonomy and 
ontological security. For the state, secrecy can contribute in such venues as security and 
efficiency. Individuals acting under the aegis of the state can also see their personal 
interests advanced by official secrecy.
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Individual vs. Official Secrecy
The capacity for keeping secrets is most clearly beneficial for individuals. It is 
possible to imagine a world in which it would be unnecessary for nation-states to keep 
secrets. Such a world might be a utopian fantasy, but it is at least can be imagined 
without doing violence to the idea of the nation-state. The same cannot be said for 
individuals. It would require a fundamental change in human character for healthy 
individuals not to require the ability to decide whether to disclose or conceal at least a 
core of personal information. For the individual, secrecy offers protection of the self in 
the form of reinforcing identity and autonomy:
Control over secrecy provides a safety valve for individuals in the 
midst of communal life — some influence over transactions between the 
world of personal experience and the world shared with others. With no 
control over such exchanges, human beings would be unable to exercise 
choice about their lives. To restrain some secrets and allow others freer 
play; to keep some hidden and to let others be known; to give and receive 
confidences and to guess at far more: these efforts at control permeate all 
human contact.
Those who lose all control over these relations cannot flourish in 
either the personal or the shared world, not retain their sanity. If 
experience in the shared world becomes too overwhelming, the sense of 
identity suffers. Psychosis has been described as the breaking down of the 
delineation between the self and the outside world: the person going mad 
“flows out onto the world as through a broken dam.” Conversely, 
experience limited to the inside world stunts the individual: at best it leads 
to the aching self-exploration evoked by Nietzche: “I am solitude become 
man. — That no word ever reached me forced me to reach myself” (Bok 
1984, p. 20).
In short, secrecy makes possible the selective disclosure or nondisclosure of personal 
information, a capacity that touches virtually every aspect of human interaction. The 
intentional disclosure of intensely personal information can signify trust and create 
intimacy — thus it is a crucial element in romantic relationships. On the other hand, the 
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intentional nondisclosure of information can be quite beneficial, as in the case of 
bargaining for a used car, in which revealing the maximum price you are willing to pay 
can severely weaken your negotiating position. In either case, though, the information 
that is disclosed or not disclosed begins as a personal secret, and it is the capacity for 
keeping secrets that makes it possible to make a decision about what to reveal. Losing 
that capacity is devastating. For Laing (1969) a sense being transparent — of being 
unable to keep maintain any secrets at all — is characteristic of schizophrenia. But even a 
small breach rather than a total breakdown of the ability to keep personal secrets is 
sufficient to cause suffering, degradation or a loss of dignity, even if an intact sense of 
self is maintained.
Collectively held secrets are powerful, too, and there can be a danger in becoming 
privy to them, particularly when knowledge of some action confers complicity. The 
danger is implicit in the sentiment, “Don’t tell me. I don’t want to know.” During the 
Iran-Contra affair, Adm. John M. Poindexter claims to have attempted to insulate himself 
from knowledge that might have technically compelled him to act against an illegal 
diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan rebels. Asked if he knew of Marine Lt. Col. Oliver 
North’s role in the diversion, Poindexter responded that he intentionally did not seek 
details:
I had a feeling something bad was going on, but I didn’t investigate it and 
I didn’t do a thing about it. ... I really didn’t want to know. I was so 
damned mad at Tip O’Neill for the way he was dragging the Contras 
around, I didn’t want to know what, if anything, was going on. I should 
have, but I didn’t (Tower Commission Report 1987, p. 54).
Poindexter also claims to have attempted to protect President Reagan from the 
same kind of information:
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Now, the reason that -- frankly, as Col. North has testified, I thought it was 
a neat idea, too, and I'm sure the President would have enjoyed knowing 
about it. But, on the other hand, because it would be controversial -- and I 
must say that I don't believe that I estimated how controversial it would be 
accurately -- but I knew very well that it would be controversial, and I 
wanted the President to have some deniability so that he would be 
protected, and at the same time we would be able to carry out his policy 
and provide the opposition to the Sandinista government.
Poindexter recognized that if Reagan were aware of the illegal diversion of funds to the 
Contras, he would be complicit in breaking the law. (Whether Reagan truly was unaware 
of the operation is another question entirely and will not be settled here.)
In addition to the dangers, there are also identifiable benefits of collectively held 
secrets for those “in the know.” Secret societies can offer acceptance, growth, self-change 
and self-transcendence (Bok 1984). They can be politically significant, as well. Koselleck 
(1988) credits the secrecy of Masonic lodges in Europe with creating new spaces for 
discussion as alternatives to the political spaces shut off by the absolutist state. These 
alternative spaces were key to challenging the legitimacy of constituted absolute 
authority. Dean (2001) explains how secrecy empowered lodge members.
The lodges were ritualized enactments of nonfamilial, nonmarket relations 
outside of the state. They provided forms of association and experiences of 
connection beyond those delimited by absolutism. On the one hand, this 
freedom was established by new bonds of belief created by shared 
initiation into Freemasonry’s arcana — the organization’s ritual and 
hierarchy demanded that some believe in others arcane knowledge. On the 
other hand, the mysteries of Freemasonry imbued it with the aura of the 
unknown. This aura competed with the aura of the crown, countering the 
representational power of the sovereign with its own mysterious authority. 
Members were thus bound together through the secret as well as through 
their exceptional position in relation to the absolutist state (p. 633).
Ironically, the alternative loci of loyalty and authority that Dean lists as virtues of 
the secret societies in resisting the absolutist state are the very things that were cited as 
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vices by the 19th century anti-Masonic movement, which professed to be defending the 
nascent democracy in the United States.
As a secret society, Masonry was considered to be a standing 
conspiracy against republican government. It was held to be particularly 
liable to treason — for example, Aaron Burr’s famous conspiracy was 
alleged to have been conducted by Masons. Masonry was also accused of 
constituting a separate system of loyalty, a separate imperium within the 
framework of American and state governments, inconsistent with loyalty 
to them. Quite plausibly it was argued that the Masons had set up a 
jurisdiction of their own, with their own obligations and punbishments, 
liable to enforcement even by the penalty of death (Hofstadter 1979, p. 
16).
The anti-Masonic movement, which Hofstadter cites as a historical exemplar of 
the paranoid style, was hardly a bastion of reasonable thinking or democratic values, but 
criticism of secret societies also comes from more reasonable quarters, such as Bok 
(1984), who notes that secret societies may motivate individual members to act in ways 
they previously would have found unacceptable and absorb their identities:
In the long run, secrecy may help focus the emotion directed toward 
scapegoats and enemies, and end by brutalizing members and rendering 
them incapable of independent judgment
Secrecy is dangerous and debilitating when it draws initiates into 
malevolent or unjust practices, such as violence directed against religious 
or racial groups (p. 54).
As they run the gamut historically and philosophically from the ancient Greek 
Pythagorean Brotherhood to the Ku Klux Klan (Bok 1984), it is impossible to assign a 
single normative valence to secret societies — or the secrets that characterize them. In 
terms of democracy, collectively held secrets can be seen as aiding democracy — as 
Koselleck (1988) sees happening with the Freemasons in Enlightenment Europe — or 
hinder it — a la the Ku Klux Klan in the post-Reconstruction South. Similarly, the 
individual capacity for secrecy can be used for laudable or indefensible purposes. 
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Whether secrecy ultimately is beneficial in any particular situation depends not on 
secrecy itself but on the end toward which it is applied. What is most significant for the 
purposes of this discussion is that while secrecy is not the existential necessity for 
collectives that it is for individuals, insiders certainly do see collectively held secrets as 
being beneficial to their interests.
Benefits for the state
For the state, too, secrecy is justified in the language of interest. Obviously, state 
secrets are different from individually held secrets or those held collectively by groups 
outside the state. However, there are parallels, as individuals responsible for official 
secrets may find some psychological benefit to their privileged positions. Likewise, 
secretive bureaucracies may offer some parallels to secret societies. However, the unique 
position and character of the state also leads to unique justifications for secrecy — and 
also means that many of the justifications for individually or collectively held secrets 
simply do not apply. For instance, official secrets, while they may be necessary for state 
survival, do not hold the same level of existential privilege as individually held secrets 
for the simple reason that the state does not have a sense of self in the same way an 
individual does. The next part of this discussion deals with the benefits to the state of 
official secrecy.
Official secrecy in its current form is a relatively recent phenomenon, as states did 
not start becoming the massive creators and repositories of information familiar today 
until after World War I (Moynihan 1998, Feinberg 1986). While some statutes date back 
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to World War I, the American secrecy system did not really begin to take its current form 
until after World War II with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the 
National Security Act of 1947. But while its modern form makes it a much more 
significant concern by dint of the sheer volume of information that is now kept secret, 
official secrecy itself is an ancient phenomenon. As Arendt (1969) notes:
Secrecy — what diplomatically is called “discretion,” as well as the 
arcana imperii, the mysteries of government — and deception, the 
deliberate falsehood and outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve 
political ends, have been with us since the beginning of recorded history. 
Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies 
have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings. (p. 6)
It is even argued that secrecy is a necessary tool of states, democratic or 
otherwise, due to the ever-present potential for hostility in an anarchic international 
environment. Zolo (1992) argues this is the case:
Secrecy, for example, and therefore pretence and falsehood, are normal 
functional practices in relations between the inside and outside of 
political groups. Power does not exist without arcana, because 
transparency and complete openness renders it vulnerable to other, 
antagonistic, powers. (p. 42)
While it is argued here that at least as a thought experiment, it is possible for a state to 
exist without secrets, as a practical matter, secrets are a necessary evil. As in Hobbes’ 
natural condition of mankind, force and fraud remain the cardinal virtues in international 
relations, although they are not democratic virtues. Force itself requires no secrecy to 
shield it, but fraud must hide in the shadows. In short, democratic state must come to 
terms with keeping at least some secrets, and democratic theory must deal with this 
reality.
In the American experience, secrecy has been considered a necessary part of 
statecraft since the earliest days of the republic. In Federalist #64, John Jay cites the 
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potential for secrecy in international negotiations as a good in the constitutional design of 
the presidency. “It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of what ever nature, but 
that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases 
where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be 
relieved from apprehensions of discovery” (p. 392). While Woodrow Wilson called for 
“open covenants openly arrived at” in the Fourteen Points as a principle of international 
relations, diplomacy continues to be conducted largely behind closed doors — for the 
very reasons Jay names in Federalist #64. For instance, in the Report of the Commission 
on Protecting and Reducing Official Secrecy (1997), Moynihan, a strong advocate for 
openness generally, notes that often diplomatic transactions are not even formally 
recorded, “because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter. What goes down on 
paper is more likely to come out in public, in inappropriate and harmful ways, harmful to 
the national interest” (p. xxxi), and it is noted in the main body of the report:
Secrecy is also essential to the effective conduct of diplomatic 
negotiations. The secret diplomacy that preceded President Nixon’s trip to 
China in 1972 provides one well-known example of how secrecy was 
maintained successfully with regard to a major diplomatic undertaking. 
More routinely, preserving the secrecy of the specific elements of ongoing 
negotiations is regarded as essential to their ultimate success (p. 6)
It would not be possible to gain optimal outcomes from negotiations without some 
secrets, such as fall-back positions on particular issues, just as one does not gain the best 
deal on a used car by revealing to the dealer the maximum one is willing to pay. This 
necessarily involves keeping secrets from both citizens and negotiating partners. In the 
United States, diplomatic secrecy is mitigated by the constitutional requirement that 
treaties be ratified by the Senate, but ratification exposes only the outcomes of successful 
negotiations, not the entire process.
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A further benefit of secrecy is that states that might be embarrassed by the sharing 
of intelligence information or other forms of international cooperation may behave 
differently if they can be assured that their roles will remain secret. In arguing for a bill 
narrowing the scope of the Freedom of Information Act, D’Amato and Greenman (1982) 
highlight the utility of secrecy in international cooperation, saying that foreign 
governments are often reluctant to cooperate with the United States because of the act’s 
far-reaching provisions.
Justifying secrecy
While diplomatic concerns undergird official secrecy in many instances, national 
security seems to be the most frequently cited justification. In addition to national 
security or diplomatic concerns, proponents of secrecy frequently justify it in terms of 
gains in efficiency or effectiveness in whatever area they propose shielding (Lewy 1983, 
Webster 1980, Sharp 1975) Official secrecy is also sometimes claimed as indispensable 
for Westminster-style parliamentary systems (Tant 1995, Cassidy 1986). The benefits 
claimed as arising from official secrecy may be important and even virtuous, but official 
secrecy, no matter how it is justified it is not a democratic virtue. At best democratic 
values can coexist with it uneasily but never welcome it or view it without suspicion.
Justifications given for secrecy in democratic states generally fall into one of three 
categories: concerns about the effectiveness of police or military power, concerns about 
candor in deliberations and protection of personal privacy or trade secrets. Although all 
of these categories can be stretched to include information that need not be kept secret by 
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any reasonable criterion, each readily calls to mind examples of intuitive, practical 
reasons why particular information should be kept hidden. Military operations are much 
less likely to succeed if an adversary knows the time and place of a coming invasion. A 
suspected mobster is unlikely to hold incriminating conversations if he knows his phone 
has been tapped. Businesses will be understandably reluctant to share proprietary 
information with the government if that information is then shared with their competitors. 
It even is conceivable that deliberations will suffer if officials know that provisional 
positions they take before reaching a decision will be subject to the same scrutiny as their 
final decisions, and changes in position may be taken as signs of inconsistency or 
hypocrisy, rather than the result of serious thought. That knowledge may create timidity 
and stifle honest discussion.
In a very limited number of instances, the concealment of information can even be 
seen as be a help rather than a hindrance to democracy. The secret ballot, for instance, 
has become virtually sacrosanct in modern democratic systems. However, Mill (1962) 
discusses the secret ballot in Considerations on Representative Government and is quite 
ill-disposed toward it, arguing that the secret ballot encourages voters to think of voting 
as an act for their own particular benefit, whereas in truth, “the voter is under an absolute 
moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his private advantage, and give 
his vote, to the best of his judgment, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were the 
sole voter and the election depended upon him alone” (pp. 206-207). That said, Mill 
admits that when citizens are of unequal power, public voting could tend more to expose 
voters to coercion than to make them take their responsibilities seriously:
It may, unquestionably, be the fact, that if we attempt, by publicity, 
to make the voter responsible for his vote, he will practically be made 
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responsible for it to some powerful individual, whose interest is more 
opposed to the general interest of the community, than that of the voter 
himself would be, if, by the shield of secresy (sic), he were released from 
responsibility altogether. When this is the condition, in a high degree, of a 
large proportion of the voters, the (secret) ballot may be the smaller evil 
(p. 207).
Mill might not agree that such a situation exists today, but concern over the potential for 
voter intimidation continues to provide a philosophical underpinning for the secret ballot. 
Despite the public implications of voting, the private character of the ballot itself is seen 
as a net benefit for both the voter and the state.
Provisions for the protection of personal privacy more generally can also be seen 
as advancing democratic values, as the threat of exposure can be used to stifle dissent. 
The break-in at Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office during the Pentagon Papers case 
offers a perfect example of the state atemoting to use exposure as a weapon against 
dissent. Personal privacy is the one venue at which individual-level needs for secrecy 
intersect with state-held information and is thus an area at which a rebuttable 
presumption of openness cannot be seen as an indisputable good. A state release of 
private information may not present the same threat to ontological security that a personal 
inability to keep secrets does, but it nevertheless can represent a serious violation of 
personal autonomy. Most citizens, for instance, would be very uncomfortable with the 
idea of the state making their financial or medical records available to all comers.
In a sense, privacy concerns differ from other forms of official secrecy in that 
they deal with issues of information collection, rather than dissemination. However, 
states seem to have a need to collect a certain amount of sensitive personal information as 
a matter of course, and the mere fact of its collection does not make it something of 
public concern. Personal information collected by the state, unlike classified information 
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created or discovered by the state, does not lose its private, individual character merely 
by being held in an official file, and because of that private character, it is not properly 
held to be political information. With this distinction in mind, the general argument of 
this dissertation — that state-held information should also be public information — does 
not extend to personal privacy.3
The various justifications for official secrecy all have a ring of truth to them and 
contain a certain practicality. It should be noted, however, that with the exception of a 
very limited set of personal privacy concerns, none of these justifications is based on 
concern for democratic values. And none alters the fact, to be discussed at length in the 
following chapters, that official secrecy is fundamentally anti-democratic, even when 
practiced in good faith and especially when its vulnerabilities to abuse are exploited.
National security concerns, which fall under the general heading of concerns 
about the effectiveness of police or military power, seem to be the most open to abuse in 
practice. According to Cheh (1984), the national security exemption of U.S. Freedom of 
Information Act provides presidents with a broad license to withhold information, given 
the courts general deference to the executive with regard to classification decisions. In 
other words, given the courts’ reluctance to review the appropriateness of classification 
decisions, the executive has broad power to withhold almost anything provided that the 
president’s classification power under the National Security Act of 1947 is invoked.
That said, the other justifications are also subject to abuse. The General 
Accounting Office’s lawsuit attempting to force Vice President Cheney to release 
documents related to meeting of his energy task force was motivated by a belief by critics 
3 It is understood, however, that the boundaries of what is and is not private information dealing 
with individuals is contestable. It is simply beyond the scope of this dissertation to enter into that 
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that the documents are being withheld solely for reasons of political expedience. 
Cheney’s defense fell squarely into the category of protecting deliberation: He said he 
was withholding sensitive documents so that people who advise the vice president in the 
future can offer candid opinions without fear of public backlash. Even the protection of 
personal privacy or trade secrets can be used to justify excessive secrecy. Critics of the 
statute creating the new Department of Homeland Security say the provision exempting 
sensitive infrastructure information from disclosure, while it is intended to extend 
protections of proprietary information in order to hamper terrorists, it may have the 
unintended consequence of making it much more difficult to uncover environmental 
scofflaws (Guzy 2002). To take a more absurd example, officials at the National Zoo 
refused to release necropsy reports on a giraffe that had died at the zoo, citing the 
animal’s right to privacy. Critics of the decision suggested the actual motivation was to 
cover up neglect by the giraffe’s keepers (Grimaldi 2002).
In American law, there is an implicit recognition of the anti-democratic character 
of official secrecy in the form of the Freedom of Information Act. While statutory 
authority for the classification system comes from the Atomic Energy Act and the 
National Security Act of 1947, it is in the nine exemptions of the Freedom of Information 
Act where one can see most clearly what is viewed in the American system as legitimate 
justifications for keeping secrets, ranging from reasons of national security (e.g. 
Exemption 1, records “to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign 
policy”), to personal privacy (e.g. Exemption 6, “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy”). The application of those principles may be problematic, as are the occasional 
debate.
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efforts to expand them, but at their heart is a practical understanding of the kind of 
official secrets that are necessary, tensions with democratic values notwithstanding.
The justifications for official secrecy provide moral leverage in its service. The 
circumstances and character of a particular state determine how applicable those 
justifications are, which in turn determines the kinds of secrecy that are seen as 
legitimate. Sharp (1986) explains a decision early in his career to resign from the civil 
service, due to the leak of a budget report he had signed: “If documents of this kind were 
to become accessible, one of two things would happen. Either the civil servants would 
ask the ministers what they wanted by the way of advice so as to avoid a public conflict, 
or the advice would be given orally” (p. 572).
According to this argument, the protection of deliberations is seen as so vital as to 
justify a very tight control over all forms of officially held information. In Great Britain, 
however, a culture of leaking has rendered secrecy in deliberations largely a political 
fiction (Tant 1995). While it can be argued that simply the myth of secret deliberations is 
necessary for the maintenance of ministerial responsibility, experience in other 
Westminster-style systems calls even that into question, as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand have had freedom of information laws, quite opposed to the British Official 
Secrets Act without any apparent ill effects (Hazell 1989). All the same, proponents of 
secrecy in systems following the British model are quite emphatic about their claim that 
deliberations are particularly in need of protection from public scrutiny, due the to unique 
character of the Westminister system.
The attractiveness of protecting deliberations is not limited to Westminster-type 
systems, though. The governing Board of Regents of the quasi-governmental 
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Smithsonian Institution4 has held its meetings behind closed doors since its establishment 
in 1846 (Ellington 2001b), a situation that Wesley S. Williams, chairman of the board’s 
executive committee, says enhances the quality of debate and oversight by the board.
My personal view is that we are advantaged to have active dialogue on the 
part of the regents. In my experience, that active dialogue has resulted 
specifically as a function of the more free-wheeling, closed meeting where 
regents are not afraid to have false starts, to say things that they don’t 
quite mean, to be informed as to what the facts are, then to recant and to 
have active dialogue. ... I think that really is a benefit that comes from a 
closed meeting (Williams 2001).
The attraction of encouraging candor and honest discussion by closing meetings 
extends to a variety of government agencies, too (although the advantages have not been 
felt to be so great as to prevent a patchwork of state and federal laws in the United States 
requiring open meetings).
Effective secrecy has proven indispensable to the functioning of 
government, serving the interests not only of the officials in power but of 
the governed as well. Secrecy permits policymakers to freely explore and 
debate different options, consider alternatives, and weigh the 
consequences of each; aids in providing the critical element of surprise 
with respect to a chosen policy; and protects individuals from the possible 
harm that could come from publicity (Commission on Protecting and 
Reducing Government Secrecy 1997, p. 6).
The downside to the candid, intelligent discussion encouraged by closed meetings 
is that no one on the other side of the doors can be certain that it is really going on. 
Problems of accountability and suspicion will be discussed in more depth in chapters 3 
and 4, but an example is in order here.
In the case of the Smithsonian, there is a school of thought that the Board of 
Regents is little more than a rubber-stamp body for controversial Smithsonian Secretary 
4 While more than 70 percent of the Smithsonian’s operating budget comes from an annual 
congressional appropriation, the complex of museums and research centers is technically not a 
government agency but a trust administered by the United States government (Ellington 2001).
50
Lawrence M. Small. “I’ve been working here for 30 years and never had much 
impression of what they’re doing,” says Storrs Olson, a senior ornithologist at the 
National Museum of Natural History. Others, such as Paul Forman, curator of the modern 
physics collection at the National Museum of American History, are more strongly 
negative in their evaluations of the board’s actions:
Greater access to the board would reveal serious problems, Mr. 
Forman says.
Being “thoroughly insulated from information about the real life 
inside the institution,” the curator says, “The regents are, however well-
intentioned, terribly ignorant. ... After all, they meet only three times a 
year for a very short meeting” (Ellington 2001a).
While those on the board, such as Williams (2001) insist that such criticisms are 
off-base, it is impossible to adequately evaluate any of the competing claims, due to the 
secrecy of the meetings being discussed.
While the credibility of those claiming to engage in serious deliberation may be 
questioned, secrecy in deliberation may allow officials to step back and engage in more 
reasoned discussion of the issues insulated from pressures of public opinion. Meeting in 
Philadelphia in 1787 to revise the Articles of Confederation, the Framers of the 
Constitution recognized these benefits when they decided to meet behind closed doors in 
Philadelphia in 1787. George Washington warned the delegates, “Nothing spoken or 
written can be revealed to anyone — not even your family — until we have adjourned 
permanently. Gossip or misunderstanding can easily ruin all the hard work we have to do 
this summer” (Williams 1970, p. 10). Indeed, it is unlikely that many of the compromises 
that came out of the Constitutional Convention would have been possible had the debates 
been open. The constitution resulting from those secret meetings is today generally 
regarded as a success, and the closed nature of discussions that brought it into being is 
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regarded either as a wise decision or merely a historical curiosity. It can be argued that 
the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention was acceptable because while the delegates 
deliberated in secret, they did not have the power to enact their decisions on their own. 
The ratification debate itself certainly was very public and democratic in character, even 
if the convention itself was not.
During that debate, though, the situation in which the Constitution was written 
became as much of an issue as the specific provisions of the Constitution. The Anti-
Federalist Pennsylvania Minority described the climate that paved the way for ratification 
in most unflattering terms: “Whilst the gilded chains were forging in the secret conclave, 
the meaner instruments of despotism without, were busily employed in alarming the fears 
of the people with dangers which did not exist, and exciting their hopes of greater 
advantages from the expected plan than even the best government on earth could 
produce” (The Anti-Federalist Papers 1986).
Naturally the Federalists rejected this argument.
In the Federalist Papers James Madison says that: “Had every 
Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would have 
still been a mob.” This remark exemplifies the spirit of the Constitution. 
The Founders saw limits to a completely open democratic system, not 
because they thought the people were stupid or unworthy of political 
power but because they thought the institutional dynamics of an open 
system were inherently dangerous (Nichols 1988, p. 59).
One does not have to accept that the Athenian assembly was a mob to recognize that 
there are certain, limited situations in which there simply is no substitute for secrecy in 
serving the best interests of the people being governed.5
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Secrecy’s symbolic value
In addition to instrumental uses, official secrecy has great symbolic value. The 
arcana imperii identified by Arendt (1969) are valued not just for their immediate utility, 
but because their existence symbolizes state power and confers a kind of legitimacy on 
those to whom they are entrusted. This is a legitimacy based on trust or expertise, rather 
than the democratic legitimacy conferred by consent. Kalven (1989) describes the 
rhetorical power of secrets: Official secrecy: “enables officials to say, ‘If you knew what 
I know, you would agree with me, but I can’t tell you what I know, so you’ll have to trust 
me’” (p. 59). But just as secrecy can generate unwarranted trust, it can also work the 
other way. Introducing Moynihan’s (1998) Secrecy, Richard Gid Powers writes:
Symbolic secrecy ... proclaims that there are those who can be 
trusted with secrets and those who cannot. As such, it is a powerful tool, 
enabling dominant groups in government to delegitimize their opponents. 
But because official secrecy is such an obvious affront to the democratic 
principle of open government, it takes no great rhetorical skill to turn the 
weapon of secrecy against those who conceal their deliberations can be up 
to no good — that they, and not their critics, are the real conspirators 
against the public weal (pp. 18-19).
5 This, of course, assumes representative democracy, rather than the direct form found in ancient 
Athens. Official secrecy becomes more problematic if the people themselves rather than their 
representatives are doing the governing.
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It is not without reason that today, just as 215 years ago, when skeptics see closed 
doors, they imagine, as the Anti-Federalists did, “gilded chains ... forging in the secret 
conclave.” As will be discussed in Chapter 4, secrecy frequently inspires misguided 
flights of fantasy by those excluded, but there is a kernel of truth to the wildest of 
imaginings: For much of the work done in intelligence, espionage and covert action, there 
is no substitute for secrecy; indeed there is nothing at all without secrecy. Necessary and 
useful though these activities may be, they are also distasteful and even arguably 
immoral.
It was this unseemly aspect those parts of government that must act in the 
shadows that led Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson to order a stop to spying operations 
by the War and State departments in 1929. Over 12 years, a joint operation called the 
Black Chamber (a predecessor of today’s National Security Agency) had decoded 45,000 
telegrams from 19 countries. Stimson was horrified when he learned of the Black 
Chamber and ordered it closed down. “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail,” he said 
(Holt 1995, p. 23). 6
And he was right: Gentlemen don’t read each other’s mail. But in the anarchic 
world of international relations the population of gentlemen is so small as to be 
negligible, a fact that has been brought home dramatically by World War II, the Cold 
War and most recently the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. If anything, the international 
environment resembles more closely an Old West saloon than a gentlemen’s salon. While 
behaving as a gentleman in a barbaric situation may offer a certain sense of moral 
satisfaction, it offers precious little security. It was a recognition of this problem that led 
6 Stimson’s thinking evolved with the changing international situation, and he certainly did not 
take such a dogmatic anti-spying position as secretary of state during World War II.
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to the rapid expansion of the intelligence community during and immediately after World 
War II. Gen. James H. Doolittle’s 1954 report on American covert activities laid out the 
philosophical underpinning of this development:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed 
objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. 
There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable rules of human 
conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, longstanding 
American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop 
effective espionage and counter espionage services and must learn to 
subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more 
sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It 
may become necessary that the American people become acquainted with, 
understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy (quoted 
in Holt 1995, p. 239).
The philosophy Doolittle describes is “fundamentally repugnant” and has nothing 
to do with democratic values but is very difficult to dismiss out of hand. The international 
environment is harsh and unconducive to the flourishing of democratic values, which 
require at least a minimal level of consensus about the rules of the game and some 
mechanism by which to enforce them. Both consensus and authority are lacking 
currently. Conventions that would forbid efforts to “subvert, sabotage and destroy our 
enemies” are textbook examples of “covenants without the sword” and they remain “but 
words, and of no strength to secure a man (or a state) at all” (Hobbes 1958, p. 139). 
Machiavelli’s advice to the Prince seems equally applicable to the intelligence 
community today:
[A] prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by doing so it would be 
against his interest, and when reasons which made him bind himself no 
longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be a good one; 
but as they are all bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you 
are not bound to keep faith with them (Machiavelli 1950, p. 64).
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It obviously would be unreasonable to expect a group like al Qaeda to “keep 
faith” with the United States, even if it were possible to find some element of common 
ground. Even more traditional adversaries can be expected to be faithless from time to 
time. Thus the move toward embracing a “repugnant philosophy” and away from 
squeamishness about reading “each other’s mail” seems like a pretty obvious one, but the 
appropriate application of that philosophy is difficult. Few would object to monitoring 
Osama bin Laden’s satellite telephone, as the NSA has been able to do in the past. 
According to Bamford (2001):
NSA regularly listens to unencrypted calls from suspected terrorist Osama 
Bin Laden, in hiding in Afghanistan. … According to intelligence 
officials, Bin Laden is aware that the United States can eavesdrop on his 
international communications, but he does not seem to care. To impress 
cleared visitors, NSA analysts occasionally play audiotapes of Bin Laden 
talking to his mother over an INMARSAT connection (p. 410).
On the other hand, the Pentagon’s abortive Total Information Awareness program 
raised vehement opposition based on the likelihood that it might ensnare innocent people 
and degrade privacy generally (Liptak 2002). Concerns such as these aside, much, but not 
all, of what goes on in intelligence, espionage and covert action by its nature requires 
secrecy.
Secrecy is of particular concern to the intelligence and national security apparatus 
of the United States, but many of those activities can be completely overt without any 
loss of effectiveness.7 For a great deal of intelligence gathering, the first step is checking 
what is available in open sources (Holt 1995), which can be as simple and mundane as 
7 This is not to say that openness necessary prevails in those areas in which it would be entirely 
benign. For instance, Herring (1997) decribes his tenure as a member of the CIA’s Historical 
Review Panel, in which a great deal of energy was spent in clearing such things as transcripts 
from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The FBIS monitors and reports on broadcasts 
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obtaining a subscription to a foreign newspaper. In other situations, particularly 
espionage, that is not the case. An agent planting bugs in a military conference room 
cannot be expected to do so both overtly and successfully. Secrecy can be used to obtain 
information that would not otherwise be available. Sources that would otherwise be 
noncooperative may open up when they are guaranteed that their cooperation will be 
hidden; frequently that also entails keeping secret the information those sources reveal. 
Official secrecy in these instances come at a cost not only to democratic openness but in 
an obligation to the source. As the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 
Secrecy (1997) explained:
In addition to keeping those secrets that could affect national security, the 
Government also has a solemn moral obligation to protect those 
individuals who provide information valuable to the United States, 
especially those who do so at risk to their lives. This obligation extends to 
protecting the methods used to gather the information as well as the 
sources, so that nothing points back to endanger them (p. xlviii).
Official secrecy has particular utility with regard to covert operations. The CIA-
directed coup in Guatemala in 1954 offers a case in point. Whether the coup itself 
entailed sound foreign policy on the part of the United States is highly questionable, but 
there is no question that the success of the coup itself depended heavily on secrecy. On 
June 18, 1954, a rebel “army” of 150 people invaded Guatemala from Honduras while the 
CIA broadcast radio accounts of fierce but entirely fictitious battles.
If (Guatemalan President Jacobo) Arbenz (Guzman) had gotten a single 
aircraft in the air, he might have discovered the trivial size of the rebel 
“army” and the true outcome of the “battles.” Yet his aircraft, like his 
army, remained at home. How had the CIA achieved this coup de main?
Realizing early on that the linchpin of the operation would be 
control of Arbenz’s information, CIA propaganda broadcasts continuously 
reported defections of pilots from Communist Bloc nations, thereby 
over public airwaves in foreign countries. Classifiying FBIS transcripts is approximately equivalent 
to classifying a network news broadcast — while leaving it available from other sources.
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planting the seeds of mistrust in Arbenz’s mind and ideas in the minds of 
Guatemalan air force pilots. Eventually one Guatemalan pilot did defect. 
... Fearing that all his pilots would fly off to Honduras, Arbenz grounded 
his entire air force. Thus blind, when rebel radio reported columns of well-
armed insurgents converging on the capital, the beleagured president 
believed them (Nutter 2000, p. 14).
Just nine days after the start of the insurgency, Arbenz fled at the demand of the army, 
victim more of the artful control of information than actual military force.
For covert operations, secrecy offers advantages in creating the capacity for lying, 
surprise and uncertainty. As discussed previously, secrecy makes lies possible. Thus 
secrecy was at the heart of plans for the Pentagon’s planned Office of Strategic Influence, 
which was ordered closed after a firestorm of criticism arose regarding plans to use it to 
plant disinformation with journalists overseas. However, there could easily arise 
situations in which there would be an advantage to be gained from doing planting 
disinformation with journalists, just as the CIA found an advantage in misleading Arbenz 
about the size of the rebellion in Guatemala. Further, even when disinformation is not 
swallowed whole, as it was by Arbenz, it can still create enough noise to bring in 
uncertainty and complicate an adversary’s decision-making process. Finally, at the outset 
of operations, secrecy preserves the element of surprise, as vital today as it was in the 
invasion of Normandy. As Friedman (2001) explains, “Surprise is the single most 
powerful tool in warfare. The essence of surprise is secrecy. It would therefore seem to 
follow that secrecy is the foundation of warfare.”
Official secrecy also has more unambiguously ignoble uses in covering up 
corruption, incompetence or information that might simply be embarrassing. After the 
1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2, President Eisenhower ordered a coverup, 
going as far as to order Cabinet officers to lie under oath. At least one did lie to the 
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congressional investigating committee, which suggests that Eisenhower was guilty of 
subornation of perjury. “The issue was never the protection of ‘our intelligence systems’ 
as Eisenhower told the NSC officials. It was covering up his role in the botched project. 
After all, the U-2 program had virtually no secrets left.” Public release of sensitive 
information was not an issue either, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regularly 
heard classified testimony in secret hearings. “Rather, what Eisenhower feared most was 
the leak of politically damaging information to the American public during a key election 
year” (Bamford 2001, pp. 58-60).
Wise (2002) fears that secrecy could serve the same purpose in the investigation 
of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, preventing embarrassment at the expense of truth. 
Wise’s experience suggests that a coverup of mistakes or incompetence would not be out 
of character for the U.S. intelligence community. While researching the Robert Hanssen 
espionage case, Wise learned that the FBI and CIA had spent three years investigating the 
wrong person, a CIA officer named Brian Kelley. But in writing the book, Wise was 
pressured by the CIA not to name Kelley, eventually asking his publisher to remove 
Kelley’s name. “It seems clear that the CIA attempted to censor the book merely to avoid 
embarrassing publicity,” Wise writes. “This episode shows just how far intelligence 
agencies will go to avoid scrutiny. If that was the case with my book, how much more 
intense would the instinct be to avoid divulging errors made prior to the terrorist attacks 
of Sept. 11?”
On one level, this use of secrecy to obscure rather than to protect appears simply 
to be abusive, but it also is important to understand that for those who use official secrets 
that way, they are simply protecting their own interests. Such self-interested behavior is 
59
hardly considered surprising in other areas of politics. It should not be a surprise when 
official secrets are concerned either. Official secrecy is useful, and at times indispensable, 
but that utility does not come without cost, particularly to democracy. The remainder of 
this dissertation will illuminate the costs of official secrecy and suggest some ways in 
which democracy can cope with the dangers it presents.
60
Chapter 3
Subverting Autonomy and Accountability
Official secrecy limits the ability of citizens to act as citizens — that is to 
participate — in all phases of the political process, from agenda setting to decision 
making to implementation and evaluation. This limitation is a fundamental denial of 
citizen autonomy, and thus even when undertaken with the purest of motives, official 
secrecy is prima facie undemocratic. This is a cost that, while it may be unavoidable, 
cannot be compensated for, even with experts or representatives standing in for citizens. 
This is especially true of more participatory or strong forms of democracy.
Democracy is predicated on the idea that citizens should have the power to hold 
the state accountable for its actions. The mechanisms of accountability are simplest and 
most understandable where the state and its citizens are coterminous, e.g., the direct 
democracy of classical Athens or the vision of Rousseau in On the Social Contract, in 
which the citizens are united into one body politic and the general will is their mutual 
product. Indeed, Rousseau voices the democratic aspiration in its broadest form: “Find a 
form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with 
all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless 
obeys only himself and remains as free as before” (Rousseau 1978). The democratic 
project today is largely a matter of salvaging as much of this as possible in a world in 
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which no citizen can remain “as free as before,” but in which the common force of the 
state is an absolute necessity.8
From Madison and Rousseau onward, the contemporary democratic state has been 
declared too large and unwieldy for the regular, direct involvement of the kind favored by 
the ancient Athenians. Still, democratic theorists agree that it is crucial for reasonably 
autonomous citizens to be capable of holding the state accountable in some measure for 
its actions, and contemporary states make use of such mechanisms as periodic elections. 
The devil, of course, is in the details, as democratic theorists offer widely divergent ideas 
of what it means to be reasonably autonomous or what is required for accountability in 
some measure. Participatory democrats set the bar much higher than do proponents of 
elite-based theory. It is argued here that participatory democrats offer a much more 
meaningful and complete vision of democratic life, but official secrecy should be a matter 
of concern for democratic theorists of all stripes. Official secrecy undermines democracy 
in whatever form it may take, as even those theorists holding the thinnest notions of 
citizenship have at least minimal requirements of state accountability. Thicker, more 
participatory visions of democracy are even more vulnerable to the depredations of 
official secrecy, as their citizens require higher levels of autonomy, and the requirements 
for state accountability are greater. Regardless, the bottom line is quite simple: More 
secrecy equals less accountability and less citizen autonomy — in short, less democracy.
8 Pateman (1970) describes Rousseau as “the theorist par excellence of participation.” For 
Rousseau, participation’s chief function is education, developing other-regarding citizens who, 
through their deliberations must take into account more than simply their own private interests. 
This deliberation process forces the individual to distinguish between his or her own impulses and 
other concerns. Participatory institutions for Rousseau guarantee freedom in a way counter to the 
way non-participatory ones threaten it or put man “in chains.”
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Secrecy and diminished participation
The danger is clearer for democrats at the participatory end of the continuum than 
for elite theorists. Barber (1984) lays out this aspirational definition of “strong 
democracy”:
Strong democracy is a distinctively modern form of participatory 
democracy. It rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens 
who are united less by homogenous interests than by civic education and 
who are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of 
their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism 
or good nature (p. 117).
A participatory, self-governing community in which citizens engage in mutual action is 
clearly inconsistent with the practice of official secrecy, as that would undermine the 
basis of participation and make mutual action an act of faith, rather than one based on 
knowledge and educated competence. Other theorists of participatory democracy, such as 
Carole Pateman and Dennis Thompson, similarly define democracy in such a way that 
citizen access to information is implicitly understood.
In attempting to construct a theory of democracy based around citizenship and 
consonant with the findings of empirical social science, Thompson (1970) describes two 
presuppositions of a citizenship-based theory of democracy: 1) autonomy, that is that 
“citizens be treated as the best judges of their own interests” and 2) improvability, that is 
that “citizens be treated as capable of showing better political and social judgment than 
they do at any present time” (p. 10). With these presuppositions in place, the ability to 
participate meaningfully in politics becomes the sine qua non of democratic citizenship.
A primary function of participation is to help ensure that what 
some nineteenth-century democrats called the “sinister interests” of the 
rulers do not prevail over the interests of most of the citizens. Twentieth-
63
century citizenship theorists make the same point, sometimes writing 
about the “abuse of power,” or the danger of the “one or a few” 
identifying “their private good with the good of the community” 
(Thompson 1970, p. 55).
In blunting the ability of citizens to participate effectively, official secrecy leaves the 
door open for “sinister interests.” Of course, this is not to say that every instance will lead 
to an abuse, merely that all official secrecy carries with it that potential, for hidden power 
is not accountable, and unaccountable power is especially subject to abuse. Thompson 
continues:
A minimal criterion of whether citizens are protected against such 
a violation is the existence of adequate opportunities (e.g. elections) which 
would allow citizens to object effectively to what rulers do. ... As long as 
the citizens who do vote are informed about what the rulers do and are not 
controlled by rulers, a majority of any number of voters are a threat to 
rulers if an electoral result can remove rulers from power (p. 55).
This is a minimal criterion because voting is such a blunt tool for expressing 
popular will. Obviously not every potential revelation of a secret holds the likelihood of 
overturning an election, but even based on this minimal criterion, secrecy has the 
potential to cause great harm. Moving outward from voting to a broader notion of 
participation, as Thompson favors, compounds the harm official secrecy can cause.
Pateman (1970) outlines the significance of participation, not only for the well-
being of democracy itself but for citizens:
The contemporary and participatory theories of democracy can be 
contrasted on every point of substance, including the characterization of 
“democracy” itself and the definition of “political,” which in the 
participatory theory is not confined to the usual national or local 
governmental sphere. Again, in the participatory theory “participation” 
refers to (equal) participation in the making of decisions, and “political 
equality refers to equality of power in determining the outcome of 
decisions, a very different definition from that of contemporary theory. 
Finally, the justification for a democratic system in the participatory 
theory of democracy rests primarily on the human results that accrue from 
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the participatory process. One might characterise the participatory model 
as one where maximum input (participation) is required and where output 
includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social 
and political capacities of each individual, so that there is “feedback” from 
output to input (p. 43, parentheses in original).
Obviously, for issues in which significant information is kept secret, the 
conditions of equal participation and political power described by Pateman are 
impossible to meet. Official secrecy imposes not only a distinction between insider and 
outsider, but sets it up as a hierarchical relationship. Those who know are positioned 
higher than the average citizen; their opinion means more because they know more. This 
is especially problematic in participatory democracy because it is not just policy or 
electoral outcomes that matter but the entire process and the enlarging effect that process 
has on citizens.
If outcomes are all that are important, then it is possible, using a Kantian 
“experiment of pure reason,” (Kant 1970) to find that in some instances official secrecy is 
not important for democracy because disclosure would not alter outcomes. Bok (1984) 
rightly objects that such a judgment would be suspect because “such experiments are 
open to all the vicissitudes of private speculation. If moral deliberation is intended from 
the outset to remain a mere thought-experiment, it allows secrecy to re-enter by the back 
door of bias and self-serving rationalization” (p. 114).
Setting that aside, however, in the participatory formulation, under no 
circumstances would an experiment of pure reason find official secrecy harmless, 
because in all cases it would stop the “feedback” described by Pateman. And without the 
maximum input of participation the development of individuals’ social and political 
capacities. Accepting this participatory formulation does not entirely foreclose the 
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acceptance of official secrecy in all cases, but it does raise the bar. Given the harm one 
knows it will cause in this understanding of democracy, official secrecy can only be 
justified in cases where it is preventing an even greater harm.
On the other hand, one does not have to accept this expansive a view of 
democracy to see danger in official secrecy. Pateman is highly critical of Robert Dahl as 
one of the chief proponents of the “contemporary theory of democracy,” with its lesser 
emphasis on participation. If Dahl takes a more moderate position, though, his theory of 
democracy is still vulnerable to disruption, particularly as regards citizen autonomy.
Dahl (1989) rejects the notion of an absolute right to autonomy.
Imagine that a democratic country were actually to declare 
political autonomy to be an absolute right. Granting such a right would 
make a state, or any coercive organization, impossible (or at any rate 
illegitimate), since any group facing coercion on any matter could demand 
and through secession gain autonomy. In effect anarchism would be 
legitimized (p. 196).
Autonomy still is important for Dahl, though it is conditional rather than a matter 
of absolute right. Dahl describes what he calls “the presumption of personal autonomy. 
Under this presumption:
In the absence of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be 
assumed to be the best judge of his or her own good or interests.
The practical effect of this presumption is to deny that paternalistic 
authority can ever be legitimate among adults, in either individual or 
collective decisions, except for presumably rare exceptions. And 
conversely, all legitimate authority relations among adults must be 
consistent with — and that sense, must respect — the presumption of 
personal autonomy (p. 100).
While citizens may be presumed to be the best judges of their own interests, 
official secrecy can seriously impair that judgment, and indeed a state that claims to 
know better than its citizens because it has ensured that it knows more is nothing if not 
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paternalistic. Serious national-security concerns (where they are not exaggerated) could 
provide the “rare exceptions” Dahl allows for, but again the bar is set high for accepting 
those exceptions. Paternalistic authority is not a matter to be taken lightly, particularly 
not by a free people.
Under Dahl’s formulation, too, simply saying that disclosure would not affect the 
outcome of a decision-making process is not sufficient to exonerate secrecy. “The demos 
must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda 
of matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic process” (p. 113). As will be 
illustrated below in the discussion of the Progressive case, official secrecy undermines 
citizens’ control of the agenda. Morland (1979) argues that official secrecy has kept 
nuclear weapons off the top of the public agenda. Even if it could be demonstrated that 
full disclosure would not lead to a more serious discussion of the issues that concern 
Morland, official secrecy is responsible for his perception and furthermore does weaken 
the position of him and like-minded people in vis-a-vis their efforts to change national 
priorities and start at least an discussion.
Official secrecy causes potential problems for even the most minimal 
formulations of democratic theory, such as the neo-elitist view. Schumpeter (1943) 
defines democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” (p. 269). Schumpeter’s conception of democracy actually finds such 
normal forms of participation as lobbying one’s representatives to be inconsistent with 
democracy because this form of exercising power goes against the trustee form of 
representation he advocates. Schumpeter also sees as exclusion from the electorate 
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(which for him is synonymous with citizenship) on the basis of race, sex or gender as 
being potentially consistent with democratic principles.9 Yet even in Schumpeter’s thin, 
competition-for-leadership model, in which autonomy and accountability are meaningful 
concepts only on election day, official secrecy has the potential to make mischief with 
democracy. That potential is less, certainly, than under more participatory models, where 
damage from official secrecy is certain, but it is not insignificant, and indeed it is an easy 
matter to imagine situations in which incumbent officials might use official secrecy as a 
tool to hold onto office.10
Schumpeter’s model of democracy is essentially the use of electoral mechanisms 
to ensure the circulation of elites through popular means. At the far end of the spectrum 
from participatory models, one finds such theorists as Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo 
Pareto, for whom democracy simply means any method that ensures a circulation of 
elites. Mosca (1939) does say that “the democratic tendency is in a sense indispensable to 
what is called ‘progress’ in human societies” (p. 415). By “democratic, Mosca says he 
means, “the tendency to replenish the ruling class with elements deriving from the lower 
classes” (p. 395). The existence of a ruling class, Mosca says, has been shown by history 
to be an inevitability. Circulation of new blood through that elite is crucial to avoiding 
9 Schumpeter writes: “In a commonwealth of strong religious conviction it may be held — again 
without any absurdity or insincerity — that dissent disqualifies or, in an anti-feminist 
commonwealth, sex. A race-conscious nation may associate fitness with racial considerations” (p. 
244).
10 Official secrecy can also work against incumbent power. Consider, for example, the 1960 
presidential election in the United States. According to some accounts (Cramer 2002), Kennedy 
defeated Nixon in a close race largely on the strength of claims he made about the danger faced 
by the United States because of a “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. In fact, according the 
secret intelligence estimates unavailable to the Kennedy campaign, there was no such gap. 
Whether the Eisenhower administration simply miscalculated in not releasing that information or 
whether the continued secrecy was based on scrupulous attention to protecting intelligence 
sources and methods, it has impossible to say. What is clear, though, is that official secrecy 
potentially affected the outcome of a presidential election. That secrecy might be expected more 
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societal stagnation, and democracy can provide an efficient way of maintaining that 
circulation under the right circumstances. However, it is the circulation of elites, not 
popular input into how it takes place, that is central for Mosca. At any rate, official 
secrecy because of its usefulness as a tool of power can be used by incumbent elites to 
solidify their positions, and thus, under Mosca’s theory, lead to societal stagnation. If 
elite circulation is accomplished through democratic means, than the impact of official 
secrecy is indistinguishable from what was discussed regarding Schumpeter.
Pareto (1984), too, looks to historical patterns and sees a circulation of elites. 
Where Mosca sees the existence of a ruling class as an inevitability, Pareto sees the 
circulation of elites itself as being natural and immutable, although some cycles of 
change last longer than others. However, it is popular thought and action that helps 
determine the course of these cycles. According to Pareto, “Even a superficial view of 
present society reveals streams of opinion that manifest underlying patterns in sentiments 
and interests [rather than opinions about specific issues] are the forces at work in 
determining the character of social equilibrium” (p. 63, brackets in original). This social 
equilibrium does not appear to be vulnerable to willful direction from below, but it is not 
difficult to imagine how an existing elite might use official secrecy to manipulate 
sentiments and alter the duration of a historical cycle, if not its ultimate course. Indeed, 
absent an ethic of democracy, it is hard to imagine why an elite would not attempt to 
preserve itself in this way.
In short, where citizen autonomy and state accountability is concerned, official 
secrecy should be a matter of concern for democrats across the spectrum, from those who 
often to work in the incumbent party’s favor pales in importance compared to the realization that it 
may well alter election outcomes in some cases.
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advocate a thick, participatory form to those elitists who advocate a thinner, more 
minimal form. Indeed, secrecy can be a matter of concern even for those elite theorists 
who do not especially prize democracy. Clearly, official secrecy presents the greatest 
problems for those democrats who prize participation more, but it should be a matter of 
concern across the board. As was shown in Chapter 2, official secrecy is a tool for 
exercising power, and as a tool that can be used by the state or agents of the state to 
exercise power over citizens, its bears close scrutiny and suspicion — much closer than it 
has received to date.
Citizen autonomy
Autonomy offers citizens the ability to make meaningful choices about the 
direction of one’s life. For purely private matters, this means making a unilateral decision 
based on what is known about the available choices; for public matters, it is more 
complicated, as public autonomy involves consultation, persuasion and, by many 
accounts (Barber 1984), concern about the interests of others. However, public or private, 
autonomous decision making requires the individual to act upon what he or she knows —
and by extension, to have at least some information about the likely result of his or her 
decisions. This does not dictate what choice the autonomous individual makes: One may
choose to smoke, while another does not, but both are decisions made by equally 
autonomous people (although the addictive qualities of nicotine do cast a shadow on the 
continued autonomy of the smoker). But one cannot make an autonomous decision in the 
absence of information.
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The state lottery provides another case in point. The decision whether to play is a 
matter of autonomous choice. One person may decide the fantasy of unimaginable riches 
and the tiny chance of actually winning are worth the $1 cost of a Powerball ticket, while 
another decides not to play. Both are acting autonomously. But for the Powerball player, 
autonomy ends at the decision to play. The player who picks his or her own numbers is 
not exercising any more autonomy than the player who lets the computer choose a ticket 
randomly, as there is no advance information available about which numbers will be 
winners. In short, zero information means zero autonomy, and more information means 
more autonomy, although the limits of human information-processing capacity mean 
there does come a point of diminishing returns.
Currently, Americans are seeing their access to information, and thus their 
autonomy diminished. In response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. 
government has diminished or eliminated access to a wide variety of information, thus 
endangering citizen autonomy. Congress has already amended the Freedom of 
Information Act to allow agencies to withhold from public disclosure information such as 
maps of transportation networks. Other measures have involved regulation or 
discretionary activities by federal agencies, with a particular focus on the World Wide 
Web. The Information Superhighway, it is feared, runs through some bad neighborhoods. 
Among the responses:
• A letter instructed librarians to destroy a CD-ROM of water-supply data, titled 
“Source-Area Characteristics of Large Public Surface-Water Supplies in the Coterminous 
United States”;
• Visitors to the IRS reading room must be shadowed by an employee at all times;
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• The National Imagery and Mapping Agency has stopped selling detailed maps 
over the Internet;
• Various other agencies “have been stripping their Web sites of such data as 
security plans of hazardous chemical sites and information about weapons of mass
destruction or aviation accident reports”;
• The operators of the search engine Google have coordinated with the federal 
government to ensure that removed items are not kept in Google’s cache of Web sites 
(Cha 2002)
In October 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission took down its entire Web 
site, which included technical data about nuclear plant operations, aerial photographs of 
nuclear plants and detailed blueprints of plant systems. Eventually a bare-bones site was 
put back up (Matthews 2002). None of this was classified information — it would not 
have been publicly available to begin with if it had been. But as Matthews puts it, “What 
has traditionally been public information — whether it’s personal data from court 
documents or information on hazardous materials compiled by the Environmental 
Protection Agency — is much more public when it’s online.”
The problem is that removing information from the Web does not only cut off 
potential terrorists from information — it also cuts off citizens with legitimate interests. 
Guzy (2002) describes the role that publicly available information had in a lengthy fight 
to make safer the District of Columbia’s Blue Plains sewage treatment plant:
For years, community activists and neighboring local governments 
called for the sewage agency to substitute more benign materials for the 
large quantities of liquid chlorine kept at the plant for disinfection. If the 
plant’s tanks were breached and chlorine released as gas, it could endanger 
the lives of thousands in the metropolitan area. Public information about 
the presence of this chemical was vital to these advocacy efforts, which, 
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finally, after the events of Sept. 11, 2001, succeeded in persuading the 
District’s Water and Sewer Authority to eliminate use of liquid chlorine
and use a safer, solid chemical.
The vulnerability of a sewage treatment plant to chlorine leaks is a prime example 
of what we might call “dual-use information.” One of the most difficult problems in non-
proliferation efforts is that of dual-use technology. It’s an easy decision to prohibit the 
trade in items for which the only use is on the manufacture of chemical, biological or 
nuclear weapons. But dual-use technology is much more difficult. What should be done 
about a chemical that can be used in life-saving medical treatment or in the making of a 
deadly nerve gas?
Dual-use information presents a similar conundrum. In the case of the Blue Plains 
plant, information about its use of liquid chlorine could have made it a more attractive 
target for terrorists. But ultimately, that openness made the people living around the plant 
safer, both from terrorist attack and from industrial accidents. Without that information 
being public, they likely would have remained vulnerable to both — and ignorant of the 
danger.
Efforts to prevent terrorists from obtaining potentially damaging information have 
highlighted the ubiquity of dual-use information, most of which has historically been 
public.
• The Environmental Protection Agency has decided to remove risk-management plans 
from the Internet, a decision that troubles Gary Bass, executive director of the advocacy 
group OMB Watch: “If the toxic plume from a chemical spill would envelop a school or 
day-care center, ‘don’t parents have a right to know that?’ he asked” (Matthews 2002).
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• Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project on Government Oversight, had written 
to Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham in October 2001, asking that the Department of 
Energy remove from its Web site maps showing the locations of storage sites for 
plutonium and enriched uranium. The department took her advice but also removed 
environmental impact statements aimed at allowing people around the sites to learn about 
potential dangers posed by the storage facilities, sparking a second letter, in which she 
wrote, “Hiding safety and security problems from the public does not make them go 
away. It leaves communities unable to prepare for and deal with potential problems” 
(Matthews 2002).
• Sean Gorman, a doctoral student in geography at George Mason University, has 
compiled a computerized map of every business and industrial sector in the United States, 
along with the fiber-optic network linking up businesses. While he created the map 
entirely on the basis of publicly available information, Gorman’s map has been described 
as a potential “terrorist treasure map,” and indeed Gorman’s research now consists of 
using the map to probe for vulnerabilities. “Some argue that the critical targets should be 
publicized, because it would force the government and industry to protect them. ‘It’s a 
tricky balance,’ said Michael Vatis, founder and first director of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center. Vatis noted the dangerous time gap between exposing 
the weaknesses and patching them: ‘But I don’t think security through obscurity is a 
winning strategy’” (Blumenthal 2003).
Winning or not, it is the strategy that is being used in the case of Gorman’s 
dissertation. The Washington Post agreed not to print the results of Gorman’s research, at 
the insistence of George Mason officials, and Gorman does his work in a lab secured by 
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an electronic lock that only he and two faculty members working with him are allowed to 
open. “[T]hey even take out their own trash. When their computer crashed, they removed 
the hard drive, smashed it and rubbed magnets over the surface to erase the data.”
Gorman’s work offers an especially interesting problem. Because his map 
depends entirely on publicly available information, there is nothing to prevent someone 
with more malevolent intent from replicating his work. Yet there would be significant 
opportunity costs involved. After all, completing a dissertation-sized project requires a 
large amount of time and effort. Rather than formally classifying information, in all three 
of the examples above, efforts to deal with dual-use information have involved attempts 
to increase opportunity costs for terrorists, removing items from the Internet in the first 
two and shutting off access to outsiders in the case of Gorman’s research.
It may be that in some cases dual-use information is so dangerous, that there 
could be justification even for classifying it. Such a move would come at a cost, however, 
of limiting citizens’ ability to make informed decisions about their own lives and of 
public life generally. In other words, it would strike a blow against autonomy. Even in 
instances in which information could not conceivably be of any use to the general public, 
classifying it still robs citizens of the opportunity to judge for themselves the propriety of 
how that information is treated. While official secrecy is used under color of protecting 
citizens, those citizens are unable to hold officials accountable for questionable decisions 
precisely because the information necessary for accountability is itself secret.
Much of the current focus on dual-use information in the United States involves 
material that is already in the public domain, but much of what is classified also falls in 
the realm of dual-use information. It is precisely for this reason that official secrecy 
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should have been so worrisome for democrats, even before the recent efforts to extend 
official secrecy in the name of security. It is bad enough that citizens are, for obvious 
reasons, unable to independently evaluate classification decisions, but it is even worse 
that many state-held secrets would certainly be of some use to the citizens from whom 
they are withheld. New developments, such as the exemption of critical infrastructure 
information from FOIA disclosure requirements, make the situation much worse.
The Progressive case provides a striking example of this problem. The 1979 court 
battle over an article by Howard Morland purporting to explain how to construct a 
hydrogen bomb is best known for the still-unsettled constitutional questions it raised 
about the government’s power to use prior restraint on publication to protect vital 
national interests. In issuing a temporary restraining order forbidding publication of the 
article, District Judge Robert Warren echoed the concerns of the government then and 
many proponents of secrecy now, writing, “If a nuclear holocaust should result, our right 
to life becomes extinguished, and the right to publish becomes moot” (quoted in Black 
and Bryant 1992, p. 538). In the actual case, publication of the same information 
elsewhere rendered the question of The Progressive’s right to publish moot — and 
nuclear holocaust did not result.
The specifics of the court battle and questions about prior restraint generally 
dominate discussions of Morland’s (1979) article, but beyond that, the article itself raises 
some interesting questions about the impact of official secrecy. According to Morland’s 
account, in 1978 Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, who was a member of the House Armed 
Services Committee, sent a series of questions to the Department of Energy seeking a 
public explanation for why it was expecting a shortage of plutonium in its nuclear 
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weapons program. The department responded that it was not able to answer his questions 
in an unclassified manner and included a “secret/restricted” enclosure. The enclosure was 
a list of Dellums’ questions (Morland 1979).
Morland concludes that the most likely reason for the anticipated plutonium 
shortage was not a need for plutonium at all but tritium, a byproduct of plutonium 
production necessary for neutron bomb production. But because of the secretive practices 
of the Department of Energy, a potential debate over the morality of the neutron bomb 
was foreclosed. While this solitary instance in which the Department of Energy was able 
to, as Morland puts it, “confiscate the questions” was probably not in itself particularly 
dangerous to democracy, it does illustrate a broader pattern. “Secrecy itself, especially 
the power of a few designated ‘experts’ to declare some topics off limits, contributes to a 
political climate in which the nuclear establishment can conduct business as usual, 
protecting and perpetuating the production of these horror weapons.” (Morland 1979, p. 
14) Fuller access to information would not have necessarily led the American public to 
turn against the “horror weapons” Morland decries, but policy outcomes are not the only 
concern here. This secrecy also limited citizens’ access to the mechanisms of agenda 
setting. The impact of secrecy in this instance is not only on the outcome of a discussion 
of nuclear policy, but on whether even to have a discussion — a serious problem, 
particularly for those democrats of a more participatory vein who believe that democracy 
is discussion.11
More than two decades later, Morland insists that the Progressive case was not 
about whether to release information that could lead to dangerous proliferation and 
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ultimately nuclear war (or, today, nuclear terrorism). After all, he collected his 
information from entirely from open sources, and the real problem for states or non-state 
groups attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons is not information but access to 
materials. Indeed, for all but the most sophisticated state actors, a thermonuclear device 
of the type discussed by Morland remains out of reach, unless it were to be obtained 
already assembled. The materials and expertise, not the design plans, are the real 
obstacles. The greater danger comes from much simpler fission weapons. Writing about 
the Wen Ho Lee scandal, in which the Department of Energy accused Lee of providing 
nuclear secrets to China, Morland (2001) says, “As an interested party, of sorts, I watched 
the unfolding melodrama with a sense of disappointment. I thought I had revealed all the 
interesting H-bomb secrets some twenty years earlier in The Progressive magazine. One 
of my purposes then, as now, was to argue that nuclear bomb secrets are a hoax, and that 
public understanding of nuclear arsenals is a necessary step in the quest for nuclear 
disarmament.”
In other words, Morland argues, Judge Warren had the danger exactly wrong: 
Secrecy is more likely to drive humanity to nuclear holocaust than is an open, honest and 
complete discussion about the technology used in the most powerful weapons ever 
devised. In deciding to publish his article in 1979, Morland (2001) writes, “Certainly 
none of us had any intention of harming the United States or hastening the day of 
Armageddon. Despite our First Amendment right to do so, none of us would have 
published a story we thought of as irresponsible.”
11 “Democracy is discussion” is a saying attributed to Tomas G. Masaryk, first president of 
Czechoslovakia. It also reflects the position of contemporary theorists of deliberative democracy. 
See, for instance, Myers (1996).
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It is worth noting that the danger cited by Judge Warren, while certainly involving 
the highest stakes, is in the subjunctive mood, a tacit acknowledgement that it is 
speculative — “If a nuclear holocaust should result.” In contrast, the danger posed to 
democracy by official secrecy is anything but speculative. The true danger posed can be 
explained in the indicative mood: When the state keeps secrets, it reduces the autonomy 
of citizens and harms their ability to hold the state accountable. Morland makes a 
compelling argument that Judge Warren’s speculation is wrong, but that by itself is not 
sufficient to be fatal to the claims made by proponents of official secrecy. Even if in this 
particular situation, secrecy offers no benefit with regard to staving off human extinction, 
it is possible to imagine other cases in which it might.
For instance, the recent film “28 Days Later” offers a scenario in which a 
genetically engineered virus turns people into enraged, murderous beasts, resulting in 
large-scale destruction and a virtual end to civilization. Suppose that such a virus were 
easily created with readily available materials and that it would be absolutely incurable. 
There would be a clear benefit to keeping that information secret, even if that secrecy 
could not prevent malevolent groups from making the discovery on their own but could 
only slow them down.
Accepting this obvious conclusion is hardly a large concession for democrats. It is 
merely a recognition that the continuation of human life is a higher order concern even 
than democracy, because without living citizens, democracy is itself an empty concept. In 
that sense, Judge Warren’s reasoning is absolutely correct. If our “right to life is 
extinguished,” everything else becomes moot, including secrecy, democracy and indeed 
all of political science.
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That said, there are precious few situations in which the choice is as clear-cut as 
in the hypothetical case of the clearly fictional virus, where making information about the 
virus public could not possibly contribute anything toward a treatment or a cure. The 
real-life concerns about dual-use information, particularly in biology are much messier. 
In 2002, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published an article by 
University of Pennsylvania researcher Ariella Rosengard that explained how a protein 
from the smallpox virus made it so effective at evading the protections of the human 
immune system. While Rosengard’s work had the potential of being useful for 
bioterrorism, it was intended to aid in finding ways to reduce rejection rates in organ 
transplants (Gugliotta 2003). That same year, other researchers in the United States 
published an article describing how they created a polio virus in the laboratory, using 
DNA material ordered through the mail; in 2001, Australian scientists reported on how 
that had accidentally created a “supervirus” that, instead of sterilizing mice, killed them 
with alarming efficiency (Cohen 2003).
An easy, knee-jerk reaction to news such as this would be to institute tight 
controls on the reporting of biological research. Indeed that has been the initial preference 
of the Bush administration, which at one point asked the American Society of 
Microbiology to eliminate from articles in its 11 journals details necessary for other 
researchers to replicate experiments, a proposal that would have undercut a key pillar of 
scientific research. “‘That takes apart the whole foundation of science,’ Ronald M. Atlas, 
president-elect of the society, said of omitting methods. ‘I’ve made it reasonably clear 
that we would object to anything that smacked of censorship. They’re discussing it, and I 
wouldn’t rule them out doing something’” (Broad 2003).
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Editors of the leading scientific journals, including Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, Nature, Science, the New England Journal of Medicine and the 
Lancet, have adopted a broad, voluntary set of guidelines in an attempt to prevent 
publication of information that would be helpful to bioterrorists, but under the guidelines, 
articles will still be sufficiently detailed to allow the replication of experiments 
(Verrengia 2003). This self-policing approach has already been accompanied by more 
heavy-handed measures by the U.S. government. In February 2002, scientists receiving 
funding from the Department of Defense were told that their work would soon require 
vetting by the department before it was submitted for publication. Later in the year, the 
Department of Agriculture requested that the National Academy of Sciences not release a 
report on the potential for agricultural terrorism, despite the fact that it was based entirely 
on already public material (Cohen 2003). And in an especially absurd episode, in January 
2003, the National Research Council gathered a group of top microbiologists, most 
without security clearances, to talk with the CIA’s strategic assessments group about 
scientific openness. It was without a hint of irony that the CIA announced it was 
preparing to issue a classified report about the unclassified meeting (Brickley 2003).
What many scientists grasp that security specialists do not is that attempts at 
scientific secrecy often are futile, as the natural world is already out there simply waiting 
to be discovered:
“The model they instinctively reach for, the nuclear weapons 
model, doesn’t hold very well for a lot of reasons,” Roger Brent, director 
of the Institute for Molecular Sciences in California, told The Scientist, 
explaining the position he took at the meeting. “Nuclear weapons were 
created by governments with immense resources that could be summoned 
only by governments. The governments owned all the scientists and kept 
them behind barbed wire.”
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Not so with microbiology, which has few secrets and many skilled 
practitioners, the vast majority of them outside the government.
“In the future, if we want to deal with BW [biological warfare] 
defense, we cannot move forward in the same time-worn ways as we have 
with nuclear weapons,” said Steven Block of Stanford University’s 
departments of biological sciences and applied physics. “It's simply not 
possible to control the information in the same way, and the kinds of 
control we use for nuclear weapons do not work against biological 
weapons.”
“For good or ill, there is very little about biology that, if you could 
keep it secret, would give you any measure of protection,” Brent said 
(Cohen 2003, brackets in original).
Of course, the nuclear-weapons model of secrecy offers little protection, even 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to the Reuters wire service 
(2003), the CIA removed from its Web site photographs of centrifuge equipment 
allegedly found buried under a rose bush in a Baghdad back yard, apparently because of 
concerns that the photographs revealed the dimensions of the equipment, information that 
could be useful to countries seeking to enrich uranium for their own weapons programs. 
However, with the physical principles behind nuclear weapons well known, the problem 
for aspiring nuclear powers is not how to build the weapons, but with what to build them, 
something that has been the case since early in the nuclear age. It is telling that one of the 
key arguments against prior restraint in the Progressive case is that much of the same 
information that the Department of Energy had wanted kept secret had already been 
published in an article by Edward Teller in the 1976 edition of Encyclopedia Americana.
Albert Einstein wrote in 1947: “The basic power of the universe cannot be fitted 
into the outdated concept of narrow nationalisms. For there is no secret and there is no 
defense; there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and 
insistence of the peoples of the world” (quoted in Morland 2001).
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In short, scientific secrecy, in practice, is largely futile effort, certainly in the field 
of nuclear physics and even more so in the case of biology, where the experts cannot be 
kept “behind barbed wire.” Even worse, scientific secrecy may be counterproductive to 
public safety, as secrecy measures may hamper efforts to forge effective defenses against 
new threats. “The one thing we have going for us is an infrastructure in biomedical 
research which is far ahead of the ability of the bad guys to use it,” says Sam Kaplan, 
chairman of the publications board of the American Society of Microbiology (quoted in 
Gugliotta 2003).
Scientific secrecy is a special case, though. When there is knowledge to be gained 
about the natural world, dependent solely on technical competence and the use of the 
scientific method, there is not enough power in the world to prevent its discovery. As the 
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy noted, “There was no real 
scientific secret to atomic fission; German scientists knew it. There are no secrets in 
science. Oppenheimer and his associates had ‘simply’ figured out the techniques and 
found the resources to build a bomb before our enemies did” (1997, p. A-27). For 
nonscientific secrets, however, the story is much different. In Poor Richard’s Almanac in 
1735, Benjamin Franklin pointed out the likelihood of a breakdown in the discipline of 
secrecy when he said, “Three may keep a secret if two of them are dead.” However, if 
discipline does not break down or prove insufficient, the information concealed in a 
nonscientific secret is absolutely invulnerable to independent discovery.
Imagine two partners planning a bank robbery. If one decides to turn informant, 
the plan is exposed; likewise if they discuss their plans on a phone line that has been 
tapped by law enforcement. Without some kind of breakdown in discipline or accidental 
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revelation, though, the robbers’ secret is totally secure until they chose to reveal it to the 
world. It cannot be discovered independently through deduction or the application of the 
scientific method. Outside the realm of what is covered by the Atomic Energy Act, 
almost all official secrecy in the United States is of this kind. In some ways that suggests 
that for the most part official secrecy does not have to be an exercise in futility, as many 
people suggest is the case for the subcategory of scientific secrets. That official secrecy 
can be effective does not mean that it is not damaging. Quite the contrary, official 
secrecy, scientific or not, diminishes citizen autonomy and the ability to hold the state 
accountable.
Undercutting public debate
Regardless of the impact on security in any particular instance — positive, 
negative or indifferent — official secrecy directly undercuts the ability of citizens to 
debate and influence public policy. Echoing Morland, Halperin (1985) describes the 
impact of official secrecy on the ability of the public to debate and influence U.S. nuclear 
policy:
Clearly, the president has vast potential power to prevent or limit various 
forms of unauthorized disclosure of information related to nuclear war. He 
is unlikely to exercise that power unless public debate threatens to 
interfere seriously with the executive branch’s view of what the national 
security requires. In a crisis, when there is extensive public opposition to 
administration policy, the temptation to use these powers might well be 
irresistible. (p. 117)
One might argue that U.S. nuclear policy is too important and complex to be subjected to 
the vagaries of public debate. This is an anti-democratic argument, though. The 
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importance of this policy area is precisely why citizens, if they are truly valued for their 
competence and autonomy, must be involved. During the Cold War, at least, it is difficult 
to think of a matter of greater gravity than that of nuclear policy. If the idea of self-
government means is at all meaningful, surely it must include policy questions that are 
the most gravely important.
Experts, citizens and policy
The point about the complexity of the issues involved is well taken but is not 
sufficient justification to call for a substitution of expertise for citizenship. The average 
citizen lacks the know-how to construct a nuclear weapon, select targets or fill in the 
details on war-fighting strategy: Indeed the average citizen has no need for such skills. If 
it has been decided that official policy should include contingencies for the use of nuclear 
weapons, the details of how to carry out such a policy are best left to the experts. These 
issues are what Dewey and Tufts (1908) call scientific problems:
The problems which fall to the lot of proper organs of administrative 
inspection and supervision are essentially scientific problems, questions 
for expert intelligence conjoined with wide sympathy. In the true sense of 
the word political, they are political questions: that is, they relate to the 
welfare of society as an organized community of attainment and behavior. 
In the cant sense of the term political, the sense of conventional party-
issues and party-lines, they have no more to do with politics than have the 
multiplication table and laws of hygiene (pp. 472-3).
The average citizen has no more business — or interest in — deciding the finer 
points of nuclear weapons design or strategy than he or she does designing roller 
coasters, but that does not mean that nuclear weapons do not involve political issues, 
which quite properly invite public participation. That the average citizen is not qualified 
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to participate in weapons design or military planning does not mean that he or she has no 
rational interest in nuclear policy. Quite the contrary. Citizens should be involved in 
debate over general direction of nuclear policy. For example, the layperson may not be 
the best person to ask how to design a new weapon, but in a democracy he or she should 
have a say over whether. The “how” is a scientific question, not a political one, but the 
“whether” is another matter entirely and should be the subject of debate. Barber (1984) 
makes the distinction clear:
Where there is certain knowledge, true science, or absolute right, there is 
no conflict that cannot be resolved by reference to the unity of truth, and 
thus there is no necessity for politics.
Politics concerns itself only with those realms where truth is not —
or is not yet — known. We do not vote for the best polio vaccine or 
conduct surveys on the ideal space shuttle, nor has Boolean algebra been 
subjected to electoral testing. But Laetrile and genetic engineering, while 
they belong formally to the domain of science, have aroused sufficient 
conflict among scientists to throw them into the political domain — and 
rightly so. Where consensus stops, politics starts (p. 129).
Democratic politics traffics in uncertainty. It is the fantasy of certain knowledge 
that lies behind the idea of government by experts, from Plato’s philosopher-kings to 
modern technocrats. But there is a difference between accepting the inevitability of a 
certain amount of uncertainty and promoting it with a policy of official secrecy.
However, the climate Morland (1979) describes, in which technocratic elites can 
declare some topics off-limits, still holds today, and it stifles not only debate over the 
how but also over the whether. The result is that citizens are denied self-government in a 
policy area that secrecy proponents and opponents alike consider important, and the state 
becomes less accountable to its citizens.
Representatives might be expected to introduce accountability in areas in which 
the populace at large cannot. Indeed for proponents of thinner versions of democracy, 
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accountability through representation is desirable. In practice, though, accountability 
through representation has failed in policy areas covered by official secrecy, particularly 
with regard to national security and foreign affairs. For instance, the planning and 
implementation of covert action, which by definition must be secretive, involves a natural 
bias toward taking covert action rather than following some other course of action, due to 
the way the decision-making process is set up and the participants are chosen. Halperin 
(1975) offers the planning process for the Bay of Pigs invasion as an example of this 
phenomenon:
Cutting off many officials from the Bay of Pigs operation meant not only 
that officials knowledgeable about the Cuban scene were unable to 
comment and warn the President that the kind of uprising on which the 
plan depended was unlikely, but also the narrow circle meant that the 
President was not confronted with advice from those who could have 
pointed out the limitations of the different ways by which the presumed 
threat from the Castro regime could be contained. (p. 46)
Decisions for covert operations come in a necessarily decentralized, secretive system, 
which increases the chance the president will choose them, whereas other types of policy 
debate are prone to be more open and involve more potential critics or proponents of 
alternatives.
In the case of covert action, the doctrine of “plausible deniability” is set up 
specifically to avoid accountability. Reforms in oversight mechanisms following the 
revelations of the Church Committee in the 1970s did bring about changes but could not 
change the fundamental fact that the doctrine of plausible deniability is incompatible with 
accountability. The Iran-Contra affair, in which covert actions undertaken by the 
executive branch contradicted stated U.S. policy, is a notorious example of this problem 
with accountability. “While the new procedures have worked for the overwhelming 
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majority of covert actions, they have been most likely to be ignored by the executive 
branch in its planning and implementation of paramilitary operations, as the Iran-contra
affair vividly illustrates.” (Johnson 1989) Accountability mechanisms that can be ignored 
at will cannot be said to increase accountability. Covert actions, by virtue of their very 
secrecy are unaccountable and can even be expected to contradict openly stated policy. 
Marchetti and Marks (1974) describe a situation during the Vietnam War in which 
William Colby, who was deputy ambassador to Vietnam and would later become director 
of central intelligence, was officially acting to shore up the Vietnamese economy while at 
the same time buying piasters on the black market to make the agency’s funds go farther. 
Thanks to the “clandestine mentality”:
[A] William Colby can with no legal or ethical conflict, propose programs 
to end corruption in Vietnam while at the same time condoning the CIA’s 
dubious money practices. ... This is the clandestine mentality: a separation 
of personal morality and conduct from actions, no matter how debased, 
which are taken in the name of the United States government and, more 
specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency. (p. 248)
This kind of contradiction in policy is the kind of problem that begs to be resolved 
through oversight, but even after the Church Committee revelations, even after the Iran-
Contra reforms, oversight is not something that most members of Congress do gladly. 
Congressional intelligence committees are specifically designed to perform the oversight 
function, and all members of Congress are allowed to inspect those committees’ files, 
although in practice, very few actually do. Despite their mandate to perform oversight, 
members have lacked the will to do it adequately — and continue to lack that will (Sigal 
1975, Holt 1995). Lack of curiosity bears some responsibility for the Iran-Contra affair, 
and there is no indication that congressional oversight has become more aggressive since 
then (Holt 1995), or for that matter since 1975 when Sigal noted that it was common for 
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members of Congress actually to wish to know as little as possible about official secrets. 
Indeed, since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, there has been a backlash against Church 
Committee reforms, with critics claiming that oversight has crippled the U.S. intelligence 
community.
There is also a great deal of informal communication about secret activities. 
Washington is a hotbed of official secrecy, but actual secrecy is much less common, as a 
great deal is communicated through informal channels. However, information 
communicated this way is not an effective way of promoting oversight, due to the 
difference between formal and informal communication. Regardless of its effectiveness, 
it also leaves citizens out of the loop. “Informal communication not only fails to satisfy 
Congress’ need for information in order to perform its oversight function, but also lessens 
the opportunity for senior officials in the executive branch to exercise control and 
monitor compliance with their own objectives.” (Sigal 1975, p. 87) As an example, Sigal 
cites the Manhattan Project and subsequent atomic bombing of Japan in which “official 
secrecy did not eliminate informal communication about the bomb, but it did limit formal 
discussion in official forums where knowledgeable participants might raise and evaluate 
options for its use” (p. 88). The bottom line is that formally, members of Congress tend to 
avoid knowing enough to perform an adequate job of oversight as representative of 
democratic citizens, and the greater amounts of information that are obtained informally 
are not useful for oversight.
Holt describes the situation for oversight succinctly:
The question was asked of a former chairman of one of the 
congressional intelligence committees: “How can an open society assert 
political control over activities which are necessarily secret?”
The answer came back like a shot: “It can't.” (p. 238)
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Official secrecy is problematic for democratic theory and democratic citizenship 
even in situations in which information might be kept secret for legitimate national 
security purposes. In practice, though, the problem extends further. Official secrecy 
frequently goes beyond the bounds of what might be considered legitimate for reasons of 
national security. Overclassification, the practice of shielding documents from scrutiny to 
a greater extent than necessary remains rampant in the United States (Gries 1993, 
Moynihan 1998) and abroad (Goldman 1985, Thomas 1976) and seems to be endemic to 
bureaucratic environments in which there are formal mechanisms of secrecy (Halperin 
and Hoffman 1977).
In 1997, according to the Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing 
Official Secrecy, there were 2 million federal officials with classification power, along 
with another 1 million people in private sector involved in contract relationships with the 
federal government. “Apart from aspects of nuclear energy subject to the Atomic Energy 
Act, secrets in the Federal Government are whatever anyone with a stamp decides to 
stamp secret. There is no statutory base and never has been” (p. xxii.). Regardless, those 
stamps get used a lot and in many cases inappropriately. The Information Security 
Oversight Office has estimated that between 1 and 10 percent of all classified documents 
are being unnecessarily concealed. While it appears that overclassification is rampant, no 
one is quite sure how much information is classified, as classification actions can cover a 
wide range, and no other reliable statistics are available. It is not surprising that the 
extent, if not existence, of overclassification is also subject to controversy (p. 36). 
Quantifying overclassification is not necessary to understanding the scope of the 
problem, though. According to the Moynihan commission:
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It may be more meaningful to recognize that the perennial problem 
of unwarranted classification attests to the continued failure of classifiers 
to engage in a rigorous assessment of the need for classification. For 
instance, in seeking to protect information about certain weapons systems
(the classification of which has been permitted under successive executive 
orders), many of the support functions associated with these systems, such 
as information concerning logistical and administrative support, have also 
been classified even though it was doubtful that their disclosure could 
have caused any damage to the national security. In the Commission’s 
review of one intelligence agency’s documents, a memorandum to 
employees of the agency describing an upcoming “family day” in which 
family members could visit the agency was classified Confidential 
because the person who signed the memorandum was under cover. By 
simply omitting the name of that individual, the memo would have been 
unclassified. The entire agenda for a Commission meeting at one 
intelligence agency was classified because one word — not crucial to the 
topic being discussed — revealed a classified relationship. At other 
meetings, Commission staff inquiries as to why certain briefing slides 
were classified were met with responses such as “I’m not sure,” or “This is 
just the way we prepare our materials” (p. 36).
Overclassification is problematic not only because it prevents citizens at large 
from gaining access to potentially useful information but because it also can keep 
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information from reaching officials who might be able to act directly upon it.12 Arendt 
(1969) provides two examples in which information that did not come to light led to 
missed opportunities. In 1945 and 1946 Ho Chi Minh wrote several letters to President 
Truman seeking U.S. support for Vietnamese independence along the same lines of that 
of the Philippines. In another instance, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai sought to avoid 
dependence on the Soviet Union by establishing relations with the United States. Neither 
instance, which contradicted the popular image of a monolithic world communism 
stretching from Berlin to Beijing to Hanoi, came to light until more than two decades 
later, after the United States had embarked on the disastrous Vietnam War. That U.S. 
decision makers were unaware of these developments is telling according to Arendt:
 This sheds some light on one of the gravest dangers of 
overclassification: not only are the people and their elected representatives 
denied access to what they must know to form an opinion and make 
decisions, but also the actors themselves, who receive top clearance to 
receive all the relevant facts, remain blissfully unaware of them. And this 
is not because some invisible hand directly leads them astray, but because 
they work under circumstances and with habits of mind, that allow them 
neither time nor inclination to go hunting for pertinent facts in mountains 
of documents, 99 1/2 percent of which should not be classified and most 
of which are irrelevant for all practical purposes. (p. 30)
Still there are incentives for officials to overclassify. The ability of the executive 
to classify documents, which even under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act is 
12 The Pentagon’s proposed Policy Analysis Market, which was shut down after widespread 
outrage over the possibility of trading in “terrorism futures,” offers an interesting illustration of the 
importance of getting information to people who can act on it. Supporters of the proposal pointed 
to political futures markets, which have been able to predict the outcomes of elections with even 
greater accuracy than public opinion polls. There is a crucial difference that got lost in this 
discussion, though. Information necessary to predict election outcomes is, for the most part, 
public and available to traders. For the Policy Analysis Market, much more of the relevant 
information, would be classified, based on communications intercepts or other necessarily secret 
techniques. Even if intelligence analysts had been allowed to participate, compartmentalization of 
information would have left almost all traders in the dark. Such a market could have been 
expected to have about the same precision and accuracy as a market in predicting winning lottery 
numbers. Had the program been allowed to continue, its failure would have shown dramatically 
shown part of the price paid for official secrecy.
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essentially unquestioned and unchecked, encourages abuse, especially when the 
executive can secure information that might be harmful to its political interests, 
irrespective of national security concerns. Further, selective classification and 
declassification can be used for spin, precluding a truly informed public from acting as a 
check on the executive. One solution proposed in the United States has been to allow the 
courts to rule on the propriety of classification decisions (Harvard Law Review 1990). 
This could conceivably remedy some abuses, but it would do nothing to remove the 
incentives that lead to overclassification to begin with.
All too often, information is concealed less for national security concerns than for 
purposes of domestic political advantage. For instance during the Congo crisis in 1960, in 
which the CIA plotted to kill Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the United States 
released information selectively that indicated that it was not intervening in the Congo 
and was actually acting to prevent intervention by other countries. This deception was for 
the consumption of American audiences rather than potential adversaries: The Soviet 
Union was already aware of American actions, as demonstrated by the reporting Pravda 
was doing on an American role in a plot to eliminate Lumumba (Gibbs 1995). More 
recently, when Chinese Gen. Zhang Wannian visited the White House in September 
1998, the Pentagon refused to release an official biography of the general, saying it was 
classified. Timperlake and Triplett (1999) claim national security was a guise for the real 
reason for keeping the his biography secret:
What was so sensitive about Gen. Zhang’s visit? Perhaps the 
White House did not want the American public to know that another 
“butcher of Beijing” was getting the royal treatment in Washington. 
According to a U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong all PLA (People’s 
Liberation Army) military region commanders sent troops to Beijing to 
participate in the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 3-4, 1989. At the 
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time, Zhang was commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, and his 
15th Airborne Army troops assaulted the square from the south, filling 
hospitals with dead and wounded. We can well understand why the 
administration would not want President Clinton’s picture with such a man 
to circulate on this side of the Pacific.
There are even indications now that secrecy may have been used to mislead 
Americans into supporting a dubious case for pre-emptive war. It may well be that 
President Bush was entirely sincere when he said that the United States could not wait for 
a smoking gun on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program because that smoking gun could be a 
mushroom cloud over an American city. But secrecy severely hampered the ability of 
Americans to evaluate fully the case for war. At this point, much of the evidence for an 
active nuclear-weapons program in Iraq has been shown to be overblown, and it appears 
that the stated case for war was based either on bad intelligence or bad-faith 
characterizations about what the U.S. intelligence community knew about Iraq. Either 
way, the arguments were based on secret information that was susceptible to selective 
disclosure.
[N]ew information indicates a pattern in which President Bush, 
Vice President Cheney and their subordinates — in public and behind the 
scenes — made allegations depicting Iraq's nuclear weapons program as 
more active, more certain and more imminent in its threat than the data 
they had would support. On occasion administration advocates withheld 
evidence that did not conform to their views. The White House seldom 
corrected misstatements or acknowledged loss of confidence in 
information upon which it had previously relied (Gellman and Pincus 
2003).
The charge that the Bush administration withheld some evidence is especially 
disturbing, but even if the administration was completely forthright, it is troubling that 
the citizens of a democracy were put in a position where they were expected to choose 
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sides on a major policy issue — they don’t get much bigger that the decision of whether 
to go to war — without a real opportunity to evaluate the evidence fully.
Admittedly, not all issues affected by secrecy are as consequential as this one, but 
it illustrates just how significant an impact official secrecy can have on the autonomy of 
citizens and their ability to hold their representatives accountable for their actions. 
Indeed, accountability in this case cannot be achieved without further revelations of what 
was known by the United States government and an accompanying explanation of either 
how officials were able to mislead the public or why intelligence efforts failed so badly. 
This accountability simply cannot be achieved in a climate of total secrecy; if national 
security does indeed require that disclosures about the lead-up to the Iraq war be limited, 
it may well be that accountability is impossible.
A recent political cartoon by Tom Toles depicts President Bush saying, “We can’t 
release that information because it would reveal our ‘sources and methods,’” along with a 
suggestion that sources could include “somebody said it,” “wild guess” and “really cool 
dream,” while methods could include “select convenient facts,” “conversation with self” 
and “lie.” In truth, the sources and methods protected by official secrecy could be 
perfectly legitimate, or they could be exactly the kinds of things Toles names. There is no 
way of knowing. But when there is an intimation that secrecy has been used to aid in 
dishonesty, all secrets become suspect. Toles provides a humorous example of the kind of 
suspicion can engender. The next chapter will show just how serious that suspicion can 
be. Even when used solely in ways that would be judged legitimate, official secrecy 
undercuts accountability and citizen autonomy; when it is coupled with the appearance of 
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misconduct, the harm becomes even greater, a problem that will be discussed in greater 
depth in Chapter 4.
96
Chapter 4
Won’t Get Fooled Again: Secrets and Suspicion
In undercutting accountability and citizen autonomy, official secrecy already 
shows itself to be a fundamentally anti-democratic phenomenon. But the circle of damage 
it causes extends beyond those areas. Given the permanent place it has found in 
contemporary statecraft, it is vital that theorists and practitioners of democratic 
government understand the corrosive effect official secrecy has on democracy so that 
they can minimize its effects. Those effects are multifaceted and wide-ranging, but one 
has been particularly glaring in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. Official secrecy creates fertile ground for thinking in what 
Richard Hofstadter (1979) referred to as the “paranoid style,” potentially poisoning the 
relationship between citizens and the state.
For the United States, suspicion and paranoia13 are part of the inevitable legacy of 
half a century of Cold War secrets and lies. Indeed, any state that keeps secrets as a 
matter of course will foster suspicion among its citizens about its true actions and 
motives. For democracy, this is a particularly acute problem that is not addressed 
adequately either in theory or practice. It is not argued here that all suspicion or paranoia 
has its roots in official secrecy. Plainly, that is not the case, as in the American 
experience, the history of the paranoid style extends further back in time than the modern 
system of official secrecy (Hofstadter 1979). An enormous literature explores the roots of 
paranoia as a symptom of mental illness. But it would be a mistake to leave the study of 
13 The terms ‘suspicion’ and ‘paranoia’ are frequently paired here, but there is a distinction 
intended. On a continuum extending from trust to distrust, suspicion and paranoia are both types 
of distrust, and paranoia can be seen simply as an extreme form of suspicion. A further distinction 
is useful, though. Whereas suspicion involves doubt and uncertainty about a particular claim, 
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the paranoid style (as opposed to clinical paranoia) to psychology and psychiatry alone,
for the distrust that is part and parcel of paranoia extends beyond what is conventionally 
called mental illness and has enormous costs for democracy, particularly when that 
distrust is directed at the state. Nor is true clinical paranoia necessary for citizens to be 
taken in outrageous stories in the style of paranoid delusions. As Hofstadter explains: “In 
fact, the idea of the paranoid style as a force in politics would have little contemporary 
relevance or historical value if it were applied only to men with profoundly disturbed 
minds. It is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that 
makes the phenomenon significant” (p. 4). It is argued here that the phenomenon is very 
significant and that official secrecy makes paranoid-style accounts of state activities 
possible and makes belief in those accounts attractive.
Two narratives — one true, one false — illustrate how official secrecy aids and 
abets thinking in the paranoid style:
The first reads like a scenario from a Cold War novel, but it is based on solid 
historical research. On March 13, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara with a plan to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. 
Operation Northwoods was to involve a series of staged incidents intended to be blamed 
on Cuba, thus providing a pretext for war and offering the military a chance to finish the 
job that was botched at the Bay of Pigs. The plan called for hijacking planes, sinking 
boats carrying Cuban refugees and orchestrating acts of terrorism in Washington and 
Miami. Whether McNamara explicitly rejected the Operation Northwoods is not clear, 
but within three days, President Kennedy had told Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman 
paranoia involves both rejection of a claim and certainty about an alternative claim for which a 
reasonable person would see insufficient evidence.
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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that overt military force would not be used to replace Castro. 
However, the Joint Chiefs continued planning pretext operations against Cuba for at least 
another year. The plans remained unknown until 2001, when James Bamford uncovered 
written documentation for his book, Body of Secrets. Bamford describes Operation 
Northwoods as possibly “the most corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government” (p. 
82).14
The second narrative reads like a sequel to the first, but it lacks any credible 
evidence for its claims. It is perhaps most kindly described as a piece of creative writing. 
On Sept. 11, 2001, an explosion at the Pentagon killed 189 people. While some initial 
reports indicated that a truck bomb had exploded, they were quickly followed by reports 
that a commercial airliner, American Airlines Flight 77, had crashed into the building. 
But according to French activist Thierry Meyssan, the untold story of that day is that the 
initial reports were probably correct. In the French best seller L’effroyable Imposture 
(The Frightening Fraud), Meyssan (2002) argues that after the attack the Pentagon 
exhibited far too little damage to have been hit by a Boeing 757. Instead, he says, the 
damage to the Pentagon was caused by a missile strike or truck bomb and then made to 
appear to be the result of a plane crash, all as part of a much wider plot by the U.S. 
government. If any of Meyssan’s charges were true, the Sept. 11 attacks would easily 
surpass Operation Northwoods in terms of of U.S. governmental corruption.
14 A detailed discussion of Operation Northwoods in found in Body of Secrets. A declassified 
memorandum from Lemnitzer on a portion of the plan is also available on line at the National 
Security Archive at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/.
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It is easy to dismiss Meyssan as a crackpot, but it would be a mistake to ignore 
him. The truly frightening thing about The Frightening Fraud is its popularity. Its first 
printing of 20,000 copies sold out in two hours, and in April 2002 it was at the top of 
Amazon France’s best-seller list (“French Lap Up Pentagon Crash ‘Fraud.’” 2002). 
Meyssan is far from alone in having found an audience for a such account of the Sept. 11 
attacks, as conspiracy theories have proliferated on both sides of the Atlantic. Aside from 
a conspiratorial world view, all these accounts have in common the idea that the U.S. 
government is keeping an important secret, that it is hiding its true role in an attack on its 
own citizens. At first glance, this seems completely implausible, but bringing to mind 
Operation Northwoods carries such a plot closer to the realm of the believable. Here was 
an actual historical case in which every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed in 
writing to a plan that would have involved the slaughter of innocent American citizens in 
order to create a pretext for a war that otherwise would have been politically impossible. 
Only cooler heads in the Kennedy administration prevented the plan from being put into 
action. As narratives, Bamford’s account of Operation Northwoods and the conspiratorial 
accounts of the Sept. 11 attacks are strikingly similar. The crucial difference is that 
Bamford’s account is well-documented, whereas the Meyssan account and others like it 
are based on speculation and innuendo masquerading as serious research.
Not surprisingly, many who reject the obvious conclusion that the 19 al-Qaeda 
hijackers were responsible for the Sept. 11 atrocities cite Operation Northwoods as 
evidence for the plausibility of their claims that the U.S. government was actively 
involved in the mass murder of its own citizens.
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• Carol Valentine (2001) claims, “There were no ‘suicide’ hijackers aboard those 
jets on September 11. Advanced robotics technology, not the hijackers, was controlling 
the jets when they crashed.” She goes on to cite Bamford, explaining, “In other words, 
U.S. allies and people within the U.S. military establishment are not opposed to killing 
U.S. servicemen and civilians, given the right goal.”
• Steve Grey (2002), claims the U.S. Air Force stood down to allow the attacks, 
writing, “If it is to be claimed that the evidence for collusion, is over-ruled by a belief 
that no country would do this to its own citizens, then it must be pointed out that the 
contemplation of terrorist attacks on US citizens by the CIA (sic) is a matter of public 
record. The previously classified ‘Northwoods’ document reveals that in 1962, the CIA 
seriously considered the possibility of carrying out terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, 
in order to blame it on Cuba.”
• Jim Marrs (2002), who claims the attacks were planned as a pretext for a war in 
Afghanistan to clear the way for a new oil pipeline, also cites Bamford:
“The question becomes: Would any American allow an attack on fellow 
Americans just to further his own business or political agenda?
“The answer, unfortunately, appears to be ‘Yes.’”
These particular theories seem not to have gained as much currency in the United 
States as Meyssan’s has in France, but that does not mean that Americans are not 
suspicious that they have not been told the whole truth about Sept. 11. In October 2001, 
Louis Farrakhan, the controversial but popular leader of the Nation of Islam, called for 
the Bush administration to release proof that Osama bin Laden was behind the Sept. 11 
attacks. “Don’t hide behind national security,” he said, adding, “They have lied before 
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and there’s no guarantee they are not lying now” (Associated Press 2001). There was also 
the June 19, 2002, CNN report, subsequently picked up by the print media, that the 
National Security Agency had intercepted communications about the attacks on Sept. 10, 
2001, but had not translated them until Sept. 12. Initial reaction suggested that many 
Americans find it entirely plausible that the U.S. government could have stopped the 
attacks but instead did nothing.
A history of suspicion
The terrorist attacks were a uniquely traumatic event for the United States, but 
widespread suspicion about the U.S. government having a hidden role in various events is 
nothing new. A 1964 survey found that only 36 percent of Americans accepted the 
Warren Commission’s finding that Lee Harvey Oswald had acted alone in assassinating 
President Kennedy. By 1978, only 18 percent believed Oswald had acted alone, while 75 
percent believed he had been part of a larger conspiracy. There has been little change in 
the numbers since then. According to 1997 CNN-Time survey, a similar number, 80 
percent, “believe that their government is hiding knowledge of the existence of 
extraterrestrial life forms” (Moynihan 1998).
While official secrecy is not the only source of suspicion and absurd belief, it is 
not without blame in these cases either. As Moynihan (1997) notes:
[T]oday something like half of all Americans think the CIA was involved 
in the assassination of President Kennedy. There is even a Hollywood 
movie to prove it.
Nor can historians disprove it. The records are sealed. We have an 
Assassination Records Review Board that lets some things out; not much.
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Greater openness might not silence conspiracy theorists, but it would at least reduce their 
appeal for a mass audience.
Park (2000) traces belief in a flying-saucer cover-up to the combination of garbled 
information and official silence to come out of the infamous Roswell incident in 1947. 
The Air Force confirmed in 1994 that the alleged flying saucer was, in fact, a weather 
balloon from Project Mogul.15
If there is any mystery still surrounding the Roswell incident, it is why 
uncovering Project Mogul in 1994 failed to put an end to the UFO myth. 
There appear to be several reasons, all related to the fact that the truth 
came out almost half a century too late. Rather than weakening the UFO 
myth, Project Mogul was pounced on by believers as proof that everything 
that everything the government had said before was a lie, and there was no 
reason to believe this was not just another lie. Government denials are by 
now greeted with derision (Park 2000, p. 179).
Nor is it just a matter of almost 50 years of silence about one incident that is 
responsible for UFO hysteria. The Air Force was actively if unintentionally complicit in 
perpetuating the myth. According to Park:
But if it was Project Mogul that started the UFO myth, it was 
another secret government program that kept it going. It was common 
during the cold war to create cover stories to protect secret operations, 
including flights of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union. Initially, the 
U-2s were unpainted; that is, their skin was shiny, metallic aluminum, 
which strongly reflected sunlight, particularly in the morning and evening 
hours, when the surface below was dark, the U-2s would pick up the Sun’s 
rays, becoming very visible. The CIA estimates that over half of all UFO 
reports from the late 1950s through the 1960s were secret reconnaissance 
flights by U-2 spy planes. To allay public concern while maintaining the 
secrecy of the U-2 missions, the air force concocted far-fetched 
explanations in terms of natural phenomena. Keeping secrets, we learn 
early in life, leads directly to telling lies (p. 180).
15 Project Mogul was a classified project for developing high-altitude weather balloons for use in 
detecting Soviet nuclear tests. Thomas (1995) offers a detailed comparison of debris found at 
Roswell with materials used in Project Mogul and pinpoints the test flight that was the likely 
source of the debris.
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It is a serious problem for democracy when three-quarters of a country’s citizens 
believe that their own government is lying to them on matters ranging from the most 
serious (the Kennedy assassination) to the fantastic (the existence of space aliens). It is 
also a serious matter for a democracy to have lied to its citizens, as the United States 
government did from time to time in waging the Cold War. As for citizens, their 
suspicions are understandable, even if frequently misdirected. They have been lied to 
time and time again, and it is only reasonable to doubt a government with a history of 
repeated lying, particularly when that government is known to have secrets it won’t 
reveal — even if the reasons for secrecy in any given instance are perfectly legitimate. 
Little wonder then that according to Robins and Post (1997), paranoia is a “characteristic 
worldview of the late twentieth century” (p. 47).
Insiders and outsiders, secrets and lies
Based on Bok’s (1984) definition of secrecy as intentional concealment, official 
secrecy has immediate consequences for the psychology of citizens, as it “presupposes 
separation, a setting apart of the secret from the non-secret, and of keepers of a secret 
from those excluded. ... The separation between insider and outsider is inherent in 
secrecy; and to think something secret is already to envisage a conflict between what 
insiders conceal and what outsiders want to inspect or lay bare” (p. 6). For the paranoid 
or the conspiracy theorist, that separation of insider from outsider is keenly felt. The 
conspiracy theory can be read as an effort to erase that distinction, to bring the outsider 
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inside by revealing what is hidden, even as paradoxically, the outsiderdom may become 
central to his or her identity.
The inside-outside distinction is significant in that it not only allows the insider to 
keep secrets, but to use that power in an abusive manner. Official secrecy can be used as 
a tool to blunt criticism or hide potentially embarrassing information. All too often, 
information is concealed less for national security concerns than for purposes of domestic 
political advantage. Obvious examples in include U.S. actions in the Congo crisis in 1960 
(Gibbs 1995) and the refusal of the White House in 1998 to release the biography of a 
visiting Chinese general (Timperlake and Triplett 1999), events that are both discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 3. The key issue  involved in these cases is secrecy. In terms of 
raising suspicions — probably rightly in this case — the contents of Zhang’s biography 
are less significant than the fact that they are being hidden.
Timperlake and Triplett’s article shows either a genuine abuse of secrecy or at the 
very least an illustration of the kind of suspicion official secrecy foments. The emergency 
landing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane on Hainan offers a more recent illustration. At an 
April 19, 2001, news briefing, Rear Adm. Craig R. Quigley refused to answer questions 
about whether or when reconnaissance flights would resume off the Chinese coast. Asked 
one reporter:
I mean, you and the secretary have both made a big point of saying that 
these are not spy missions because they’re done overtly and they’re not 
secret. So why are you now turning around and telling us that you can’t 
tell us anything about it because you don’t want to telegraph anything, if 
these are supposed to be done overt — if these are overt intelligence 
gathering and not secret spying?
Quigley ended up suggesting that the Chinese government be asked for a schedule of 
American reconnaissance flights. The reporter’s question is worthwhile because 
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presumably the flights are not secret from the Chinese military — in at least one instance, 
it was able to detect a flight with sufficient accuracy to cause a midair collision. It may be 
that Quigley refused to answer on the grounds that openly discussing the flights would 
irritate the Chinese government at a sensitive time in a way that remaining silent about 
them would not; this would be a realistic concern. However, to someone already dubious 
about the truthfulness of the U.S. account, this refusal to answer would be cause for 
further suspicion. Justified or not, this kind of suspicion is a very real perception for some 
citizens and at sufficient levels runs the risk of being corrosive to democracy.
Secrets and lies are close neighbors. Conspiracy theorists know they are being lied 
to because something is being hidden, but they go a step beyond mere suspicion in that 
despite the concealment they manufacture narratives explaining with precision and a 
great deal of certainty what is hidden. Official pronouncements about the propriety of 
what is being done in secret do not move them, just as Dorothy and her friends in The 
Wizard of Oz are not moved by the Wizard’s plea to “Pay no attention to the man behind 
the curtain.” At its most extreme, the paranoid style involves a mixture of extreme 
skepticism about the “official line” and equally extreme credulity with regard to one’s 
own counternarrative, which holds together, if at all, only with the thinnest threads of 
evidence. Just as forest rangers think, “Fire,” when they see smoke, political paranoids 
think, “Lie,” when they see a secret. They are not entirely without justification in reacting 
this way. As Robins and Post (1997) note, “Paranoia — especially political paranoia — is 
seldom a complete delusion. It is typically a distortion of a truth” (p. 50). This distortion 
that is dangerous for democratic politics, but it is important to remember the kernel of 
truth being distorted. In this case, it is that secrets begets lies.
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Beyond the passive protection of information that the holder may prefer not to 
reveal, secrecy makes it possible to manipulate proactively what others believe through 
selective disclosure, misdirection and outright lying — a potential that can have wide-
ranging strategic consequences. Imagine, for instance, a poker game in which a player 
holding a pair wins the pot after bluffing out an opponent holding a full house. Through a 
combination of luck and misleading signals (drawing, betting, gestures, etc.), the player is 
able to win the pot with an inferior hand. Now imagine the same player trying that bluff 
with his or her cards face up on the table. The bluff succeeds in the first instance only 
because of the secrecy of the hand. The same principle that holds for the bluffing poker 
player also holds for the democratic state practicing official secrecy, the difference being 
that it is much more problematic for the democratic state to try to bluff its citizens. This is 
what President Eisenhower attempted to do in using a cover story to explain the 1960 
downing of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane, in the hopre of preserving plausible 
deniability. Only when it became clear how much the Soviets knew did it become 
obvious that he was essentially trying to bluff with all his cards showing.
Eisenhower’s failure to sustain plausible deniability in this instance was a 
watershed event, as many Americans realized for the first time that their government 
would lie to them. A generation after the disaster in Vietnam and the revelations of 
Watergate, in an era in which one president parses the meaning of the word “is” and his 
successor is widely viewed as having started a war on the basis of a series of lies, the 
significance of this realization is difficult to appreciate. But for practitioners of the 
paranoid style, the enormity of the realization that their government has secrets and will 
lie about them is a source of unending irritation and an inexhaustible source for unending 
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theorizing. The U-2 crisis demonstrated for the first time the problems inherent in the 
plausible deniability (Holt 1995), but it did not mean an end to the doctrine. The Iran-
Contra scandal offers a more recent example with yet another dramatic failure of 
plausible deniability, but executive-branch officials continue to insist that the possibility 
of lying to the public is a vital tool for national security, going so far as to defend the 
principle, as Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson did in an amicus brief for the Supreme 
Court in the 2002 Christopher v. Harbury case.
In addition to lies about covert operations, the United States used disinformation 
more broadly as an instrument of foreign policy during the Cold War, at one point going 
so far as to have the CIA produce a pornographic film starring an actor who resembled 
Indonesian President Sukarno (Zakaria 2002). Given the Bush administration’s strong 
reaction against reports of plans by the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Information to 
plant disinformation with journalists overseas, the strategy may be falling out of favor. 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld denied plans for a disinformation campaign, 
saying, “The Pentagon does not lie to the American people. ... It does not lie to foreign 
audiences” (Allen 2002). The office was eventually closed.
For those of a paranoid frame of mind, the denials are likely to be seen as yet 
another set of lies, and given the same administration’s stand later in Christopher, some 
suspicion is understandable. At any rate, the United States has already racked up a storied 
history of disinformation campaigns at least as colorful as anything to spring from the 
mind of a conspiracy theorist. During the controversy over the Office of Strategic 
Information in February 2002, Reuters carried a story detailing past U.S. disinformation 
efforts, all of which were, of course, secret at the time. Among those campaigns:
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• For several years, on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Central 
Intelligence Agency placed ads in newspapers in Muslim countries carrying the Soviet 
military seal and announcing a celebration at the Soviet embassy.
• Misleading radio broadcasts were used in the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala and again against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.
• The CIA produced a pornographic film using an actor resembling Indonesian President 
Sukarno, although it’s not clear whether the film was ever released (Zakaria 2002).
To be sure, disinformation has its uses, and not all of them are deleterious to the 
practice of democracy. The Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II owed a large 
measure of its success to a series of deceptions suggesting that the invasion was planned 
for Calais, prompting the Germans to allocate their resources in a manner advantageous 
to the Allies. The outcome was clearly desirable, and even had it not been, it is difficult to 
see where the deception itself was especially meaningful for democracy. Not all 
disinformation is so benign. One of the major dangers of disinformation is blowback, in 
which false information reaches not only its intended target abroad but citizens back 
home, and the increased interconnectedness of the world is making blowback a greater 
risk (Zakaria 2002). The short-term consequences of blowback vary. In practice, it 
shouldn’t matter a great deal if Joe Sixpack falsely believes the president of Indonesia 
moonlights as a pornographic actor. On the other hand, there can be policy consequences, 
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as in the Allende case, in which efforts to discredit him in Chile might have affected 
American public opinion and support for the Nixon administration’s Chile policy.16
Two more instances of disinformation demonstrate more dramatically the 
corrosive impact official lies can have, even in service of a defensible foreign policy 
goal:
In 1986, following retaliatory bombing raids on Libya, President Reagan 
approved a plan to create appearances of an anti-Gadhafi movement in Libya in hopes of 
getting him to respond by pressuring the army sufficiently to incite a rebellion that would 
overthrow him:
The disinformation first appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 
August 25, 1986. A front-page story reported that the Reagan 
administration was completing plans for “a new and larger bombing of 
Libya.” The White House called the story “authoritative.” Other 
newspapers and television networks picked up the story, but as reporters 
tried to learn more, the story began to disintegrate. By October, the broad 
outline of the truth emerged: the whole thing had been made up by the 
Reagan White House (Holt 1995, p. 141).
According to Holt, the Reagan administration defended the attempt to mislead 
Gadhafi, arguing that a distinction must be made between him as the target audience and 
the American people. In Holt’s words, “The administration seemed to be saying that it 
was possible to mislead Gadhafi, through a story in a prominent American newspaper, 
without misleading the American people, who make up most of the newspaper’s 
readership.”
16 While the focus here is the meaning of secrecy for democracy domestically, it is certainly worth 
noting that in terms of foreign relations, the United States was actively engaged in undermining a 
democratically elected leader and manipulating public opinion in Chile.
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The controversial Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars,” program was also 
the subject of a disinformation campaign designed to trick the Soviet Union into 
increases in military spending that it could not afford.
In 1993 it was revealed that SDI tests conducted in 1984 had been 
rigged to make the program look more successful than it was. As a result 
of these false tests, Congress appropriated more money to continue the 
program, and the Soviet Union spent more money to counter the program 
than it otherwise would have. This additional Soviet spending was 
sufficiently burdensome, in one estimate, to hasten the Soviet Union’s 
collapse by five years. Even before that, in the view of Robert C. 
McFarlane, President Reagan’s national security adviser during part of the 
Star Wars program, SDI drove the Soviet Union to serious arms control 
negotiations (Holt 1995, p. 142).
McFarlane’s interpretation is questionable, as it must be remembered that it was 
only Reagan’s insistence on keeping SDI that prevented an agreement in Reykjavik in 
1987. Still, accepting McFarlane’s claim at face value, the duplicity surrounding SDI is 
disturbing, as it very likely distorted the outcome of a contentious debate over an 
expensive program. This is true whether one believes that the deception truly was 
designed as a clever ploy to fool the Soviet Union or whether one instead accepts Holt’s 
instead: “The basic purpose was to deceive Congress in order to receive more 
appropriations; deception of the Soviet Union was an afterthought” (p. 143).
There are long-term effects as well. Knowing the history of SDI, it is hard not to 
be suspicious of the Bush administration’s motives for exempting the projects related to 
the proposed national missile defense from “planning and reporting requirements 
normally applied to major acquisition programs.” This is particularly true given that the 
Pentagon has “announced plans to restrict information about targets and decoys used in 
flight tests of the most advanced option under development, the Ground-Based 
Midcourse Defense,” in the wake of the failures of two of the first three tests. It may well 
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be that the new tests are being conducted honestly, and that Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, 
director of the Missile Defense Agency, is right when he says, “The charge of excessive 
secrecy is wrong” (Graham 2002). But for a reasonably skeptical person, the Pentagon 
has squandered its credibility on this subject. For the paranoid, the renewed secrecy is 
nothing but further evidence of a renewed plot.
Official secrecy is tightly coupled with problems in accountability for the state, 
and when citizens already see their power to hold the state accountable diminished, 
official secrecy creates fertile ground for distrust of government in both its statements 
and deeds. That distrust is not necessarily misplaced, as previous instances of outright 
official lies demonstrate. But neither is it necessarily fruitful or well directed: 
“Governmental secrecy breeds stupidity, in government decision making and in the 
thinking of some citizens. Secrecy helped produce Oliver Stone, the paranoiac whose 
1991 movie ‘JFK’ found a mass audience for the notion that the assassination of 
President Kennedy was the work of a vast right-wing conspiracy” (Will 1998). Park 
(2000) names UFO true believers as a part of this phenomenon:
The real cost of the Roswell incident must be measured in terms of the 
loss of public trust. In the name of national security, every government in 
this troubled world feels compelled to grant itself the authority to hold 
official secrets. Those in power quickly learn to love secrecy. It enables 
the government to control what the public hears: bad news is squelched, 
good news is leaked. In the long run, however, episodes like Roswell 
leave the government almost powerless to reassure its citizens in the face 
of far-fetched conspiracy theories and pseudoscientific hogwash (p. 181).
Meyssan and his compatriots must too be counted with those obsessed with the 
Kennedy assassination and UFO true believers as the latest intellectual heirs to the 
paranoid style, and their thinking fits the pattern of the paranoid as described by Robins 
and Post (1997):
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His quest is like that of a scientist, but with a crucial difference. 
Seeking the truth, the scientist reasons both deductively and inductively 
and searches for an explanation of observations. The scientist tests his 
hypothesis, ready to disconfirm it if the evidence does not support it. The 
paranoid, in contrast, knows the ‘truth’ already and searches for 
confirmation. His is a fixed conclusion in search of evidence. Thus the 
paranoid is not working to prove or disprove a hypothesis; he knows that 
if he works hard enough he will find the evidence to prove his suspicions. 
In his preoccupation with finding evidence, he selects only that “evidence” 
that confirms his conclusion of danger (p. 8).
Official secrecy and the lies that it enables encourage thinking in the paranoid 
style. Brun (1995) incredibly claims that KAL 007 (discussed at length in Chapter 6) was 
intentionally diverted on an intelligence and provocation mission and that additionally 
there had been a battle between U.S. and Soviet military aircraft, with at least 10 aircraft 
being shot down. He claims the civilian plane crashed several hundred miles south of its 
purported crash site about an hour after the reported shoot-down. Brun’s evidence, for 
lack of a better word, includes debris he found on the Japanese coast years later. He also 
depends heavily on early newspaper accounts, taking discrepancies as evidence of a 
cover-up, rather than as a result of confusion at the time. Where radar and voice data 
don’t fit his hypothesis, he insists that they were initially misinterpreted.
Brun is easy enough to dismiss, but he is not alone in his suspicions. Some family 
members of the victims continue to believe that the whole truth has not come out. 
According to Maier (2001):
[T]he continued secrecy (with regard to the existence of some unreleased 
documents) has fueled a cottage industry of conspiracy theories. Many of 
them stem from KGB disinformation, such as unproved allegations that 
former president Richard Nixon was booked and then warned off the jet or 
that spy gear had been placed aboard at Andrews Air Force Base in Camp 
Spring, Md. 
“Look, we just want to know what happened,” insists (Hans) 
Ephraimson (father of a victim). “As of today, they still haven’t released 
all the files on the flight.”
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Journalists such as Maier continue to give respectful, if not entirely credulous, 
attention to claims that the plane did ditched successfully, with the Soviets imprisoned 
the survivors.
The thinking of Brun (1995) or some of the people interviewed by Maier (2001) 
fit the pattern of the paranoid described by Robins and Post (1997), who selects only 
evidence that appear to confirm the existence of a plot. Brun’s method of evidence 
selection  certainly falls into this pattern. Even Hans Ephraimson, who seems to fit the 
pattern more of bereaved parent than political paranoid, is left with his imagination to fill 
in the blanks of documents he is unable to see. No matter how complete and compelling a 
story is told of the actual events in the shoot-down, the suspicions are here to stay, just as 
with the Roswell incident. The conspiracy genie, once it is let out of the bottle, is 
impossible to recapture.
In the preface to Brun’s conspiratorial account of the 1983 downing of Korean 
Air Lines Flight 007, John Keppel tells of having worked as a foreign-service officer in 
Moscow during the U-2 crisis and having been part of a group that recommend President 
Eisenhower stick to the original cover story. “It is hard to realize today that when 
Eisenhower got caught in the lie we thrust upon him, it was the first time many 
Americans realized that a U.S. president would lie to them on an important subject. We 
had made our contribution to the erosion of truth-telling, on which democracy in large 
measure depends” (in Brun 1995, pp. xvii-xviii). They had also made their contribution to 
eroding the trust on which democracy depends, and the kind of thinking in the book 
Keppel prefaces is one of the consequences. One of the elements of paranoia identified 
by Robins and Post, fear of loss of autonomy, is exacerbated by official secrecy: In fact, 
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official secrecy does diminish autonomy of all citizens, certainly encouraging the 
delusions of the paranoid.
The claim here is not that there would be no paranoia if there were no official 
secrecy or even that official secrecy is a major contributing cause of clinical paranoia. 
Rather, the claim is that official secrecy creates an unhealthy climate of distrust of which 
paranoia is an extreme example. It is not even that distrust is without utility. It is distrust 
on the part of homeowners that forces burglars to pick locks or break windows instead of 
strolling in through an unlocked door. For the paranoid-style thinker, though, distrust is a 
constant companion. It leads to the rejection of the obvious as “too obvious” — as in the 
claims that the Pentagon was not hit by an airliner at all — and, even when there is ample 
ground for distrust, goes beyond reasonable skepticism to the construction of unfounded 
counternarratives to the “official line.”
The danger is that paranoid-style thinking can threaten the reservoir of trust that a 
democratic state requires to function effectively. For instance, legitimacy requires a well-
founded belief that election ballots will be counted. Some distrust can be positive, as in 
the ballot example, where it might impel citizens to demand accountability measures in 
the counting process. But if distrust reaches the level at which citizens simply cannot 
believe that the process can be made to work honestly, there is no hope of salvaging 
legitimacy. Much of the ongoing debate on social capital has centered the importance of 
trust as an interpersonal and communal resource.17 Trust in the state and interpersonal 
17 Putnam (1995), for instance, points to a strong correlation between social trust and civic 
engagement and calls for efforts to increase social connectedness in order to restore 
engagement and social trust. 
115
trust are different but related phenomena,18 and just as a community requires a certain 
level of social trust to thrive, democracy also requires trust of the state. More than half a 
century of secrets and lies has contributed to a dangerous climate of distrust in the United 
States. The lies and abuses of the secrecy system have meant that a great deal of that 
distrust is warranted; the secrets themselves have created more that is not.
This is not merely the product of a unique set of circumstances but an inevitable 
result of official secrecy and the lies are secrecy’s inseparable companion.
We live in a time when the harm done to trust can be seen first-
hand. Confidence in public officials and professionals has been seriously 
eroded. This, in turn, is a most natural response to the uncovering of 
practices of deceit for such high-sounding aims as ‘national security’ or 
the ‘adversary system of justice.’ It will take time to rebuild confidence in 
government pronouncements that the CIA did not participate in a Latin 
American coup, or that new figures show an economic upturn around the 
corner. The practices engendering such distrust were entered upon, not just 
by officials now so familiar to us, but by countless others, high and low, in 
the government and outside it, each time for a reason that seemed 
overriding (Bok 1989, p. 27).
At best the result is citizenry alienated from the government that is supposed to be 
its instrument, a society always looking askance at an untrustworthy state, finding almost 
any story credible as long as it is not the official line. At worst, there is collapse. The 
paranoid style is dangerous not because of its appeal to the mentally ill but because of its 
universal seductiveness.
The would-be leader propagating a paranoid theme in a time of 
tranquillity will appeal to only a small audience. Even in a time of stress 
such an appeal will fail if the leader lacks conventional political skills. But 
when the politically skillful leader or propagandist with a persuasive 
paranoid message calls to an overwhelmed society, the conditions are ripe 
18 Uslaner (2002) explains the difference: “There is no general syndrome of trust. Trusting other 
people makes you barely more likely to trust the government to do what is right. Trust in 
government reflects whether people have favorable impressions of the people in power and the 
institutions of government, as well as whether they agree with the policies of the current regime. 
Confidence in government is based on experiences. Trust in other people is not.”
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for a violent and widespread response. ... [B]ehind every destructive mass 
movement of this, history’s bloodiest century, are the dark forces of 
political paranoia (Robins and Post 1997, pp. 301-302).
Official secrecy contributes to an atmosphere in which distrust, even paranoia, 
seems reasonable. The wide-ranging conspiracy theories, some more popular than others, 
regarding the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon illustrate this point 
dramatically, but they are far from unique. Distrust in the state is rampant. Large 
majorities of Americans believe their government is hiding the truth on subjects ranging 
from the Kennedy assassination to the existence of extraterrestrial life. Every lie hides 
behind a veil of secrecy, so many citizens imagine a lie behind every official secret. The 
paranoid style of thinking has a faulty syllogism19 at its core, but secrecy makes its 
conclusions impossible to disprove. This is the case regardless of the motivation for 
secrecy and its propriety, and a history of official lying only makes the situation worse. 
At best, a democracy overly dependent on secrecy leaves citizens looking over their 
shoulders at the state. At worst, secrecy sows the seeds of the democratic state’s 
downfall. Particularly at a time when official secrecy is ascendant, democratic theory 
must take seriously the relationship between secrecy and suspicion because democratic 
practice has no choice but to deal with the consequences. To this point this consequences 
discussed have been the burden primarily of citizens. Chapter 5 discusses consequences 
that have a direct bearing on the functioning of the state, as it examines the impact of 
official secrecy on legitimacy and authority.
19 “All lies are concealed by secrets, therefore all secrets conceal lies.”
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Chapter 5
Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Curtain: How Official Secrecy 
Undermines Democratic Legitimacy and Authority
Legitimacy is a concern for all states, especially for the democratic state, and so it 
the deleterious impact of official secrecy on legitimacy and authority must be viewed 
with a great deal of concern. Legitimacy is not a necessary condition for democracy, but 
rather democracy is a necessary condition for legitimacy. This is recognized as true not 
only in democratic theory, but in general practice, democratic or not. Even autocratic 
regimes frequently make their claims to legitimacy in democratic language, using such 
mechanisms as rigged elections to claim the democratic mantle, and, where even a veneer 
of democracy is impossible to maintain, present their states as “not ready” for democracy.
As Shapiro (2003) notes:
The democratic idea is close to nonnegotiable in today’s world. Liberation 
movements insist they are more democratic than the regimes they seek to 
replace. Authoritarian rulers seldom reject democracy outright. Instead 
they argue that their people are not ready “yet,” that their systems are 
more democratic than they appear, or that the opposition is corrupt and 
antidemocratic — perhaps the stooge of a foreign power. International 
financial institutions may be primarily interested in countries adopting 
neoliberal market reforms, yet they also feel compelled to call for regular 
elections and other democratic political reforms (p. 1).
The particular details of these claims are new, but the underlying recognition of 
democracy’s claim to legitimacy is not. With Europe already at war and the United States 
on the verge of entering the fight against fascism, Merriam (1941) noted a similar trend.
Even those hacking at democracy cannot escape its implications. In 
Germany and Italy today, why do they not abolish the vote? Why do they 
not abolish the forms of representation and consultation? Why do they 
profess their solicitous regard for reflecting the people’s will and interest? 
Why does Hitler speak of “a true Germanic democracy”? And why does 
Mussolini demand “an Italian proletarian democracy”? And why do the 
Soviets refer to “a true socialistic democracy”? These things are done or 
not done because the symbolisms of democracy, the attitudes of popular 
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rule, and the demands of popular welfare are by this time so deeply 
ingrained in the modern mind that they cannot be safely challenged, even 
by those who hold in their hands weapons that seem irresistible for the 
moment (p. 7).
The regimes change, the world system changes, but democracy retains its place, at least 
rhetorically, as the sole legitimate form of government. This is why prescriptive forms of 
democratic theory demand a voice for citizens. The reasoning, in general, goes like this: 
If there is to be a state with the power of constraining the actions of its citizens (and 
without that power, there is truly no state), the state’s acquisition and maintenance of that 
power must be justified — that is, legitimated. This legitimization is important on two 
levels: 1) It strengthens the state by making citizens more accepting of power and thus 
less likely to attempt to overturn it; in short it confers authority upon the state. And 2) it 
brings a measure of justice, however that may be defined, into the mix, this being the 
process of legitimation. For those who prescribe democracy as the preferred form of 
government, such a system provides the state with legitimacy, and authority, in a way 
that no other form of government could.
In the Book I of On the Social Contract, Rousseau epitomizes this reasoning 
when he writes, “Man was/is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. One who believes 
himself the master of others is nonetheless a greater slave than they. How did this change 
occur? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? I believe I can answer this question” 
(p. 46).
What can make it legitimate? Democracy, that is, authorization by the popular 
will, can. Rousseau, of course, has his own particular brand of democracy in mind, but in 
a broader sense, this legitimation of the state is a central part of the project envisioned by 
all theorists who prescribe democracy as the single best form of government. There are 
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other accounts of what constitutes a legitimate state (e.g. natural law, the command of a
sovereign, etc.), but for contemporary democrats, the inclusion of popular will is 
supreme. The choice is between a legitimate, democratic state and an illegitimate, 
nondemocratic one. For the most part, disagreements between democratic theorists do not 
touch this foundation, but instead center on questions of what criteria make a state 
democratic — and thus legitimate, or at least potentially legitimate. The harm caused by 
official secrecy is more immediately obvious under thicker, more participatory versions 
of democratic theory, but even the thinnest, most elite-based formulations are vulnerable. 
This vulnerability becomes acutely clear when the impact of official secrecy on 
legitimacy is considered. Some democrats holding to thinner, more minimal formulations 
may not be particularly disturbed by the opportunities for participation lost to secrecy, but 
all are concerned with legitimacy and authority. Whether the criteria are minimal and 
simple, a circulation of elites for instance, over more complex and demanding, as 
participatory theorists hold, the requirements of democracy are also necessary conditions 
for state legitimacy. By undermining democracy, as discussed in previous chapters, 
official secrecy also undermines legitimacy.
If a legitimate state is also a democratic state, and the democratic state requires 
accountability, citizen autonomy and access to information (all of which are undermined 
by official secrecy), one must conclude the official secrecy also undermines the 
legitimacy of the state. A state that engages in official secrecy is a state that undermines 
the autonomy of its citizens, that denies them mechanisms for holding their 
representatives accountable and them foments paranoia; such a state may hold some 
democratic characteristics, and it may maintain a measure of authority, but it is far from 
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exemplary of what democracy aspires to. This chapter has two tasks, to show in absolute 
terms the harm to legitimacy and to show the related damage to state authority. At their 
base, the two approaches are certainly compatible.  For the state, official secrecy 
decreases legitimacy and authority via two related routes: legitimacy by the diminution in 
possibilities for accountability caused by secrecy, and authority by the increase in 
distrust, which is reinforced when abuses are revealed.
Chapter 3, with its discussion of how official secrecy hobbles mechanism of 
democratic accountability is also, by implication, an account of how official secrecy 
reduces the legitimacy of the state. In diminishing accountability by withholding the 
information necessary for citizens to act in an informed, responsible manner, official 
secrecy weakens the state’s claim to legitimacy. A democracy can hardly be said to be 
living up to its promises if it intentionally denies its citizens the tools needed for self-
government. Official secrecy encourages corruption (Bok 1984), shields incompetence 
and creates a bias toward particular types of policy. Likewise, in a society that is heavily 
dependent on the free flow of information, official secrecy not only offers bad 
symbolism, but with the state increasingly acting as a creator and repository of important 
information, may deny needed information flows. See, for example, Park (2000), Chalk 
(1986), Demac (1984), Cheh (1982) and Benn (1979).
Distrust of the state itself (as opposed to distrust of the potential for misuse of 
power) signals a loss of authority. This is not to say that distrust of the state is entirely 
negative, or without precedent in American political thought. The Founders had a healthy 
distrust of power, which finds expression repeatedly in the Federalist Papers, as well as in 
the institutions designed into the Constitution. Like the Founders, Tocqueville (1969) 
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feared democratic power precisely because of its effective authority. This concern 
underlies his discussion of majority tyranny. However, a project that seeks to limit the 
potential abuses of power is a far cry from the loss of authority that comes when citizens 
begin to have grave doubts about the legitimacy of the state itself.
Chapter 4, with its discussion of the suspicion and paranoia engendered by 
secrecy, tells a story of impaired authority. Citizens may indeed come to doubt the 
legitimacy of the state in ways that are absolutely pathological. But citizens do not have 
to embrace the paranoid style to see the state they are living in. As the Founders and 
Tocqueville recognize, power is necessarily subject to abuse. But citizens are not just a 
problem, as the language of majority tyranny suggests. As subjects and observers of state 
power (and not simply holders of power), they provide a significant check against abuses, 
thus official secrecy makes abuse easier, by removing them as observers. Official secrecy 
undermines the legitimacy of the democratic state, while in turn undercuts its authority. 
In other words, the state does lose legitimacy, and citizens experience that loss 
personally.
But when it is argued that official secrecy reduces legitimacy and authority, it is 
not merely a restatement of old concepts in new words. Loss of legitimacy is a serious 
problem for the state, and official secrecy has a great deal to answer for in causing that 
loss.
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Power, perception and legitimacy
The well-known story of The Wizard of Oz is a useful, if fanciful, illustration of 
the problems official secrecy poses for legitimacy. In the climactic scene of the film, 
Dorothy and her friends have made their way back to the Wizard’s palace in the Emerald 
City having disposed of the Wicked Witch of the West at the Wizard’s behest. As he 
stalls on making good on his promises to them, the illusory nature of his power becomes 
apparent, when Toto the dog pulls back a curtain to reveal the powerful Wizard is nothing 
more than a little man manipulating mechanical apparatuses.
“Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain. Go — before I lose my temper! 
The Great and Powerful Oz has spoken,” he declares into a microphone in a last effort to 
preserve the illusion.
Of course, he fails and is exposed as a “humbug,” but he insists, “I’m a very good 
man. I’m just a very bad Wizard.”
Indeed, he is a bad Wizard. Granted, everything turns out well — the Cowardly 
Lion ends up with his courage, the Tin Man his heart, Oz is liberated of a plague of 
wicked witches, etc. — but the Wizard’s methods are highly suspect. He has made 
promises he cannot keep in order to manipulate Dorothy and her friends, and thus even 
before the discovery of “that man behind the curtain,” he is on shaky ground. His secret 
— that he his not the powerful sorcerer he makes himself out to be — casts a shadow on 
his legitimacy, even before anyone else is aware of it.
The difference between legitimacy and authority is evident in the moment when 
the curtain is pulled back and the secret revealed. Before, the Wizard’s secret deprives 
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him of legitimacy — and would even if it were never revealed. With the revelation, the 
Wizard also loses his authority in the eyes of those who see him as he is.
In citing this example, it is not intended to suggest that the Wizard is an
archetypal democratic leader. He is not. But his use of deception and secrecy in the 
exercise of power illustrates the pitfalls for legitimacy posed by official secrecy in 
democratic systems.20 These pitfalls are important because legitimacy is important. 
Citizens need the state to be legitimate, and the state needs to seem legitimate. In other 
words, legitimacy benefits citizens most directly while authority benefits the state itself 
(and in democracies, citizens as well, by implication).
Damage to legitimacy
Official secrecy damages legitimacy to the extent that theory holds that citizens 
should be involved to the maximum extent possible in making political decisions. 
Official secrecy has little meaning for the philosophical underpinning of autocratic 
regimes, at least those that do not cloak the right to rule in democratic language. But for 
democratic states, the impact official secrecy on legitimacy is unavoidable and potentially 
severe.
It is theoretical legitimacy that Richardson (2002) references in writing:
Government action comes under the burden of legitimation 
because it impinges on freedom. It does so in two ways. The liberal is 
rightly concerned about government action because it can undercut or 
violate fundamental rights. The republican is rightly concerned because it 
can put us under new duties and may do so arbitrarily. Because of these 
20 His exposure also highlights another truth: Secrets have a way of being revealed, frequently at 
a time of maximum inconvenience for the holder.
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threats to freedom, government decisions need to meet strong 
requirements of legitimation (p. 23).
This process of legitimation requires that the state give reasons for its actions.
Because of the two ways that government action impinges on 
freedom, governments stand under a burden to justify or legitimate their 
actions. To justify or legitimate their actions. To justify or legitimate 
anything requires offering reasons for it. Government action without any 
reasons in support of it is arbitrary in an elemental sense, epitomized by 
the arbitrariness of K.’s judge in The Trial. ... The burden of legitimation 
entails that governments must not act in an elementally arbitrary way but 
must instead offer reasons for their actions. That government decisions 
must be made on the basis of reasons is the first premise of democracy. 
Since both the liberal and republican aspects of freedom that are impinged 
on are individualistic — pertaining, respectively, to the rights and the 
duties of individuals — an appropriate set of legitimating reasons must be 
addressed to, or must pertain to, the individuals impinged on (p. 27).
At first glance, much of what is covered by official secrecy might appear to pass 
muster. To be sure, this is not true of the most egregious cases, such as Operation 
Northwoods (see Chapter 4), which would have almost certainly involved the killing of 
innocent Americans had the plan actually been carried out. But what about a case like the 
Iran-Contra scandal, which involved the secret trading of weapons to Iran in return for 
the release of hostages, as well as the illegal diversion of funds to rebels in Nicaragua? 
While this episode is widely recognized as a case in which secrecy was abused in order to 
evade the will of the democratically elected Congress, it may not be immediately obvious 
which of Richardson’s criteria for legitimacy were violated. No Americans’ rights were 
violated by the secret program (although one might argue that many Nicaraguans’ were), 
and no Americans were put under new duties, aside from possibly a negligible portion of 
their taxes dedicated to the operation. How, then, does one evaluate the secret support of 
the Contras as illegitimate?
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One could answer on the basis of duties, that tax dollars were used to support the 
operation, but this is a thin thread on which to hang an argument about legitimacy, as it 
leaves no way of evaluating as illegitimate cost-free actions by the state, assuming they 
also have no impact on rights. The better answer lies in what Richardson refers to as the 
first premise of democracy, that the government must give reasons for its actions. Official 
secrecy precludes giving reasons, and reasons are necessary for citizens to be able to 
evaluate state actions. It is quite well to claim here that Americans’ rights and duties were 
unaffected by the Contra operation, but that is entirely different than allowing citizens to 
evaluate that for themselves. Even more significantly, to accept what was done in the 
Iran-Contra scandal as legitimate is to accept the principle that the state may act 
legitimately without exposure to mechanisms of democratic accountability. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, to accept such a principle is to render those mechanisms discretionary and 
optional, making them likely to be used only in cases in which state actors can be 
reasonably confident of obtaining the outcome they desire.
There is no adequate substitute for the state offering reasons for its actions so that 
so that citizens may evaluate or seek to alter those actions. Bok (1984) explains:
Such deliberation about moral reasons cannot always be public, 
depending on time and circumstances; but in principle, it must at least be 
capable thereof. Unlike Mill, philosophers who have stressed publicity 
have tended to view is, following Kant, as a strictly theoretical exercise —
“an experiment of pure reason.” But such experiments are open to all the 
vicissitudes of private speculation. If moral deliberation is intended from 
the outset to remain a mere thought experiment, it allows secrecy to re-
enter by the back door of bias and self-serving rationalization.
To be sure, the thought-experiment is an indispensable first effort 
in evaluating a choice. If taken seriously, it will certainly eliminate some 
of the more blatant abuses. But if it is not capable of being put to the test 
— if it remains an “experiment of pure reason” — it bypasses the controls 
of the test of actual publicity: the necessity to articulate one’s position 
carefully, to defend it against unexpected counterarguments, to take 
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opposing points of view into consideration, to reveal the steps of reasoning 
one has used, and to state openly the principles to which one appeals (pp. 
113-114, italics in original).
Public officials are every bit as vulnerable to the “vicissitudes of private 
speculation, as are private individuals. Thus to truly ensure decisions that the public 
would support, that is, democratic outcomes, publicity is absolutely necessary. 
Furthermore, even if it could be definitively shown that secret deliberation would lead to 
identical outcomes as full, public deliberation, that does not ease the requirement for 
publicity. It is not just the outcome, but also the act of deliberating that is important. That 
it is also sometimes impossible does not alter this democratic imperative one bit.
Citizens should not simply be presented with government actions for their 
retrospective evaluation. Although, again, circumstances may make this impossible, all 
things being equal, citizens should have meaningful input into proposed state actions 
before they are implemented.
If the democratic project of self-government is taken to its logical end, it also is 
insufficient to protect citizens’ access to information about prospective actions alone. If 
citizens are to be offered a meaningful role in self-government, they must have the 
opportunity to propose policy and set the public agenda, not merely ratify or reject 
proposed items. This requires that they have access to state-held information even if it is 
not directly relevant to pending policy questions. First of all, citizens are the best judges 
of what is an is not relevant to them, and second of all, if they are full participants in the 
political process, they must have full access in order to be able to not only help make 
decisions, but also to help decide what is to be decided.
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For democratic theorists, democracy and legitimacy are so intertwined that 
legitimacy does not get a great deal of attention in its own right — and understandably 
so. If what is legitimate is also what is democratic, and vice versa, by explaining what 
democracy entails, one is also explaining what makes a state legitimate.
Here, however, the concern is not only with what makes the state legitimate but 
also with what makes it seem legitimate. The distinction is an important one, as are both 
forms of legitimacy and authority (as founded on citizens’ perceptions) are important. 
Legitimacy is important as in democracy it directly benefits the citizens’ ability to control 
the actions of the state. It may also be threatened or diminished, even when citizens are 
unaware of that impact. The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s approval of Operation Northwoods 
undermined the legitimacy of the U.S. government in 1962, although its existence was 
undisclosed at the time. The secret funding of the Contras, in contravention of U.S. law, 
offered another instance of illegitimate action, even before the operation was revealed. In 
both instances, revelation of these secret operations then also undermined authority, that 
is, whether citizens believe the state has the right to continue to exercise power.
It should not be thought, however, that either legitimacy or authority is a 
necessary condition for the other. The following table shows how the two related 
concepts may combine, along with examples based on how an election might be run:
Legitimacy
Authority




A free, fair election that is incorrectly 
perceived as having been rigged.
Illegitimacy
Authority
A rigged election that is concealed 




A rigged election that is perceived as such.
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It is, thus, only when citizens are able to discern accurately what the state is doing that 
legitimacy and authority coincide in value.
Undermining authority
While those who prescribe democracy as a political system would argue that 
legitimacy is a characteristic of democracy alone, authority is a concern for all states.
Zolo (1992) describes the significance of authority, or the perception by citizens 
that the state has a right to exercise power:
In complex societies the legitimacy of political decisions is not 
based on general criteria of political or juridical nature. Even less is it 
based, as contractualists aver, on a code of moral rules ideally subscribed 
to by citizens and used by them in order to evaluate the democratic 
legitimacy of procedures and decisions. On the one hand, legitimacy is 
generated by a situation of diffused social readiness to accept as legitimate 
the decisions made by the public administration, even if they are 
eventually held to be “unjust,” incorrect or disadvantageous — i.e. a 
presumption of legitimacy is accorded to democratic institutions on the 
basis of purely formal postulates. On the other, it arises from the 
administration’s ability to presuppose this generalized “readiness to 
accept” without particular reference to values, rational motives or 
collective outcomes which may precede or stand in an independent 
relation to political decisions (p. 131).
While the regimes were themselves illegitimate, the collapse of the communist 
system in Eastern Europe stemmed from a crisis in authority. It is authority to which 
Fukuyama (1992) refers when he writes:
On both the communist Left and the authoritarian Right there has 
been a bankruptcy of serious ideas capable of sustaining the internal 
political cohesion of strong governments, whether based on “monolithic” 
parties, military juntas, or personalistic dictatorships. The absence of 
legitimate authority has meant that when an authoritarian government met 
with failure in some area of policy, there was no higher principle to which 
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the regime could appeal. Some have compared legitimacy to a kind of 
cash reserve. All governments, democratic and authoritarian, have their 
ups and downs; but only legitimate governments have this reserve to draw 
on in times of crisis (p. 39).
The fact is that the communist governments of Eastern Europe did have a higher 
principle to which to turn in the variants of Marxism that officially formed the 
philosophical basis of their regimes. It was not a principle acceptable to democrats. More 
important in terms of the crisis they faced, though, was that they also lacked authority. By 
1989, no one really believed in the philosophical underpinnings of these states, neither 
the people nor their rulers. Arguably, the crisis began to take coherent shape in 1957 with 
the publication of Milovan Djilas’ The New Class, a scathing look from the inside at the 
cynical machinations of the Communist Party. If the leaders were unable to act like they 
believed in the sustaining myth of the state, all that kept the people acting like they 
believed was the threat of brute force. When that threat ceased to be credible, the lack of 
perceptual legitimacy of those states led quickly to their collapse.
As Fukuyama puts it:
The critical weakness that eventually toppled these strong states 
was in the last analysis a failure of legitimacy — that is a crisis on the 
level of ideas. Legitimacy is not justice or right in an absolute sense; it is a 
relative concept that exists in people’s subjective perceptions. All regimes 
capable of effective action must be based on some principle of legitimacy. 
There is no such thing as a dictator who rules purely “by force,” as is 
commonly said of Hitler. A tyrant can rule his children, old men, or 
perhaps his wife by force if he is physically stronger than they are, but he 
is not likely to be able to rule more than two or three people in this fashion 
and certainly not a nation of millions. ... Security apparatuses can 
themselves be controlled by intimidation, but at some point in the system, 
the dictator must have loyal subordinates who believe in his legitimate 
authority (p. 15, italics in original).
Authority is a concern for all states. In writing Leviathan, Hobbes was explicating 
a version of theoretical legitimacy, one that was based in contractual terms. But in urging 
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that his book be taught in universities, he was attempting to bolster the English state’s 
authority. No matter how thoroughly he made the case for the legitimacy of a strong 
ruler, Hobbes knew it was for naught, unless the people believed  the ruler was legitimate 
and acted accordingly.
In the American tradition, the core requirement of legitimacy is expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence in the statement, “Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any form of 
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or 
abolish it.” This is at first glance a normative claim and a description of a criterion for 
legitimacy. Implicitly, however, it is also simply a statement of empirical reality. 
Authority requires consent of the governed, at least implicitly, and absent that the regime 
will is likely to fall.
That is what happened to Eduard Shevardnadze’s government in Georgia after 
obvious electoral fraud drove the masses into the streets in nonviolent revolt against the 
“re-election” of his government. Lacking authority, the regime lost the consent of the 
governed and collapsed. It should be understood that this is not an argument that regimes 
cannot survive without majority popular support. They obviously can and do, frequently 
on the basis of brute force. Even in those cases, though, as Fukuyama points out, “[A]t 
some point in the system, the dictator must have loyal subordinates who believe in his 
legitimate authority.”
Authority is a practical concern for democratic regimes, as without it, citizens are 
likely to withdraw their consent. To the extent that it engenders suspicion, official 
secrecy thus undercuts the stability of the state. Ironically, official secrecy, the practice of 
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which is intended to defend the state from outside threats, as a side effect corrodes the 
internal supports that maintain the stability of the state. That is not to say that any one 
instance of official secrecy is likely to lead to regime change. Obviously that is not the 
case. But authority is not a dichotomous variable — it is not a matter of presence or 
absence, but one of “more” or “less,” and official secrecy creates a pressure toward less.
It can be a small pressure, driven by an essentially trivial incident. For instance, in 
September 2003, the Washington, D.C., metro area was struck by the remnants of a 
hurricane, leaving many people without power for days and leading to widespread 
criticism of area governments and power companies. In a letter to the editor of the 
Washington Post, Michele Dyson illustrated the impact secrecy had on an already 
frustrated and angry couple:
I talked to one couple who had no power for five days.
“Did you see what [Montgomery County Executive Doug] Duncan 
did today,” the husband asked.
“No,” I said.
“He closed the meeting with Pepco to the public.”
“Did he say why?” I asked.
“No.”
“Why do you think he did it?” I asked.
“So they could get their story straight, is what I think,” the wife 
said (brackets in original).
This is hardly a case of a couple ready to run to the barricades. They might even 
support Doug Duncan if he runs for re-election. But they nevertheless have the 
impression that something unseemly and illegitimate is going on behind closed doors.
Of course, as discussed in Chapter 4, Americans are suspicious of the government 
on much larger matters than coming clean about the response to a power outage during a 
major storm. Substantial numbers believe they are being lied to about everything from 
flying saucers to the Kennedy assassination — and they have been lied to about many 
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other significant details of U.S. policy. This suspicion, even when it does not rise to the 
level of paranoia — in fact, even when it is totally justified by the facts — casts a shadow 
on the authority of the state.
This raises another question, though: If so many people are so suspicious, how is 
it that in the United States, the federal government continues to survive, indeed thrive, 
with no serious alternative being posited that has any chance of being implemented? The 
answer perhaps lies in Fukuyama’s idea of legitimate authority being a kind of “cash 
reserve.” Despite its shortcomings, the United States government appears to have built up 
a substantial reserve of authority over the years. (This reserve is so large that many 
express their loyalty and belief in the system with the expression, “My country right or 
wrong,” which is generally stated passionately and sincerely.) Suspicion that Lee Harvey 
Oswald did not act alone is not likely, 40 years removed, to inspire a substantial number 
of people to denounce an entire system of government as corrupt and unworthy. The 
issue is simply not salient enough to provoke that kind of reaction, particularly when 
there are other, more recent examples of state action competing for their attention.
That the reserve of authority is large, however, does not mean that it is 
inexhaustible. Official secrecy is not the only potential drain on authority, but it is 
potentially a significant one and should be recognized as treated as such. To this point it 
has been demonstrated that official secrecy comes with high costs both for citizens and 
the state in which they live. Its costs do not end there, though, as it also has negative 
effects in social institutions more broadly. Chapter 6 will address those costs.
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Chapter 6
Further Costs of Official Secrecy
To this point, the focus has been on the impact that official secrecy has directly on 
democracy. But its impact is even broader than what has been discussed so far. By 
hindering necessary information flows, official secrecy also damages institutions that 
lend support to democracy and that more generally may be necessary for a good society. 
As the state increasingly becomes a primary creator and repository of information, this 
impact is bound to become more significant. Of particular concern here is the impact of 
official secrecy on decision making in the miliary and the intelligence community, its role 
in the court system, and its effects on science and on history. This is by no means 
intended to be an exhaustive list of areas affected by official secrecy, but simply to 
provide some instructive examples of that practice’s costs.
This discussion begins with an area that is conventionally though of as finding the 
effects of secrecy to be entirely salutary: the military. As long as external threats to the 
state exist, the military will remain necessary to help provide stability that democracy 
requires to function. Secrecy offers the military (and related security and intelligence 
apparatuses) a wide array of advantages. Indeed, as discussed at length in Chapter 2, the 
most significant justifications for keeping secrets are couched in terms of real national 
security concerns. However, even for the military, official secrecy does not come without 
a cost.
Bok (1984) describes what she calls “self-defeating military secrecy,” “which can 
delay, entangle, and undercut military efforts to the detriment of the self-protection 
governments aim for” (pp. 194-195). Bok cites the failure of the 1980 mission to rescue 
American hostages in Iran as an example of the damage secrecy can cause to military 
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operations. Obviously, total transparency would have doomed the mission, by allowing 
Iran to learn of and prepare to counter the mission plan. However, the secrecy intended to 
safeguard the plan also helped to ensure its failure. According to Bok, “Secrecy 
prevented those who planned the mission from seeking sufficient advice during the five-
month period that members of the task force were each told as little as possible about the 
mission and that so few helicopters were used” (p. 195).
Secrecy hindered not only the planning of the rescue mission but also in its 
execution. A review, commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, found that efforts to 
maintain secrecy during the mission also contributed to its failure:
The helicopter force planned and trained to operate in complete 
radio silence. Intraflight communication, where possible, was to be done 
with light signals. The absence of radio communication indicated to 
helicopter pilots that all was well and to continue the mission. 
Subsequently, when helicopter flight became separated in the dust cloud, 
each separate element lacked vital information. The lead helicopter did not 
know that #8 had successfully recovered the crew from #6 and continued 
nor that #6 had been abandoned in the desert. More importantly, after he 
reversed course in the dust and landed, the lead could not logically deduce 
either that the other helicopters had continued or that they had turned back 
to return to the carrier. He did not know when the flight had disintegrated. 
He could have assumed that they had become separated before he reversed 
course and unknowingly proceeded. Alternatively, they could have lost 
sight of him after turning and, mistaking his intentions, continued back to 
the carrier. Lastly, #5 might have elected to continue had he known that 
his arrival at Desert One would have allowed the mission to continue and 
that VMC [visual meteorological conditions] existed at the rendez-vous 
(quoted in Bok 1984, pp. 195-196, brackets in original).
The phrase “fog of war” is frequently used to describe the confusion characteristic 
the battlefield. Ideally, when a military uses secrecy, it is with the hope that secrecy will 
thicken the fog in which the adversary has to operate. However, as happened in Iran in 
1980, operational secrecy can be equally blinding to the people who use it, at least in 
some situations. Maintaining secrecy about the beginning time for an offensive is 
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unlikely to diminish its chances of success, but when ongoing secrecy prevents people 
from getting the information they need to act effectively in the dynamic, ever-changing 
environment of the battlefield, it can easily be self-defeating.
As noted above, secrecy can also detract from planning phase, as it hinders 
deliberation, limits input to insiders and may create an atmosphere hostile to criticism and 
an echo-chamber effect, in which only proponents of a particular course of action have a 
voice. This phenomenon is not limited to the military (Tant 1995), but it is a particular 
concern there. In the case of the Iran rescue mission, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 
who opposed the plan due to its risks, was left out of the decision-making process that led 
to the final go-ahead (Bok 1984).
The Desert One debacle is not isolated or an anomaly: It is merely one example of 
official secrecy leading to unintended consequences. The Bay of Pigs is another well-
known example of a successful effort keeping secrets leading to disastrous consequences, 
as well a failure to reach policy objectives. Truth be told, the secrecy surrounding the 
impending invasion of Cuba was not as complete as U.S. officials would have liked. The 
New York Times actually uncovered the invasion plans ahead of time but was persuaded 
by the Kennedy administration not to publish a story for the sake of American national 
interests. Had the newspaper not given in, it could have scuttled the ill-conceived project 
(Pontuso 1990), although it is doubtful the officials involved would have greeted the 
revelation with gratitude, deprived as they would have been of an understanding of the 
disaster that awaited.
Secrecy damaged the Kennedy administration’s planning process, as it limited the 
range and type of information available to decision makers. According to Halperin 
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(1975): “Cutting off many officials from the Bay of Pigs operation meant not only that 
officials knowledgeable about the Cuban scene were unable to comment and warn the 
President that the kind of uprising on which the plan depended was unlikely, but also the 
narrow circle meant that the President was not confronted with advice from those who 
could have pointed out the limitations of the different ways by which the presumed threat 
from the Castro regime could be contained.”
The use of secrecy in this kind of situation also privileges secret information over 
that contained in open sources, no matter how valuable open-source materials may be. 
Moynihan (1998) writes that in the Bay of Pigs invasion, this bias toward the use of 
secret information contributed directly to an inadvisable decision to go ahead with the 
invasion, despite evidence that the popular uprising planners were counting on was 
unlikely to occur.
The Bay of Pigs debacle could have been avoided if foreign policy 
experts in the United States had but paid attention to published research 
already available to them. In the spring of 1960, Lloyd A. Free of the 
Institute for International Social Research at Princeton had carried out an 
extensive public opinion survey in Cuba. ... The Cubans reported that they 
were hugely optimistic about the future; many dreaded the return of 
Castro’s predecessor, the dictator Fulgencio Batista. Free’s report ended 
on an unambiguous note: Cubans “are unlikely to shift their present 
overwhelming allegiance to Fidel Castro.” ... Free’s report, published July 
18, 1960, was readily available in Washington. (Indeed, the Cuban
embassy sent for ten copies.) It is difficult not to think that the information 
in the public opinion survey might have had more influence had it been 
secret. In a culture of secrecy, that which is not secret is easily disregarded 
or dismissed (pp. 222-223, parentheses in original).
Certainly, the existence of secret information does not require that publicly 
available information be ignored, but in practice that appear to be what happens all too 
often.
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Official secrecy frequently damages the quality of deliberation and decision 
making, particularly when is comes to making decisions about covert operations. 
Halperin (1975) identifies pathologies that have afflicted the decision-making process for 
covert action: Proposals tend to come from the organizations that will be responsible for 
programs if they are approved, and consultation is limited to a narrow circle of advisers.
The super secrecy of covert operations increases the chances the 
President will choose covert actions rather that other more desirable 
options which, given a free and open debate within the executive branch 
or through involving Congress and the public in the decision-making 
process, would otherwise have adopted. A major problem that faces an 
American president is that of multiple audience. Whatever the President 
does will be seen by the foreign country against which he may be directing 
his action, by leaders and active groups in other countries, and by a 
number of domestic groups in the Congress and the attentive public. One 
of the major attractions of covert operations is the ability to avoid the 
problem of multiple audiences. If something is to be conducted in secret, 
then one can avoid the fight over means and ends which erupts when other 
audiences discover an ongoing operation. Compared to alternatives, it is 
easier to obtain the necessary approval for covert operations. The 
President himself can usually authorize such operations without having to 
go to Congress for funds or to go before the American people to make a 
public justification.
The mechanism of decision-making also tends to bias the system 
toward choosing covert options. ... In a typical case there will be meetings 
to discuss the whole range of overt possibilities weighted against each 
other in an advisory procedure that will permit critics of one proposal to 
be heard while the proponents of that proposal are present. Covert 
operations will not be discussed at such meetings but rather will be 
considered separately at meetings from which both advocates of other 
proposals and critics of covert operations are excluded. Indeed, in 
meetings in considering other options, many participants are often not 
aware of the fact that there are other meetings in which covert alternatives 
are being considered (p. 49).
Decision-making mechanisms have not stood still in the time since Halperin’s 
comments. Indeed, the situation he wrote about was kind of a worst-case scenario, in that 
Congress and the American public were finding out for the first time about the many 
abuses of power that had taken place shielded by official secrecy. Nevertheless, 
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Halperin’s comments continue to be relevant. When significant policy decisions must be 
made in secret, there are costs. Conscientious officials may try to minimize those costs, 
and indeed some institutional arrangements are more useful than others in accounting, but 
in the end, the impact of official secrecy cannot be entirely eliminated. Protecting secrets 
requires minimizing the number of people on the “inside,” which, as Halperin notes can 
lead to sycophancy and groupthink, not to mention potentially depriving decision makers 
of vital information, analysis or perspectives.
As Schattschneider (1960) explains, who is allowed to participate in a conflict 
goes a long way to determining how that conflict is resolved.
Every fight consists of two parts: (1) the few individuals who are 
actively engaged at the center and (2) the audience that is irresistibly 
attracted to the scene. The spectators are as much a part of the over-all 
situation as are the over combatants. The spectators are an integral part of 
the situation, for, likely as not, the audience determines the outcome of the 
fight. The crowd is loaded with portentousness because it is apt to be a 
hundred times as large as the fighting minority, and the relations of the 
audience and the combatants are highly unstable. Like all other chain 
reactions, a fight is difficult to contain. To understand any conflict it is 
necessary, therefore, to keep constantly in mind the relations between the 
combatants and the audience because the audience is likely to do the kinds 
of things that determine the outcome of the fight. This is true because the 
audience is overwhelming; it is never really neutral; the excitement of the 
conflict communicates itself to the crowd. This is the basic pattern of all 
politics (p. 2, italics in original).
In the case of planning for covert action, limiting the scope of the conflict also has the 
effect of creating disadvantages for those who favor other courses of action, in general 
excluding them from the audience entirely. Even more significantly, it can ensure that 
those who have superior insight or information are excluded and their proposals 
discounted. In simple terms, what this means is that official secrecy holds a significant 
risk for leading policy makers to choose risky courses of action because those who hold 
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the power do not fully understand the risks and those who understand the risks do not 
hold the power. At worst, what happens is like the Bay of Pigs invasion, where even the 
most staunch partisans of invading Cuba must have wished afterward that they had been a 
position to be forced to pay greater attention to analysis suggesting that the operation 
could not have worked as planned.
Understanding the risk of bad decision making posed by official secrecy does not 
provide officials with easy answers. There is a real trade-off between increasing access 
and effectively protecting necessary secrets. But at the very least, understanding how 
secrecy can negatively affect the quality of decisions can at least help officials guard 
against overconfidence, as well as to think carefully about how desirable secrecy may be 
and what benefits increased openness might hold. Encouraging officials to take this 
perspective does not offer any guarantees and is certainly no substitute for true openness, 
but it is a far superior approach to one that holds that secrecy and security are 
synonymous.
Not only does official secrecy alter the decision-making process by frequently 
stifling dissent and shutting off significant policy alternatives, but it also makes it much 
more difficult for decision makers and analysts to gain perspective on the big picture. 
Again, awareness of secrets does not logically require this outcome, but in practice, that 
is the consequence.
Even an insider with the proper security clearances does not necessarily have 
access to secrets held by the U.S. government. This practice is keeping with the 
understanding that the fewer people who have access to a particular piece of information, 
the less likely it is to be revealed.
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In keeping with this principle, the CIA compartmentalizes 
intelligence — that is, officers operate in compartments separated from 
each other, and each is privy only to the intelligence that is directly related 
to his or her current assignment. This reduces the number of people who 
know any given fact, and thereby it reduces the possibility of exposure.
But it also reduces the possibility of relating one piece of 
intelligence to another piece. Excessive compartmentation sometimes 
hinders operational efficiency. Analysts may not see all of a picture. Some 
collection programs or covert actions may work at crosspurposes (Holt 
1995, p. 116).
This failure to see the big picture can have devastating results, for example,
consider the claims that the intelligence community failed to “connect the dots” that 
could have allowed U.S. officials to prevent the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington. The argument is that while various agencies within law enforcement and the
intelligence community had valuable pieces of information, institutional arrangements 
prevented those bits of data from being shared in a way that would allow for meaningful 
interpretation. According to Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.), “Sadly, the CIA seems to 
have concluded that the maintenance of its information monopoly was more important 
than stopping terrorists from entering or operating within the United States” (quoted in 
Loeb 2003).
If one accepts this argument, it follows that well-intended institutional 
arrangements meant to safeguard secrecy — and by implication security — in fact 
backfired. While horrific, this is hardly an isolated or unusual example.
Holt (1995) describes another related problem:
The intelligence directorate of the CIA once had a major internal dispute 
over an intelligence estimate of Soviet activities in the third world. The 
problem was that the Soviet analysts did not know much about the third 
world, and the third world analysts did not know much about the Soviet 
Union; yet all sides were proceeding in good faith without noticeable bias.
This type of difficulty comes from overspecialization. The problem 
is compounded when there is a failure to share intelligence. The 
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intelligence community is prone to compartmentalizing especially 
sensitive intelligence and limiting access to it. Once notoriously reluctant 
to share its intelligence, the National Security Agency (NSA) has become 
somewhat more forthcoming. The CIA’s directorate of operations has not 
always told everything to the directorate of intelligence. Sometimes the 
directorate of operations does not recognize hot intelligence when it sees it 
(p. 82).
Compartmentalization has long been recognized as a double-edged sword, 
providing added protection for secrets, but at a cost to accountability and effectiveness. In 
its 1975 report to the president, the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United 
States, noted potential problems created by compartmentalization:
Even persons whose function it is to oversee or inspect CIA 
activities are sometimes denied complete access to operational details.
On the other hand compartmentation results in high-level, detailed 
approval of many activities — more so than in most government agencies. 
In addition, the secrecy of CIA activities creates additional problems for 
internal control. Individuals trained and accustomed to be secretive and to 
use unorthodox methods to perform their tasks may be tempted to employ 
this knowledge and experience to avoid close scrutiny (p. 83).
The commission went on to emphasize the importance of personal character of 
both front-line agency employees and top leadership in preventing abuses of secrecy, 
saying: “The sensitive and sometimes dangerous nature of the work of the CIA demands 
high standards of personal discipline, dedication and patriotism” (p. 82) and, “In the final 
analysis, the proper functioning of the Agency must depend in large part on the character 
of the Director of Central Intelligence” (p. 93).
The commission’s analysis seems to be both unequivocally true and entirely 
unsatisfactory, particularly in the United States, with its tradition of relying on 
institutional solutions over reliance on the good intentions of those in positions in power. 
In Federalist No. 51, James Madison writes:
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If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions.
With that in mind, leaving the CIA’s proper functioning to the good character of the 
director means that the agency is out of reach of the people and without much in the way 
of “auxiliary precautions.”
Compartmentalization in particular has proven to be a particularly sticky problem. 
In his book Secrecy and Democracy, Stansfield Turner (1985), director of central 
intelligence under President Carter, finds compartmentalization to be at least partially to 
blame for at least two of the most notorious abuses committed by the CIA: the study 
supervised by CIA Dr. Sidney Gottleib in which unknowing subjects received doses of 
LSD21, and the treatment of Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko, who was held in solitary 
confinement for more than three years because of unfounded suspicions by CIA 
counterintelligence officer James Angleton that Nosenko was a Soviet plant.
Turner writes:
I found the system of compartmentation eminently sensible. I 
couldn’t help wondering, though, if it had been used deliberately to keep 
people from knowing what they properly needed to know to supervise the 
Gottleibs and Angletons. I found it difficult to believe, for instance, that 
DCI Dick Helms knew what was being done to Nosenko when he 
continued to approve his prolonged incarceration. As the pieces fell into 
place, I could see that Angleton had manipulated the system by 
constructing elaborate barriers around sensitive information. He had built 
a powerful empire within the CIA. If anyone challenged him, he could say 
or imply that there was other information the challenger did not have that 
justified his actions. He acquired such autonomy that even his superiors 
21  One subject, Frank Olson, died as a result of Gottleib’s experimentation. Gup (2001) offers a 
thorough profile of Gottleib.
143
sometimes could not find out what he was doing and in many cases were 
intimidated by him. Angleton’s barony was not the only one built in the 
CIA by controlled access to knowledge, but it was the most harmful (pp. 
46-47).
However, despite the reforms that followed the 1975 revelations, Turner 
continues to identify compartmentalization (and secrecy more generally) as a practice 
that can hamper intelligence analysis:
[A]cademics and journalists have one big advantage over CIA 
analysts: there is a good deal of sharing of views between them. In the 
CIA wide-ranging debate and exchange of ideas is not nearly so easy 
because of the necessary controls on the highly secret data CIA analysts 
use. CIA analysts are disinclined to test their theories and conclusions on 
people outside the Agency, who work from a less complete set of data. 
This problem of secrecy is genuine, but of more influence is an inherent 
reluctance in the CIA to go outside for second opinions (pp. 116).
These twin problems of compartmentalization and an analytical privileging of 
secret information over more useful information from public sources both continue. In 
early 2001, Robert D. Steele, president of Open Source Solutions Inc., wrote a letter to 
President Bush decrying the intelligence community’s tendency to ignore publicly 
available information. 
“Our secret intelligence community is spending $30 billion a year
focusing on the 5 percent of the information they can steal, while ignoring 
the 95 percent of the relevant information that is not online, not in English, 
and yet vital and very relevant to your strategic decisions,” Steele wrote 
(Loeb 2001, italics in original).
As the president of a company that traffics in open-source intelligence, Steele 
obviously has an axe to grind, but his point actually echoes one made by Moynihan 
(1998), in calling for “Decisions made by those who understand how to exploit the 
wealth and diversity of publicly available information, who no longer assume that 
clandestine collection — that is, “stealing secrets” — equals greater intelligence. 
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Analysis, far more than secrecy, is the key to security” (p. 222, italics in original). There 
is no indication that Steele and Moynihan’s calls have led to significant action.
In 1999, Donald H. Rumsfeld, who later became secretary of defense, and who at 
the time was a member of a commission investigating threats from ballistic missiles, 
noted a problems caused by compartmentalization in a classified memo to the Director of 
Central Intelligence George J. Tenet.
As an example taken from his experience, Rumsfeld said at the end 
of a two-hour classified briefing on several countries’ ballistic missiles 
and other weapons, his group was told “that most of what we had heard 
was incorrect.” The reason, he said, was “the briefers did not have access 
to the information contained in the compartments that we were now to be 
briefed on.” ...
“We ended up getting briefed two or three or four times on the 
same subject because from the first two or three we didn’t get the correct 
information, not because people were lying to us, but because they didn’t 
know,” Rumsfeld said (Loeb 1999).
As discussed elsewhere Rumsfeld can hardly be called an advocate for 
openness22, but he is no doubt concerned about the effectiveness of military and 
intelligence operations, and in excessive compartmentalization, he recognizes a threat to 
effectiveness. That is significant. While most of this project focuses on the tension 
between official secrecy and democratic practice, there is also some tension between 
official secrecy and effectiveness of military and intelligence policy.
22 Ironically, as a member of Congress, Rumsfeld was a co-sponsor of the Freedom of 
Information Act and at one point said, “disclosure of government information is particularly 
important today because government is becoming involved in more and more aspects of every 
citizen’s personal and business life, and so access to information about how government is 
exercising its trust becomes increasingly important” (quoted in Tapscott 2002).
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Secrecy and the judiciary
The American court system has an especially complex relationship with secrecy 
in that it must deal with both its own operations and with secrets held by the other 
branches of government. The courts have been notably reluctant to intervene to force the 
executive branch to disclose information if it is said to be held for national-security 
purposes. The Yale Law Journal (1980) proposed that First Amendment implies a right to 
obtain state-held information. However, this doctrine has not found practical application. 
Likewise, a call by the Harvard Law Review (1990) to amend the Freedom of 
Information Act to encourage judicial scrutiny of classification decisions met with no 
action. As Cheh (1984) notes, the national-security exemption of the Freedom of 
Information Act has essentially given the executive branch carte blanche to withhold 
information, with judges continuing to be almost entirely unwilling to examine the 
appropriateness of claiming that exemption.
The Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States found that at the 
time of its 1975 report there were only seven judicial decisions related to the agency, and 
“None operated as a substantial check on the CIA’s activities.” The commission also 
pointed out major obstacles to judicial oversight of the CIA:
[S]ince practically all of the CIA’s operations are covered by secrecy, few 
potential challengers are even aware of the activities that might otherwise 
be contested; nor can such activities be easily discovered.
The CIA is also specifically freed from statutory requirements 
which often constrain government activities and are enforced by the 
courts. For instance the 1947 [National Security] Act authorizes the 
Director to discharge employees whenever he deems “such termination 
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” This 
discharge power has been held unreviewable. Accordingly, employees 
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have rarely initiated suits against the Agency for wrongful termination and 
have never successfully done so (p. 78).
In effect, the secret exercise of power has also been buttressed by measures 
ensuring unaccountability. The CIA has become increasingly involved in litigation —
from its successful effort to confiscate royalties from a former agent who wrote a book in 
violation of a secrecy agreement with the agency (Medow 1982) to successful defenses 
against lawsuits seeking to compel disclosure of its total annual budget appropriation and 
even a German invisible ink formula dating back to World War I. What has not changed 
is the courts’ unwillingness to review the appropriateness of executive-branch claims 
invoking the national-security exemption of FOIA. In fact, Halperin (1985) detects an 
increased willingness of the courts to defer to executive-branch decisions on what may be 
published, to the extent that the public’s ability to debate national-security issues is 
threatened.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the current climate with concerns about 
international terrorism has not made the courts any more willing to challenge executive-
branch claims regarding secrecy. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did rule in 2002 that 
deportation hearings for people detained in post-Sept. 11 terrorism investigations must be 
open, with Judge Damon J. Keith writing, “Democracies die behind closed doors. The 
First Amendment, through a free press, protects the people’s right to know that their 
government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in deportation proceedings,” (Lane 2002) 
in a ruling that echoed the reasoning of the Yale Law Journal’s claim of a constitutional 
right of access to information. However, in a similar case, the Third Circuit ruled that the 
deportation hearings could be closed (Fainaru 2002), with the Supreme Court refusing to 
hear an appeal of that case (Walsh 2003). And early in 2004, the Supreme Court refused 
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to hear an appeal of a case in which the Center for National Security Studies, the 
American Civil Liberties Union and several media organizations unsuccessfully sought to 
compel the Bush administration to release the names of people detained in the post-Sept. 
11 law-enforcement sweeps (Lane 2004).
A court set up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act known as the FISA 
court, did refuse in 2002 to grant the Justice Department new powers, only the second 
time it had ever ruled against the government, “saying the government had misused the 
law and misled the court dozens of times” (Eggers and Schmidt 2002). However, while 
the ruling was widely viewed as a setback for the Bush administration, Fein (2002) 
argues that such a view is an exaggeration: “The FISA Court balked, but then largely 
capitulated. It substituted for Mr. Ashcroft’s union of law enforcement and intelligence 
collection sweeping authority for the FBI, the Criminal Division, and the Office of 
Intelligence Policy Review to consult directly and to coordinate their efforts to protect 
against international terrorism or other grave hostile acts.” Capitulation or not, the FISA 
court’s action against the Justice Department soon became a moot point, as an appeals 
court set up to hear FISA cases, in its first ruling ever, overturned the FISA court’s 
decision (Eggen 2002).
In short, the courts in the United States are almost entirely content to allow the 
executive branch to keep secrets, provided it invokes national security in some fashion. 
Of course, executive branch secrets, significant though they may be, are not the only 
secrets worth attention here. The fact is that the court system keeps plenty of its own 
secrets, as well. Juries deliberate behind closed doors, grand juries hear witness testimony 
away from the eyes and ears of the public, and in some states, juvenile-court proceedings 
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are closed entirely. All of these measures of secrecy are defended with claims that they 
increase the efficiency of the court system and the likelihood that justice will be served, 
justifications that on their face seem at least plausible.
Jury deliberations are kept secret on the grounds that such secrecy will enhance 
the quality of deliberation and actually increase the perception of legitimacy of the 
outcome. Jurors are supposed to reach a consensus rather than bargain, and secrecy helps 
preserve to the perception that this is always what takes place. Jurors are also spared 
public exposure of their moments of uncertainty or when the persuasion of others leads 
them to alter their positions. The idea of deliberation is generally accepted as a good one, 
but the actual process itself can be unsettling to watch particularly for a public that values 
highly the idea of principled people holding strongly to their stated positions. In shielding 
juries, it should be noted that the secrecy surrounding deliberations is strictly limited and 
circumscribed. Juries have their agendas set for them before they leave open court, and 
the results of their deliberations become public. It is not a form of creeping secrecy (like 
FOIA’s national-security exemption) that threatens to become all-encompassing.
Bok (1984) explains:
Even where persuasive reasons for collective practices of secrecy 
can be stated, accountability is indispensable. The difference it makes is 
illustrated by the comparison between the practice of secrecy in two types 
of court proceedings: jury deliberations, and the secret tribunal or Star 
Chamber trial. Jury members are selected so as to be representative and 
without evident personal bias in the case. Their task is to arrive at a joint 
decision about an individual’s innocence or guilt. Secrecy for their 
deliberation protects the members from attempts to influence them, 
increasing the likelihood of a fair decision; and it allows the resolution of 
difficult conflicts even when the evidence is ambiguous, generating a 
degree of confidence in the final result that otherwise might be 
unattainable. Full publicity to every aspect of deliberations might cast 
doubt on the most careful of decisions. The secrecy, moreover, is 
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terminated as soon as a decision has been reached, and the verdict itself is 
open to public scrutiny and to appeal (pp. 110-111).
It is only the collective nature of the jury that makes secrecy or publicity an issue 
at all. In a bench trial, the public will never have access to the total thought process of the 
judge in reaching his or her decision, nor does that seem problematic in the slightest. It is 
sufficient that the evidence and trial proceedings be open. With the strict boundaries 
around jury secrecy, deliberations can be seen as analogous to collective thought process 
of the jury, and similarly inaccessible to the thought processes of an individual judge.
Grand-jury and juvenile-court secrecy (where it is still practiced) are buttressed 
by similar arguments about the potential harm publicity could cause to justice. That is not 
to say that secrecy in these venues is universally accepted as a good thing. Stephen 
Rosenfield, former editorial page editor of the Washington Post called for greater 
openness in grand-jury proceedings after serving as the foreman of a federal grand jury. 
Rosenfeld (2001) is disturbed by the overwhelming advantage prosecutors enjoy in 
gaining indictments. “The prosecutor’s edge was memorably captured by former federal 
judge and convicted felon Sol Wachtler, who said a grand jury, if asked, will indict a ham 
sandwich.” While the prosecutorial advantage is portrayed as acceptable because of the 
defendant’s ability in to defend him- or herself in the actual trial, Rosenfield is 
unconvinced:
Indictment is the gateway to a broad spread of risks and penalties. 
To submit someone to these real hazards without according him at least 
some of the protections of the adversarial model of trial seems unfair.
These dilemmas might be eased, some believe, if the secrecy 
provisions of grand jury proceedings were relaxed. Our English legal 
forebears invented secrecy in the name of protecting the judicial process. 
No doubt even in America secrecy still has its uses to protect that process. 
But openness may better serve the same fundamental rationale. Having 
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watched up close for a year, I am convinced that the balance needs closer 
tending.
Likewise, Washington Post columnist Marc Fisher (2004) makes a compelling 
argument for the District of Columbia to join the 36 states that allow public access to 
juvenile court proceedings:
I have seen judges in juvenile court pat female lawyers on the rear, 
laugh at children who didn’t understand the proceedings and fall asleep on 
the bench. I have heard judges in juvenile court shout insults at parents 
and ridicule children for their parents’ shortcomings.
I saw none of this in the District of Columbia’s juvenile courts 
because the public is not allowed inside those courtrooms. The 
management of the thugs-in-training who flow through our juvenile courts 
is largely a secret affair, conducted behind closed doors so that you and I 
cannot see if the kids are coddled, ignored or otherwise mishandled by an 
overwhelmed and understaffed justice system.
Fisher saw the abuses he describes in an open juvenile court system in Florida, 
where publicity was at least available to expose miscarriages of justice. Publicity, though, 
can have other consequences. Closed juvenile courts are justified by the idea that public 
exposure of juvenile crime could stigmatize young defendants and interfere with what 
might otherwise be a successful process of rehabilitation. But, Fisher says, “in states 
where reporting on juvenile court is permitted, news coverage tends to focus not on the 
evils of individual crooks but on the systematic problems that blossom in unwatched 
bureaucracies.”
Perhaps juvenile court proceedings should be open everywhere, as Fisher 
suggests. And perhaps grand-jury proceedings could use a strong dose of sunshine. It 
may even be that there is a compelling argument to be made for opening jury 
deliberations (although that seems highly doubtful). Regardless, the secrecy practiced by 
the American court system does not pose the same threat to democratic values as the 
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secrecy imposed by the executive in the name of national security. Where national 
security threatens to become an all-encompassing rationale for secrecy, potentially 
stifling democratic discussion on matters of great public importance, judicial secrecy is in 
practice narrowly circumscribed and at most threatens private injustice. That is not to say 
that its potential abuses are unimportant — Fisher’s concerns about children being 
victimized are important — but the stakes are lower.23
While an independent judiciary may exist in a democracy, it is debatable as to 
whether the courts themselves are democratic institutions. It has been argued that with the 
power of judicial review, courts can act as a check on majority tyranny, thus serving as 
vital democratic institutions due to their key role in preserving minority rights. Just a 
quick glance at Plessy v. Ferguson suggests that the courts are not always reliable in this 
role.
On the question of whether constitutional courts make a difference 
among democracies, in the United States there have certainly been eras 
when the federal judiciary has successfully championed individual rights 
and civil liberties against the legislative branch of government, that of the 
Warren Court being the most known. But there have also been eras when 
it has legitimated racial oppression and the denial of civil liberties 
(Shapiro 2003, p. 20).
23 That is not to say that it is impossible for judicial secrecy to have a negative impact on 
democratic institutions. The case of Avner Cohen is instructive. Relying only on publicly available 
and legally obtained information, Cohen wrote s no reason to proceed. Since then, however, 
Cohen has been warned not to return to Israel because he faces interrogation and potential arrest 
there. Cohen has attempted to clarify his situation but has been unable to confirm whether he 
indeed still faces prosecution, and if so, for what. In this instance judicial secrecy in Israel is 
clearly being used as part of an effort to stifle public discussion of a serious political matter, the 
propriety and wisdom of Israel maintaining nuclear weapons.
American activists have complained of the use of judicial and police power to stifle 
dissent. However, their actual complaints have involved allegations of more general abuses and 
not of secrecy itself.
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Even working precisely as its defenders intend, judicial review is troubling 
precisely because of its anti-majoritarian character. Dahl (1989) discusses judicial review 
as a type of “quasi guardianship”:
There is necessarily an inverse ratio between the authority of the 
quasi guardians and the authority of the demos and its representatives. If 
the authority of the quasi guardians were comprehensive, then the demos 
would alienate its control over the agenda of public affairs and the 
democratic process would be gutted. Even if the authority of the guardians 
were restricted solely to certain questions of fundamental rights and 
interests, on these matters the demos would necessarily alienate its control. 
On questions within a narrower range, the inverse ratio still holds: The 
broader the scope of rights and interests subject to final decision by the 
quasi guardians, the narrower must be the scope of the democratic process. 
Moreover, even within a restricted range the power of the quasi guardians 
may be more than merely negative, more than a veto of unconstitutional 
laws. As the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court shows (in school 
desegregation, for example), in seeking to enforce superior rights and 
interests a court may find it necessary to go beyond mere negative 
restraints and attempt to lay down positive policies, sometimes in great 
detail (pp. 188-189, parentheses in original).
Granting that judicial review may preserve rights fundamental to democracy, the 
actions of the courts are consistent with their role as preservers of democratic institutions 
only to the extent that they in fact act to protect fundamental rights, a proposition that is 
empirically shaky at best (Dahl 1997).
Shapiro (2003) argues that the view that independent courts are indispensable 
owes little to their character as institutions of democracy.
Indeed, there are reasons for thinking that the popularity of independent 
courts in new democracies ay have more to do with the popularity of 
independent banks than with the protection of individual freedoms. They 
can operate as devices to signal foreign investors and international 
economic institutions that the capacity of elected officials to engage in 
redistributive policies or interfere with property rights will be limited. 
That is, they may be devices for limiting domestic political opposition to 
unpopular policies by taking them off the table (p. 21).
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The American judiciary is unique among the branches of government in both its 
role as an interpreter of law and as a decider of fact. Indeed, it can be argued that in 
seeking truth, the courts are apolitical.
Politics concerns itself only with those realms where truth is not —
or is not yet — known. We do not vote for the best polio vaccine or 
conduct surveys on the ideal space shuttle, nor has Boolean algebra been 
subjected to electoral testing. But Laetrile and genetic engineering, while 
they belong formally to the domain of science, have aroused sufficient 
conflict among scientists to throw them into the political domain — and 
rightly so. Where consensus stops politics starts (Barber 1984, p. 129).
In this formulation, politics involves acting in the face of uncertainty, whereas the courts 
in their truth-seeking function attempt to eliminate that uncertainty — or at least protect 
rights in the realm of the uncertain.
The uniqueness of the courts and the narrow scope of judicial secrecy make it in
practice much less troubling than other forms of secrecy discussed here. However, there 
is yet one more problem to consider: Not all secrets involving the courts are imposed by 
the courts. The courts are in fact quite dependent on external sources of information. In 
bringing in evidence and witnesses (and to a certain extent in citing precedent and legal 
doctrine) opposing sides in a case are providing the court with the information it needs to 
arrive at the truth of the matter at hand. When that information is not forthcoming, it can 
create a real problem for the courts’ functioning. In practice, this is where official secrecy 
causes the greatest problems with regard to the courts — in secrets that are maintained 
externally.
In an adversarial system, there is ample incentive for each side to deliver 
information that will assist in establishing its account of the truth as the correct one. A 
competent defendant need not be compelled to bring forward evidence of his or her 
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innocence. A prosecutor does not have to be told to present evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt. With other kinds of information, a court does need to use a system of incentives or 
sanctions. A prosecutor may be reluctant to provide the defense with exculpatory 
evidence. In the interest of reaching truth, court rules make doing so mandatory. On the 
other hand, a truly guilty defendant would not voluntarily provide evidence of his or her 
guilt, and under the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment does not have to. 
However, the courts do have such powers as the subpoena to compel others to provide 
information that they might otherwise prefer not to. In general, these arrangements work 
with sufficient efficiency for the courts to receive the information they need. But in some 
cases, because releasing information to the courts is tantamount to making it public, 
officials are reluctant to release information that they claim could affect national security.
Particularly (but not solely) in espionage cases, court rules requiring that 
defendants have access to potentially exculpatory evidence have led to a phenomenon 
called graymail, in which the government must face a choice between allowing the 
release of classified information and allowing a defendant to be freed. The potential for 
graymail has also provided prosecutors with added incentive to offer plea bargains to 
defendants, perhaps unjustly. According to Philip Heyman, who was assistant attorney 
general at the time:
[Graymail] foster[s] the perception that government officials and private 
persons with access to military or technological secrets have a broad de 
facto immunity from prosecution from a variety of crimes. This perception 
not only undermines the public’s confidence in the fair administration of 
criminal justice but it also promotes concern that there is no effective 
check against improper conduct by members of our intelligence agencies 
(quoted in Salgado 1988, p. 429, brackets and italics in original).
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Dealing with the problem of graymail is a tall order as it requires resolving a 
tension between protecting a defendant’s due-process rights and the interest of the 
government in keeping secrets. With the 1980 Classified Information Procedures Act, 
Congress set up a system intended to protect a defendant’s right to discovery while 
keeping classified information out of open court. However, if large amounts of classified 
information are involved, the required procedures are cumbersome (Salgado 1988), and 
at any rate, the law has not put to rest all situations in which a defendant’s right to 
exculpatory evidence comes into conflict with a the state’s interest in keeping secrets.
The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, who is been accused of having conspired with al-
Qaeda in planning the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the United States, offers a case in point. 
Moussaoui has sought access to accused al-Qaeda members in U.S. custody, including 
Ramzi Binalshibh, who is alleged to have planned the attacks. District Judge Leonie M. 
Brinkema, who is presiding over the case, has been highly critical of the amount of 
secrecy surrounding the case. “The court, too, is disturbed by the extent to which United 
States intelligence officials have classified [materials] ... and further agrees with the 
defendant’s skepticism of the government’s ability to prosecute this case in open court,” 
she wrote in April 2003, in response to Moussaoui’s request for an unclassified copy of a 
transcript of a closed hearing and a secret opinion issued by the court (Davis and Markon 
2003). In October 2003, after government lawyers defied her order to produce witnesses 
requested by Moussaoui, Brinkema sanctioned the prosecution, barring it from seeking 
the death penalty for Moussaoui or from claiming at trial that he was linked to the Sept. 
11 terrorist attacks.
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Brinkema’s decision sparked speculation that Moussaoui would not be tried in a 
civilian court. The Justice Department’s defiance of a court order here is unusual and 
appears unjustified. But the Moussaoui case demonstrates more than the Bush 
administration’s excessive use of secrecy or the difficulties inherent in trying terror 
suspects. It also shows how secrecy can hamstring a court. Faced with the government’s 
defiance, Brinkema had a choice of allowing Moussaoui’s due-process rights to be 
violated or dismissing the case against a defendant who seems quite likely to pose a 
serious threat to the United States. Brinkema’s sanctioning of the prosecution is a not-
altogether-satisfactory attempt the court’s ability to seek the truth in the Moussaoui’s case 
while being hobbled by external secrecy.
As with graymail, it is conceivable that there are situations in which the 
government has a legitimate interest in keeping information out of open court. 
Regardless, when the courts are denied the information they need for reaching the best
possible decision in a trial, their functioning is inhibited. This is an unavoidable cost of 
official secrecy when the judiciary is denied access to information by another branch of 
government.
Secrecy and science
Secrecy has a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the court system, as well as 
with military or intelligence operations. In some situations, it can be helpful, even crucial, 
while in others it can be devastatingly unhelpful. Where science is concerned, however, 
there is no such ambiguity. Secrecy is bad. There may be scientific information that it 
157
might be desirable to keep hidden, but in cases in which secrecy is desirable, that 
desirability never arises out of scientific rationale. Science values and depends on the free 
movement of information, and regulations impinging on that free movement, however 
nobly intended or necessary, do interfere with the scientific pursuit of knowledge.
The scientific rationale for disseminating knowledge as widely as possible is 
exemplified by the Prometheus myth. At great cost to himself, Prometheus defies the 
gods and brings fire to humanity, an innovation that, while it may be harmful if used 
carelessly, unquestionably improves the situation of humanity — and at no cost to anyone 
but Prometheus himself. It is an appealing image — particularly for scientists who see 
themselves making great sacrifices in order to help humanity — and one that leaves no 
room for secrecy. Prometheus never considered withholding fire from humanity. If in 
addition to light and warmth, it also brings danger and destruction, well, it will be up to 
its future handlers to decide the manner in which it is used. This is exactly the approach 
of science to secrecy. While scientific information may be kept hidden, a la by the 
Atomic Energy Act, that secrecy is compelled by some external rationale, not a scientific 
one.
Denunciation of secrecy is ritualistic in science. Precisely because 
the conflict that secrecy creates is so strong, their declarations against it 
are in part efforts at conjuring away its power. Unlike other professionals 
such as lawyers or government officials, modern scientists have never 
staked out a rationale justifying practices of secrecy. They have held free 
and open communication to be the most essential requirement for their 
work (Bok 1984, p. 153).
Prometheus does not offer the only mythological account of what the creation and 
dissemination of new knowledge means for humanity. The story of Pandora embodies 
anxiety about the potential for inquiry to lead to devastating and irreversible results. 
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Despite warnings to the contrary, Pandora lets her human curiosity get the better of her 
and opens a box that consequently lets loose a host of plagues upon humanity.24
Contemporary debates about cloning and the use of genetically modified organisms 
evoke the Pandora myth in critics’ warnings about the potential consequences of such 
research.
It is important to note what the Pandora myth is and is not. Pandora warns us 
against inquiry altogether, for once the box is opened, its contents cannot be recaptured. 
It is not an argument for secrecy. Rather it suggests that some knowledge is so dangerous 
that that it should not be sought by anyone, not even a select priesthood. Secrecy on the 
other hand, as in Chapter 3’s discussion of dual-use information, involves a recognition 
of the danger along with an aspiration to limit the danger by limiting the spread of 
knowledge.
As Bok (1984) points out, secrecy does find a place in contemporary scientific 
practice, for instance in the double-blind experiment25, or in cases in which temporary 
secrecy about one’s work is used for reasons of professional competition. It should be 
24 The Pandora myth is far from being the only story cautioning against inquisitiveness. In the 
Book of Genesis, Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden of Eden only after defying God 
and eating fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
In the New Testament, Thomas doubts the other disciples have seen the resurrected 
Christ, saying “Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print 
of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.” Eight days later, Jesus indulges 
Thomas’ doubts but chastises him, saying “Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou has 
believed: blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed” (John 20:25-29).
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein offers a modern caution against unfettered scientific inquiry.
25 In a double-blind experiment, neither the subjects nor the researchers administering the 
experiment know who is receiving the experimental treatment and who is receiving a placebo. 
This method is used to ensure that confounding variables and psychosomatic factors do not 
contaminate the experiment.
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noted that only the former is practiced for scientific reasons, as the double-blind 
experiment allows access to knowledge that would not otherwise be reliably available. 
The latter is secrecy practiced by scientists, but not for scientific reasons. And official 
secrecy stands altogether apart from these uses, as a restriction imposed from outside and 
accepted only with the greatest reluctance in a practice of science that is thoroughly 
Promethean in motivation.
Citizens or their representatives may decide that other considerations require the 
hobbling of scientific work, as in the moratorium on human cloning (although in practical 
terms, enforcement may be difficult). However, such a choice can only be made for 
reasons external to science. Officially imposed secrecy cannot help but be a burden on 
the scientific enterprise. Nor is that the only cost.
The secrecy surrounding much current scientific research makes it 
difficult for the public to consider such alternative directions for scientific 
work, and to evaluate the full burden of present research priorities. And 
secrecy likewise insulates scientists from examining their own role, and 
from accountability to the public. Many scientists have also testified to the 
personal and professional costs of working under secrecy restrictions: of 
having to take part in systems of classification, submit to research delays 
or outright censorship, and swear loyalty oaths; of fearing espionage; and 
of being themselves suspected when traveling or conversing with 
foreigners (Bok 1984, p. 170).
In short, the requirements of science are fundamentally opposed to the practice of 
secrecy.
Secrecy and history.
As with science, history has a reasonably unambiguous relationship with official 
secrecy in that secrecy and the enterprise of historical inquiry are fundamentally opposed. 
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Decrying the state of Americans’ historical knowledge has become something of a parlor 
game for pundits and historians, even as the dangers of official secrecy for history are 
brushed to the side.
A typical example:
Ninety percent of eighth graders (in the 1994 National Assessment of 
Educational Progress in U.S. History) could recount nothing of the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention. Even when prompted by mentions of 
Yalta, Lend-Lease, and Hiroshima, 59 percent of the eighth grade were 
unprepared to say which conflict these references brought to mind 
(Hitchens 1998, p. 38).
This “don’t know much about history” school of criticism points to a serious and 
seemingly intractable problem. Yet a certain optimism underlies the whole project: If 
only the curriculum were better ... If only Americans could be made to understand the 
importance of the past ... If only the culture could be reclaimed from the philistines who 
value Joe Millionaire over James Madison ... Then the scales of ignorance would fall 
away, and Americans would be prepared to apply the lessons of the past in making way 
for a brighter future.
If only it were that easy.
The criticisms certainly have merit. Citizens doubtless would be better off if they 
were better informed about history, and a shift in societal priorities and an improved 
curriculum would be beneficial. But a larger problem remains, for it is not just that 
Americans don’t know much about history, but that they can’t. Particularly since World 
War II, concerns about national security have created a growing class of information, 
much of it historically significant, that is off-limits to all but a privileged few, or 
available only through the most convoluted of channels. In the introduction to its 1997 
final report, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy 
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complained, “The secrecy system has systematically denied American historians access 
to the records of American history. Of late we find ourselves relying on the archives of 
the former Soviet Union in Moscow to resolve questions of what was going on in 
Washington at mid-century. This is absurd” (p. xliv).
More recent moves in the United States toward greater secrecy are worrisome on 
a number of fronts, and several recent measures are of particular concern to historians. 
For instance:
• In 2001, President Bush issued an executive order essentially countermanding 
the intent of the 1978 Presidential Records Act. Under the new executive order, the 
current president can order predecessors’ records kept secret, even if the former president 
in question has approved their release. Helen Thomas (2001) argues the motivation is to 
protect former President Bush and members of the current administration who served 
previously; the Bush administration claims its moves toward greater secrecy are part of 
an attempt to reassert executive branch power that has eroded over time (Nakashima 
2002, Rosenbaum 2002). Regardless of the motives, the net result is to deny historians 
access to a potential treasure trove of documents. The Bush executive order came at a 
time when the Reagan library had approved 68,000 pages for release.
• In contrast to previous practice that encouraged officials to take an expansive 
approach to releasing information under the Freedom of Information Act, Attorney 
General John D. Ashcroft has sent out a memo that seems to favor the withholding of 
information. It reads in part, “when you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to 
withhold records ... you can be assured that the Justice Department will defend your 
decisions.”
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“‘The cumulative message from the White House and from Ashcroft is: Stall. 
Don’t release,’ said Tom Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive, an 
access advocacy group. ‘They believe that the trend for 30 years has been to make the 
White House too open’” (Nakashima 2002).
• The administration has refused to release 4,000 pages of documents relating to 
President Clinton’s last-minute pardons of 140 people (Tapscott 2002).
In short, even more than previous administrations, the Bush administration is 
closing off access to information that could expand or even radically alter citizens’ 
understanding of the past. However, it is not as though a more enlightened approach to 
information would make the problem disappear.
There are two basic, interrelated claims at the heart of this discussion of the 
relationship between official secrecy and history: 1) Official secrecy interferes with 
citizens’ ability to know and evaluate what happened in the past. 2) The past matters; 
citizens need to understand a history of reasonable completeness and veracity in order to 
situate themselves and act in the present. If both of these things are true, then it stands to 
reason that what is currently being kept secret is probably distorting what can be 
understood about the past. Obviously, the exact nature of that distortion is unknowable 
for now, but previous revelations of secret information provide some idea of the damage 
caused by official secrecy.
Take, for instance, the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by the Soviet 
Union. The Reagan administration offered what appeared to be the definitive account of 
the incident at the time. In this account, on Sept. 1, 1983, a commercial passenger airliner 
accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace where a Soviet fighter pilot fully aware of the 
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civilian nature of his target, shot the plane from the sky, killing all 269 people aboard. 
Adding credibility to the Reagan administration account were incredible Soviet 
countercharges that the plane was actually on a spy mission and had been running 
without navigation lights. The U.S. government solidified its credibility with a dramatic 
presentation before the U.N. Security Council (the first ever using videotaped evidence) 
that used radar and voice intercepts to give what appeared to be proof that Soviets had 
knowingly murdered hundreds of civilians in cold blood that night. The American story 
carried the day and is probably still the version most commonly remembered. 
Unfortunately, that version is incomplete and inaccurate.
Snyder (1995), who created the tape as director of the Television and Film 
Service of the U.S. Information Agency, says he later learned he was working with 
incomplete materials. The voice intercept tape contained a crucial five-minute gap. 
Additionally, it included the Soviet pilot’s side of the conversation but not the ground 
controller’s side and, on top of everything else, was poorly translated. While the tape 
gave the impression that the Soviet pilot had a clear view of the plane from close up, 
“Nothing could have been further from the truth.” (p. 61):
Our tape did not include pilot Osipovich’s comment, “Unclear,” at 18:10 
GMT, in response to his ground controller’s question, “805, can you 
determine the [intruder aircraft] type?” Osipovich had said it was too dark 
for him to see the intruder clearly. The full transcript would later show that 
Soviet pilot Gennady Osipovich had circled the intruder to get his 
attention and tilted his wings to force the aircraft down, after being asked 
repeatedly by his ground controllers to do so. Osipovich had also reported 
firing his warning bursts to get the intruder’s attention. This comment was 
also not on the tape we were provided (Snyder 1995, p. 62, bracketed 
material is Snyder’s).
While Snyder was unaware at the time, Air Force intelligence had actually 
reconstructed a reasonably accurate scenario attributing the incident to mistaken identity 
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even before Secretary of State George Schultz announced the loss of the plane. Schultz, 
however, presented what would quickly become the standard narrative, accusing the 
Soviets of intentionally shooting down an unarmed civilian plane (Hersh 1986). Before 
the Security Council meeting, the president muddied the waters further with a mixture of 
half-truths and exaggerations:
President Reagan had roundly condemned the Soviets for intentionally 
shooting down a civilian airliner. ‘There is no way a pilot could mistake 
this [Boeing 747] for anything other than a civilian airliner.’ Reagan had 
also claimed it was ‘a clear night with a half-moon,’ although actually 
there was less than a half-moon, and in the area of southern Sakhalin 
Island, where the plane was shot down, there was a low overcast, and 
scattered medium and high clouds.” (Snyder 1995, p. 68, bracketed 
material is Snyder’s).
By 1986, Hersh had done sufficient investigating to piece together what had 
happened and conclude that the Soviets mixed up the flight path of KAL 007 with that of 
a RC-135 surveillance plane doing intelligence gathering outside Soviet territory, and as 
Snyder confirms, were unable to visually identify the plane in the dark from the position 
from which it was shot down.
Taking into account the presence of a American surveillance plane in the same 
time and a history of intrusions into Soviet airspace by U.S. spy planes (Bamford 2001), 
it is unsurprising that the Soviets would have had their suspicions about KAL 007. The 
shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later approach that they took was certainly irresponsible, 
but it was hardly the premeditated act of murder represented by the American side. Yet, 
among those who are not conspiracy enthusiasts, how many now are aware of this more 
complete account, as opposed to the public-relations disinformation put out by the United 
States government immediately after the incident. Snyder’s (1995) guess is not many, 
despite the publication of his book and his 1996 op-ed piece in the Washington Post:
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The moral of the story is that all governments, including our own, lie 
when it suits their purposes. The key is to lie first. ... KE-007 was a victim 
of the cold war, and it proved this war could be very real and cold lead to 
human casualties. Another casualty, always war’s first, was the truth. The 
story of KE-007 will always be remembered pretty much the way we told 
it in 1983, not the way it actually happened (Snyder 1995, p. 71).
KAL 007 is hardly an anomaly. Gibbs (1995) shows how initial U.S. 
misinformation about the Congo crisis led to later accounts of the events being garbled. 
According to a popular version of history, when Klaus Fuchs gave the Soviets 
information from a 1944 meeting at Los Alamos about the feasibility of the H-bomb, he 
made possible the success of their H-bomb program. Material declassified later reveals 
that while that might have been his intent, the model Los Alamos scientists were working 
on at the time was not capable of producing a working weapon. The Soviets, in fact 
gleaned their information from the fallout of American atmospheric testing. (Hirsch and 
Matthews 1990). But that is not likely to be what is recalled.
Post-World War II American history teems with examples of events in which 
initial accounts later proved to be wrong or misleadingly incomplete, not because of 
because of information that could only be unearthed later but because of state action in 
concealing that information. Whether that concealment was motivated by genuine 
concerns over national security or baser political motives, as appears to have been the 
case in the KAL 007 crisis, the end result was the same: History was damaged or 
distorted, perhaps irreparably in the public imagination.
The problem is not merely one of faulty memory or a failure to pay attention on 
the part of the public. Official secrecy continues to cast a shadow on historical fact long 
past what reasonable cautiousness would dictate. In the 1980s, the State Department 
published editions of the purportedly authoritative Foreign Relations of the United States
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that neglected to mention the American role in instigating coups in Iran in 1953 and 
Guatemala in 1954.
Concerning Iran and Guatemala names and facts the whole world already 
knew about thus joined the disappeared: for reasons of plausible 
presidential deniability. These censored volumes remain a national 
disgrace. Over two-thirds of the material relating to Guatemala, which I 
and others got declassified were reclassified during the information slash 
and burn years of the Ronald Reagan administration. Now we need to 
pause here to note this unprecedented historical anomaly: never before in 
U.S. history were records declassified and published, then reclassified and 
deleted. The precedent impacts the historical record into perpetuity. 
Today’s covert operations blind and distort our future history. We are 
being asked to build history on the sands of misinformation (Cook 1996, 
p. 286).
Blanche Wiesen Cook argues that it is better not to build at all than to build on 
such shaky ground. A history of the Iranian or Guatemalan coups that excludes the 
American role is like a history of the American Revolution that excludes George 
Washington. Iran and Guatemala provide dramatic examples, but not exceptional ones. In 
fact, secrecy has become so much a part of how the executive does business that Cook 
suggests a moratorium on the publication of scholarly editions of presidential papers until 
steps are taken to increase openness and recover from a national “secrecy mania.” Such a 
move would be justified by the understanding that an awareness of ignorance is less 
dangerous than the illusion of being well informed. 
George C. Herring (1997) who served as a member of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Historical Review Panel, describes the panel’s work as largely a public-
relations gambit to create the illusion of openness. The panel wastes a great deal of time 
on work such as clearing transcripts from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
information that is readily available to the public in other countries because it has been 
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broadcast over public airwaves or collected from other open sources. In dealing with 
actual secrets, too, the agency has dragged its feet:
Declassification of documents for the FRUS (Foreign Relations of the 
United States) series was at times excruciatingly slow, and the volume of 
documents released certainly did not live up to our expectations of the 
meaning of openness. ... The materials the CIA released to the archives 
were some miscellaneous documents and some articles from classified 
intelligence journals that didn’t amount to a great deal substantively but 
not a single office file from any part of the Agency (Herring 1997).
Herring reports that out of 165 million pages of pre-1975 records, the CIA planned to 
seek exemption from declassification for 106 million, a decision that is hardly out of 
character for an agency that last year successfully defended itself in a lawsuit seeking the 
declassification of a formula for a World War I-era invisible ink (“Judge Upholds 
Secrecy of Invisible Ink Formulas” 2002).
The situation is getting worse, not better. In March 2003, the president issued an 
executive order that delays until 2006 the declassification of millions of documents that 
otherwise would have been released April 17, 2003, as well as expanding the power to 
reclassify information that has already been released (Milbank and Allen 2003). This 
comes at a time when events in the recent past are poorly understood, and efforts to 
change that are being hampered by secrecy. In addition to being starved for funds, the 
independent commission to investigate the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks has had its 
work delayed by difficulties in obtaining security clearances for its members and 
disagreements over how the commission will handle classified material (Eggen 2003). 
What is already known about the days leading up to the attacks is disturbing enough: 
President Bush was notified of a risk of al-Qaeda hijackings on Aug. 6, 2001, the CIA 
followed two hijackers to a meeting in Malaysia but was slow in passing on information 
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to the FBI, and the Minneapolis office of the FBI was repeatedly denied warrants that 
could have allowed the plot to be uncovered. Is it any wonder that in an atmosphere of 
stifling secrecy, conspiracy theorists find an eager audience? Misconceptions are found 
more broadly, too. Surveys find consistent majorities of Americans who believe Saddam 
Hussein was directly involved in the Sept. 11 attacks, a conclusion even the Bush 
administration has been unwilling to draw (Berman 2003). A credible, reasonably 
authoritative account if the events leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks is desperately 
needed, and official secrecy has gotten in the way.
Of course, all this discussion is predicated on the idea that history matters. The 
impact of secrecy on how citizens understand the past is much less significant for 
someone such as Keith Jenkins (1999) who argues that because historical accounts must 
necessarily be incomplete and constructed from a particular point of view, all such 
accounts are created equal and equally irrelevant:
[T]he idea of the historical past can thus be considered as just one of the 
many historical imaginaries we have fabricated to help us make some 
sense of the apparent senselessness of existence and to protect us from the 
possible trauma occasioned by having to face radical finitude. Of course, 
the past per se is not imagined in the sense that “it” didn’t actually occur. 
It did occur and in exactly the way it did. But it is an imaginary with 
respect to the historical meanings and understandings, the significances 
and purposes it has been deemed to have for us, both as a whole and in its 
parts (p. 14, italics are Jenkins’).
There is a serious, noteworthy argument behind this radical position, even though, 
taken to its logical conclusion, it would have us throw the baby out with the bath water —
and then perhaps construct an equally valid counternarrative claiming that such an event 
never occurred. Historical accounts are necessarily incomplete and subject to 
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interpretation, thus making it possible for the same events to be used as supporting 
evidence for contradictory arguments.
In its untiring availability and promiscuity, the historical past has gone 
along with anybody who has wanted it — Marxists, Whigs, racists, 
feminists, structuralists, empiricists, antiquarians, postmodernists —
anybody can have it. Having no meaning-full existence independent of 
historians’ textual embrace, being constructed by them, the past 
constituted as historicized text has ultimately no choice but to go along 
with whatever purposes are desired (Jenkins 1999, pp. 14-15).
What this means is that those who would argue a particular stance or position cannot 
simply point to “history” and expect it to carry the day. But not all historical accounts are 
equal, and history is far from irrelevant. All other things being equal, an account of the 
1954 Guatemalan coup that has the United States directing anti-Arbenz forces is better 
than one that ignores American involvement — not just different but better. History does 
matter.
It matters for democracy, and it matters for citizens, who make democracy a 
meaningful concept. While it may not make Dahl’s (1989) list of necessary conditions for 
polyarchy, it performs a number of functions vital to citizens, as will be shown in the 
following sections. The understanding that comes from shedding history’s light on the 
past can reinforce a sense of identity, instill humility and tolerance, and finally, it can 
spur citizens into action.
The role the past plays in identity may be at its most intuitively obvious on the 
individual level.
[T]he memories of the past that make up history constitute an absolutely 
crucial part of what we presently are. Without some autobiographical 
narrative, our identities literally disintegrate: they fall apart into unrelated 
fragments, and we are indeed in a nightmare situation, where anything 
might have happened and anything might; and that’s enough to drive us 
crazy (Southgate 2000, pp. 40-41).
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The myth of possessive individualism may hold that we are what we do, that our 
identities are nothing more than a function of our participation in a set of exchange 
relationships, but this notion of identity seems awfully hollow. As Wallace Gruner tells 
Saul Bellow’s Mr. Sammler, “Everyone needs his memories. They keep the wolf of 
insignificance from the door” (1977, p. 190). We are not just what we do: We are what 
we have done, what has been done to us and what we have seen. There is a reason that 
refugees cling to family photographs despite their lack of immediate utility in enhancing 
the chances of survival. Photographs provide a tangible connection to a past that is felt as 
a part of their very being. A communal past matters in the same way when the individual 
has internalized group membership as part of his or her identity.
History is crucial to the formation and maintenance of a strong sense of identity, 
which in turn is necessary for citizens to act effectively in a democratic state. Strong 
identity, however, does not necessarily lead to democratic outcomes. In fact, some forms 
of identity, particularly those based on a sense of superiority and a marginalization of 
others, are profoundly anti-democratic. In the antebellum United States, white identity 
was based on on negation of the other rather than something innate to the self, on the idea 
of being not black, but in fact superior. In this way even the poorest, most disadvantaged 
white workers could find solace in the fact that they at least were “better” than slaves or 
even free blacks (Roediger 1991).
In short, the very strength of identity that is necessary to make citizens efficacious 
actors may turn toward anti-democratic ends if it is based on arrogance or a sense of 
superiority. In The Burden of Southern History, originally published in 1960, C. Vann 
Woodward (1993) detects a dangerous triumphalism in the American identity, rooted in a 
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history that essentially had seen no frustration, failure or defeat, but had seemingly never 
strayed from the path of unerring progress. The myth of the city on the hill, which holds 
that the United States has a special calling to act as an example for others to follow, also 
contains the seeds of a certain arrogance and encourages the disregard of others in a way 
that is impossible for those whose past includes failure and defeat. For Woodward, the 
most obvious place to look for such a history is the South.
Southern heritage is distinctive. For Southern history, unlike American, 
includes large components of frustration, failure, and defeat. It includes 
not only an overwhelming military defeat but long decades of defeat in the 
provinces of economic, social and political life. Such a heritage affords 
Southern people no basis for the delusion that there is nothing whatever 
that is beyond their power to accomplish. They have had it forcibly and 
repeatedly borne in upon them that this is not the case. Since their 
experience in this respect is more common among the general run of 
mankind than that of their fellow Americans, it would seem to be a part of 
their heritage worth cherishing (Woodward 1993, p. 19).
Furthermore, Southerners who are honest with themselves cannot lay claim to the 
sense of insufferable rightness and divine mission that is implied by the myth of the city 
on the hill.
Southerners have repeated the American rhetoric of self admiration and 
sung the perfection of American institutions ever since the Declaration of 
Independence. But for half that time they lived intimately with a great 
social evil and the other half with its aftermath. ... The South’s 
preoccupation was with guilt, not with innocence, with the reality of evil, 
not with the dream of perfection. Its experience in this respect, as in 
several others, was on the whole a thoroughly un-American one. ...
The experience of evil and the experience of tragedy are parts of 
Southern heritage that are as difficult to reconcile with the American 
legend of innocence and social felicity as the experience of poverty and 
defeat are to reconcile with legends of abundance and success (pp. 20-21).
It is Woodward’s goal to shatter these dangerous twin illusions of triumph and 
innocence and replace them with a sophisticated understanding of history that will not 
tempt the United States “to exert all the power she possesses to compel history to 
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conform to her illusions” (p. 193). The vehicle he sees as most likely to accomplish this 
goal is Southern history, but it is the goal, not the vehicle that is important here. Since 
1960, as Woodward recognizes in later editions of The Burden of Southern History, the 
rest of the country has joined the South in having to come to terms with a burdensome 
history of loss and moral culpability. The peak came perhaps in 1975, with the finality of 
defeat in Vietnam and a series of revelations about abuses and crimes committed by the 
intelligence community in the name of fighting communism.
There is a real value in coming to terms with this shameful side of American 
history, namely that one acts differently when the possibility of shame and defeat is 
recognized. An idealized image of invincibility is impossible to maintain in the face of 
the fall of Saigon; a sense of moral arrogance falls apart in the face of revelations about 
murderous, corrupt actions committed by the intelligence community in the name of 
national security. These are painful revelations to be sure, and no one would want to 
return to 1975 to experience them again. But the memory of shame and defeat is enough 
to make citizens wary of actions that would cause a return to those actual experiences 
again.
These are not easy lessons to embrace, though, and when official secrecy is 
available there is a temptation to hide painful truths.
[O]ne of the ways in which information is controlled and democracy 
denied, is by the government withholding important documents from the 
public, or keeping secret their existence altogether, or censoring them 
(how we must struggle to get data about the Gulf of Tonkin, the Bay of 
Pigs, the bombing of Laos, CIA operations in Guatemala). And while the 
ostensible purpose of such secrecy is the physical security of the nation, 
the actual purpose is almost always the political security of those who run 
the nation (Zinn 2001, pp. 170-171, parentheses in original).
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Indeed a CIA that is committed to keeping 64 percent of its 25-year-old records secret 
(Herring 1997) is not acting merely out of concern for national security. Genuine national 
security concerns may prompt continued secrecy about successful, justifiable covert 
actions, but absent that there are incentives for the state to reveal its involvement in 
actions likely to prove popular. But for the failures and obviously reprehensible acts, 
there is an additional incentive to keep them secret, and with no independent arbiter of 
what truly must be kept secret to protect national security, there is a real danger that the 
state will come to bury its mistakes. Furthermore, for those on the outside looking in, it is 
virtually impossible to determine whether the criteria for keeping necessary secrets are 
being applied honestly.
History should be available to help citizens navigate the twin shoals of despair 
and triumphalism, however reluctant they may in fact be to take on the task. Ultimately, 
the goal is for them to be inspired to act, for if democracy as rule by the people is taken 
seriously, it cannot mean that the people are passive. Studying history can lead into the 
trap of seeing past events as having been inevitable. But there is an alternative:
If the present seems an irrevocable fact of nature, the past is most usable 
as a way of suggesting possibilities we would never otherwise consider; it 
can both warn and inspire. By probing the past, we can counter myths 
which affect the way we act today. We can see that it is possible for an 
entire nation to be brainwashed; for and “advanced, educated” people to 
commit genocide; for a “progressive, democratic” nation to maintain 
slavery; for apparently powerless subordinates to defeat their rulers; for 
economic planning to be unaccompanied by restrictions on freedom; for 
oppressed to turn into oppressors; for socialism to be tyrannical; for a 
whole people to be led to war like sheep; for men to make incredible 
sacrifices on behalf of a cause (Zinn 2001, pp. 203-204).
Seeing the past this way, though, requires the availability of reasonably complete, 
accurate information. As the historian Howard Zinn notes elsewhere, “The chief problem 
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in historical honesty is not outright lying. It is omission or deemphasis of important data. 
The definition of important, of course, depends on one values” (2001, p. 51, italics in 
original). It is impossible to be outraged by the Ludlow Massacre or turn that outrage into 
useful action if one is unaware that the event took place. For Zinn and other historians, 
this means reopening debates over what is and is not important. But for events shrouded 
by official secrecy, even this kind of debate is impossible.
One more question remains regarding the impact of official secrecy on history: If 
history truly is important for democratic citizenship, and official secrecy distorts history, 
how much of a problem is this in the United States today? How much trouble is history 
in? The quick answer is no one knows. No one can know, for the very information that is 
needed to answer that question is secret. It is impossible to evaluate the damage caused 
by a secret with any degree of precision until that secret is revealed.
That said, there are indications that the danger posed by official secrecy is serious 
and growing. The current administration does not hold openness high as a democratic 
value, and indeed has been working feverishly to increase the scope of official secrecy, 
going so far as to embrace the principle that information that has been released to the 
public can be classified again. It seems likely that more secrets equal more damage to our 
understanding of history. Admittedly, this is only a rough calculus, but it seems a 
reasonable one and impossible to improve upon without actually examining what is kept 
behind closed doors.
Additionally, previous revelations offer some idea of the damage that has been 
done before. Other than possibly the war with Iraq, no event of the recent past cries out 
for understanding more than the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Yet, as with Iraq, it 
175
seems that there is much about those attacks that is simply not understood, and some 
conventional wisdom may even be wrong.
For example, government data compiled by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse at Syracuse University after the attacks showed that U.S. attorneys 
nationwide had decided not to prosecute large numbers of terrorism cases referred by 
various law-enforcement agencies, including the FBI. According to an account in the 
Washington Post:
Such embarrassments apparently have continued to upset Justice 
Department bureaucrats. In March, Teresa Davis of the Executive Office 
of U.S. Attorneys wrote that monthly FOIA requests for data would be 
delayed to make sure releasing data did not “jeopardize the department's 
counter-terrorism efforts or threaten national security.”
Nevertheless, the Justice Department released the data in April. It 
wasn’t a pretty post-Sept. 11 picture, at least not to Senate Judiciary 
Chairman Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and Grassley. “The information raises 
troubling questions about whether the FBI and Department of Justice are 
devoting sufficient resources to counter-terrorism efforts,” the senators 
wrote in June, “whether the FBI continues to dedicate valuable resources 
to crimes [such as bank robberies] that other agencies are equipped to 
handle; how well the FBI conducts terrorism investigations; and what the 
FBI is doing with its intelligence and analysis personnel” (Grimaldi 2003, 
bracketed material is Grimaldi’s).
These are troubling questions indeed, but the Justice Department has taken steps 
to ensure it will not have to answer many more like them. It is no longer releasing 
information about ongoing cases to TRAC, despite the fact that the data requested are “so 
vague and incomplete that it would be impossible to ascertain any specific cases, suspects 
or investigations” (Grimaldi 2003). In short, the Justice Department is keeping secrets as 
a way of avoiding public accountability — hampering citizens’ ability to understand the 
steps being taken in response to the Sept. 11 attacks.
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Unfortunately, this is entirely keeping in character with a national-security state 
that is increasingly obsessed with secrecy. The resulting damage to history cannot be 
calculated with any precision, but it is undoubtedly real. Future revelations may someday 
repair some of the damage, but the fact is that once established in the public mind, 
accounts of history are very difficult to alter, no matter how inaccurate or incomplete 
they may turn out to be. For conspiracy theorists, official secrecy offers a golden 
opportunity to jump into the breach and use their vivid imaginations to explain what is 
being held back in the shadows. For everyone else, it means that all they can do is 
wonder, an entirely unacceptable position for democratic citizens who are supposed to be 
engaged in a project of self-rule.
Official secrecy has far reaching costs both in terms of direct damage to 
democratic institutions and in damage to other institutions. For military and intelligence 
operations, it can be desirable and even crucial, yet at the same time it is a double-edged 
sword having the potential in some circumstances to be devastating to military or 
intelligence objectives. For the court system, some forms of secrecy (e.g. closed jury 
deliberations) that are under judicial control are benign or beneficial. On the other hand, 
official secrets that are kept from the courts cast serious doubt on their ability to arrive at 
a just, reliable account of the truth. For science and history, the impact of official secrecy 
is much clearer: It is harmful and can only be justified by rationale external to those 
disciplines. Having now covered in some depth what official secrecy means for 
democracy and society, it is now time to move on to a related question: Given the broad 
and damaging impact of official secrecy, particularly with regard to democracy, why has 
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this phenomenon not attracted greater scrutiny from democratic theory. This question is 
the subject of Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
Bringing Official Secrecy Out of the Shadows
As shown in the preceding chapters, official secrecy creates a wide range of 
negative effects, particularly for the instiutions of democracy. This being the case, it 
seems obvious to wonder why it has not received more rigorous attention from 
democratic theory. The answer lies in the newness of official secrecy as a phenomenon, 
at least in its contemporary form. Fortunately, democratic theory has dealt with analogous 
issues in the past, and those debates should offer some guidance in coming to terms with 
official secrecy.
On June 20, 1966, Donald Rumsfeld, then a Republican member of the House 
from Illinois, offered a powerful argument against official secrecy in a speech supporting 
the passage of legislation that was to become the Freedom of Information Act.
[D]isclosure of Government information is particularly important today 
because Government is becoming involved in more and more aspects of 
every citizen's personal and business life, and so the access to information 
about how Government is exercising its trust becomes increasingly 
important. Also, people are so busy today bringing up families, making a 
living, that it is increasingly difficult for a person to keep informed.  The 
growing complexity of Government itself makes it extremely difficult for 
a citizen to become and remain knowledgeable enough to exercise his 
responsibilities as a citizen; without government secrecy it is difficult, 
with Government secrecy it is impossible (Rumsfeld 1966, p. 13654).
The Freedom of Information Act was passed and later strengthened, but more 
broadly, there has been a general failure to address the virtues of openness and the costs 
of official secrecy. FOIA establishes a legal presumption of openness in the U.S. federal 
government, but a significant portion of the story is found under the exemptions to that 
presumption, policy areas where secrecy is seen in practice not as a necessary evil but an 
out-and-out virtue.
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While official secrecy has yet to receive the attention it deserves, to a limited 
extent, secrecy and openness have been addressed in the political realm for at least as far 
back as 431 B.C. In the funeral oration of Pericles, Thucydides reports an eloquent 
defense of the value of openness:
If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our 
antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts 
exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, 
although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; 
trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens. ...
Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend 
to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of 
industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, 
regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as 
useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, 
and instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of 
action, we think of it as an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at 
all (Harding 1973, pp. 58-9).
Obviously, the information environment of ancient Athens was far different than that of 
today, in which there was neither the will nor the ability to set up and maintain the 
massive institutions of secrecy that Americans would recognize today. Still, the 
democratic nature of openness and the dangers inherent in having the state keep secrets 
remain unchanged today.
Historically, democratic theory has concentrated on the ability of citizens to create 
and manipulate privately held information because the information needed for self-
government has been in private hands but vulnerable to official controls. The cluster of 
rights that falls under the heading free expression could be expected to ensure adequate 
access to information. This is no longer the case. To be sure, governments have always 
had secrets, but not on the current scale. It is only after World War I that states became
the vast producers and repositories of information recognizable today, and the trend 
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accelerated after World War II. The role of state-held information was not recognized 
because it simply was not that significant.
Sweden implicitly recognized the importance of access to state-held information 
by enacting the world’s first freedom of information law (Relyea 1986), while Great 
Britain moved in the opposite direction in 1889 with the passage of its first Official 
Secrets Act (further significant action on this front came in 1911 and again in 1989, and 
will come again in 2005 when the U.K. Fredom of Information Act comes into force) 
(Griffith 1989). However, in both the British and Swedish cases, legislative action came 
well before official secrecy and government records more generally achieved the 
significance that they obtained in the 20th century.
In the United States, the federal government did not begin the collecting and 
generating records on the massive scale recognizable today until World War I (Feinberg 
1986). Before that, maintenance of records was of so little concern that in Democracy in 
America Tocqueville (1969) writes that in American practice, “No method is adopted; not 
archives are formed; no documents are brought together, even when it would be easy to 
do so.” (p. 208) Some American officials even gave Tocqueville original documents to 
keep.
Several historical developments in the United States led to radical changes in the 
information environment. American entry into World War I ended a period of relative 
openness with regard to what information was held by the federal government, as 
concerns about national security and military efficiency became paramount. Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan notes that “Indeed, much of the structure of secrecy now in place in the 
U.S. government took shape in just under eleven weeks in the spring of 1917, while the 
181
Espionage Act was debated and signed into law (1998, p. 84).” The massive expansion of 
the federal government during the New Deal meant not only new programs but a vast 
increase in the amount of documentation involved in the business of governing — which 
necessitated decisions about how to manage that documentation.26
The end of World War II brought two other developments that ensured that the 
practice of official secrecy would become a deeply entrenched practice: the near-
simultaneous beginnings of the Atomic Age and the Cold War. The development of the 
fission bomb, by far the most destructive weapon ever devised to that point, quickly led 
to concerns that an increasingly hostile Soviet Union might duplicate the feat, and 
secrecy was seen by many as a defensive measure. Thus, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
first created the presumption that all information related to atomic energy is “born 
classified” and that only positive state action could transform it into public information.27
The idea that control of information is the best defense against nuclear proliferation did 
not gone unchallenged. For instance, the August 1945 official history of the Manhattan 
Project noted that most of the information needed to build an atomic bomb was available 
in the open literature (Smyth 1945), and Howard Morland’s 1979 H-bomb article in The 
Progressive, which sparked an unprecedented effort by the Department of Energy to 
26 Congress took the first step toward addressing this issue with the Administrative Procedures 
Act of 1946. However, that law came to be widely regarded as inadequate, and ultimately it was 
superseded in 1966 by the Freedom of Information Act.
27 This treatment of atomic-energy-related information is far broader in scope and restrictive than 
the classification systems, established by a series of executive orders, that are used by the 
military and the intelligence community. Military and intelligence secrecy require a positive 
decision to classify, rather than taking classification to be automatic. The idea of “born classified” 
has some unusual consequences. For instance, it is possible for a physicist who lacks a security 
clearance to make a discovery that he or she is not cleared to know about. The 1979 Progressive
case offers a real-life instance of this happening. Using only publicly available sources, journalist 
Howard Morland was able to describe in sufficient detail the construction of an H-bomb, that the 
Department of Energy went to court to prevent his article from being published. After the same 
information was published elsewhere, the case was dropped before a final ruling could be made. 
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impose prior restraint on publication, had at its heart the argument that there was no 
secret, that the idea of an H-bomb secret was a “hoax” that had the effect of stifling 
public debate on nuclear policy. However, in the realm of policy and practice, the idea 
that there are atomic-energy secrets worth keeping has carried the day. As for the 
growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, it too contributed to an atmosphere in 
which secrecy was an attractive policy option, as instead of returning to a peacetime 
posture, the United States assumed permanent emergency footing.
The Cold War had come. Americans were used to secrecy 
during wartime. The date of D day, for instance. But now a 
distinction was being made between a “hot war” like World War II 
and a “cold war” like the one then under way (both terms date from 
the 1940s), and secrecy was being presented as essential to both. 
This was wholly new. Profound aspects of culture, even the nature of 
energy (the oldest of mysteries), were now to be known by a few but 
withheld from the rest. In a sense, it was the most primitive of 
arrangements in the most advanced of societies (Moynihan 1998, p. 
141, parentheses in original).
It may have been primitive, but it was also a radically new arrangement, which 
raises the question of why it did not receive more comment — or indeed protest, given 
the high costs official secrecy exacts from democratic values. To be sure, official secrecy 
has had and does have its share of critics, but much of that criticism has been ad hoc in 
nature, frequently referring to a right to know (e.g. Theoharis 1998, Cantwell 1982, 
Kalven 1982, Rowat 1982, Halperin and Hoffman 1977).28 While well-intentioned, this 
argument does not hold up well under close examination and fails to illuminate the high 
costs of official secrecy. A more systematic account and analysis of official secrecy is 
needed.
The Department of Energy’s case hinged on the argument that Morland had discovered restricted 
data while doing his research entirely within the public domain.
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Taken by itself, the notion that the public has a “right to know” is 
as quixotic from an epistemological as from a moral point of view, and the 
idea of the public’s “right to know the truth” even more so. It would be 
hard to find a more fitting analogue to Jeremy Bentham’s characterization 
of talk about natural and imprescriptable rights as “rhetorical nonsense —
nonsense upon stilts.” How can one lay claims to know the truth when 
even partial knowledge is out of reach concerning most human affairs, and 
when bias and rationalization and denial skew and limit human knowledge 
still further? And how can one claim a right even to all the limited insights 
that it might be possible to acquire? Even such limited knowledge can 
rarely be viewed as a matter of right: indeed, there are realms about which 
we recognize that we must claim no rights to knowledge: the personal 
letters other wish to keep private, for example, or their intimate 
relationships (Bok 1984, p. 254, italics in original).
At first glance, the idea of a right to know seems to offer a powerful foundation 
for an argument against official secrecy. Upon closer examination, though, such an 
argument is very vulnerable not only to philosophical attacks on the existence of such a 
right but to empirical evidence of citizens’ failure to acquire basic knowledge in such 
areas as politics, history or geography, to name a few (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 
for an analysis of Americans’ political knowledge). Rather than focusing on an inchoate 
and contested right that many seem disinclined to exercise to begin with, it is far better to 
take a more systematic approach to official secrecy, acknowledging the advantages it 
offers as a tool of statecraft, while also illuminating its many costs. What is at issue is in 
fact far more important than a right to know, for if citizens grow through participation in 
politics, official secrecy not only handicaps democracy but renders human experience 
less complete than it otherwise could be. To be sure, official secrecy is not the only 
obstacle standing between citizens and effective participation, but it is an especially 
pernicious one due to the intent with which information is withheld.
28  In a related area, American legal theorists have also attempted to derive a right to gather 
state-held information from the First Amendment (Yale Law Journal 1980).
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Again the question arises: Given the stakes, why has democratic theory failed to 
address official secrecy as the issue of central importance since World War II? The 
answer to that question is necessarily speculative, but it is well-founded, informed 
speculation. In general, political theorists try to take a long view and make claims of 
universal importance, but they also write based on the concerns of their times. One need 
look no further than the impact of the decline of Athens on Plato or the English Civil War 
on Hobbes or the Industrial Revolution on Marx to see this. Official secrecy would not 
have occupied a high place on the agenda for democratic theorists before World War II 
because even in the early stages of its development a generation earlier, it was simply not 
that significant a phenomenon. And as it gained significance after World War II, there 
were also other developments that became pressing concerns: explaining the popularity 
of fascism as a mass movement in Europe of the 1930s and 1940s, and coming to terms 
with empirical evidence from the new science of survey research, which suggested that 
citizens were neither knowledgeable nor sophisticated enough in their belief systems to 
form a foundation for a stable, just government. In other words, the mass of citizens 
looked less like an idealized “the people” than a dangerous, untrustworthy mob, and it 
was urgent that democratic theory react. Thus official secrecy slipped beneath the radar.
As Carole Pateman notes:
Thus, although democracy as the rule of the people by means of the 
maximum participation of all the people might still be an ideal, grave 
doubts, doubts put forward in the name of social science, appeared to have 
been cast upon the possibility of realising this ideal.
But by the middle of the century even the ideal itself seemed to 
many to have been called into question; at least, “democracy” was still the 
ideal, but it was the emphasis on participation that had become suspect 
and with it the “classical” formulation of democratic theory. The collapse 
of the Weimar Republic, with its high rates of mass participation, into 
fascism, and the post-war establishment of totalitarian regimes based on 
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mass participation, albeit participation backed by intimidation and 
coercion, underlay the tendency for “participation” to become linked to 
the concept of totalitarianism rather than that of democracy. The spectre of 
totalitarianism also helps explain the concern with the necessary 
conditions for stability in a democratic polity, and a further factor here 
was the instability of so many states in the post-war world, especially ex-
colonial states that rarely maintained a democratic political system on 
Western lines (1970, p. 2).
Concerns about totalitarianism aside, the post-World War II years were also 
unhappy ones in the United States for research on citizenship. The traditional ideal of 
fully informed and involved citizens making sound decisions about their government on 
the basis of their knowledge took a beating with the advent of modern survey research 
techniques, starting with the panel study of voters by Lazarsfeld, et al. (1948), in Erie 
County, Ohio. Early reports indicated that most Americans might not have sophisticated 
enough cognitive frameworks in which to fit any information they receive. In looking at 
open-ended explanations of how Americans evaluate candidates and parties, Campbell, et 
al. (1964), find just 3.5 percent with sufficient sophisticated explanations to be classified 
as “ideologues” and another 12 percent as “near ideologues.” It appeared that voting 
decisions, which offer American citizens the most direct and routine methods of holding 
government accountable, typically stem more from psychological attachments to labels 
and images than from critical, reasoned evaluation. Converse (1964), too, found a low 
level of sophisticated, well-integrated systems of political thought among members of the 
mass public.
As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) note, “Debates over the importance of an 
informed citizenry are rooted in the collision of theory and practice. In theory, a 
democracy requires knowledgeable citizens to avoid becoming Madison’s ‘tragedy’ or 
‘farce.’ In practice, it appears that a majority of people lack even the most basic political 
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information” (p. 22). This clash led from the beginning to skepticism about democracy, 
and democratic theorists have typically responded in one of three ways: 1) falling back on 
an elite-based theory of democracy that involves citizens in only the most superficial, 
tangential ways, 2) explaining away the need for knowledgeable citizens by turning to the 
utility and power of heuristics and 3) turning collective rationality to mitigate the impact 
of individual ignorance and irrationality, explaining that “the whole of citizen awareness 
is greater than the sum of its parts” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
This is not the place to recount the entire debate over the role of participation in 
democracy. Nor is it necessary to engage in a blow-by- blow account of the literature in 
citizen competence. The argument here is not that citizens’ capabilities and 
characteristics are ideal. Rather, it is that their capabilities are good enough (and 
potentially improvable) for citizens to stake a reasonable claim to autonomy. Concerns 
about totalitarianism and citizen competence are certainly serious, and with those 
concerns occupying space high on the agenda for political science, it is not surprising that 
the genesis of the age of official secrecy was largely overshadowed.
Ignoring official secrecy, however, is no longer an option. To do so is to court 
irrelevance. The past two-and-a-half years have seen an unprecedented move toward 
greater secrecy in the United States, with radical changes in the treatment not only of 
classified information but also with new efforts to control information that has already 
entered the public domain.
Among recent developments:
• Earlier this year, the Transportation Security Administration asked that two 
pages be deleted from transcripts of unclassified testimony in a congressional hearing on 
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airport security. The Federal Document Clearing House (an organization that is partially 
owned by the Associated Press and provides transcripts to news organizations) complied 
and passed along the request to clients that already had the transcript in question. It is 
unclear if any complied, but Congressional Quarterly refused (“Media Asked to Delete 
Security Testimony” 2004).
• The Freedom of Information Act has already been amended to exclude “critical 
infrastructure information” from its disclosure requirements. This measure may indeed be 
useful in concealing information that could be useful to terrorists, but that is far from its 
only impact. For instance environmental groups are concerned that this exemption will 
make it more difficult for citizens to learn about pollution or unsafe practices (Guzy 
2002).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has refused to release Duke Power’s 
application for an exemption from new security requirements for several of its nuclear 
plants in the Carolinas, on the basis that it contains unclassified but “critical infrastructure 
information” (Smith 2004). The public, which has an obvious interest in whether plant 
security is breached, is thus denied the opportunity for meaningful input into the NRC’s 
decision.
The NRC also recently threatened to prosecute staffers at the Project on 
Government Oversight for a report in which they critiqued security arrangements for two 
nuclear reactors at Indian Point, N.Y. While the group based its critique on interviews 
with participants in security drills and publicly available information, the NRC declared it 
contained “safeguards information” that was illegal to disclose. However, when staffers 
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which information the NRC wanted deleted from the report, it initially refused to say and 
later only described the information in general terms (Smith 2004).
In short, official secrecy is casting a longer and longer shadow. This is sparking 
criticism, even from some unexpected quarters (Nakashima 2002). Rep. Dan Burton, R-
Ind., has referred to President Bush as dictatorial, due to his administration’s penchant for 
secrecy (Baker 2002). In his new book Worse Than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of 
George W. Bush, John Dean, who was White House counsel in the Nixon administration, 
describes the current administration as “the most secretive presidency of my lifetime” 
(Talbot 2004). Criticism of the new moves toward secrecy is welcome, but the problem 
not simply partisan, and is bigger than the current president. Democratic theory has an 
important role to play in offering a systematic analysis of the impact of official secrecy, 
which in turn can be used to minimize the use of official secrecy, manage it where it must 
be used and mitigate its damage as much as possible.
Where democratic theorists have evaluated the impact of official secrecy, they 
have noted the salutary effects of publicity and the dangers inherent to secrecy. Jeremy 
Bentham (1962) devotes an entire chapter in his “Essay on Political Tactics” to the 
importance of publicity for legislative assemblies, calling it “the fittest law for securing 
public confidence, and causing it constantly to advance towards the end of its institution” 
(p. 310). Among the dangers of secrecy Bentham cites is this:
To conceal from the public the conduct of its representatives, is to 
add inconsistency to prevarication: it is to tell the constituents, “You are to 
elect or reject such of your deputies without knowing why — you are 
forbidden the use of reason — you are to be guided in the exercise of your 
greatest powers only by hazard or caprice” (p. 312).
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To be sure, official secrecy today is most commonly a tool wielded by appointed 
bureaucrats, rather than elected officials, but the basic objection still stands: It prevents 
citizens from effectively evaluating the performance of their government.
In Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill (1962) goes a 
step further, naming publicity as the primary function of a legislative assembly.
Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, 
the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the 
government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full 
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers 
questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who 
compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner which 
conflicts with the direct sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and 
either expressly or virtually appoint their successors (p. 111).
In explicitly engaging the issues of secrecy and publicity, Bentham and Mill are 
unusual. However, it is not the case that democratic theorists are unaware of the citizens’ 
need for information to be effective in public life. It is simply that with the information 
environment being what it was prior to the evolution of contemporary regimes of secrecy 
within democratic states, it was quite reasonably assumed that the information citizens 
required was generally held in private hands. Thus the emphasis was on ensuring that 
privately held information could be shared unimpeded. From Milton’s (1918) defense of 
the institution of the free press in Areopagitica to Dahl’s (1989) inclusion of a right to 
free expression as a necessary institution of polyarchy, it has been rightly recognized that 
citizens must be free to create and exchange information for democracy to function. What 
has been less completely integrated into democratic theory is the idea that in addition to 
access to information from each other, citizens must be able to obtain state-held 
information to be fully actualized as citizens. However, recognizing this fact does not 
require an enormous leap of logic. Much of the reasoning applied to justify free 
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expression is also applicable to arguments for publicity and against official secrecy. It is 
not possible to establish a right to know in the same way that a right to free expression is 
established. However, in examining the damages caused by official secrecy, many of 
them are analogous to damages caused by censorship, and it is certain that people who 
value democracy would desire to minimize those damages — and eliminate them 
whenever possible.
For instance, Gaetano Mosca (1939), who defines democracy so narrowly as to be 
little other than the circulation of elites, still holds that protecting public discussion of 
politics is absolutely essential:
People of our time have come to take for granted the advantages of 
a system in which all governmental acts are subject to public discussion. 
That alone can explain why superficial observers among our younger 
generations fail to realize at a glance the moral ruin that would result from 
the downfall of such a system. That ruin would take the form of a series of 
violations of juridical defense, of justice, of everything that we would call 
“liberty”; and those violations would be more pernicious than any that can 
be laid to the charge of even the most dishonest of parliamentary 
governments, let alone of representative governments (p. 257).
In Democracy and Its Critics, Robert Dahl (1989) cites free expression as part of 
a general moral “right to self-government.” “Freedom of speech, for example, is 
necessary both for effective participation and for enlightened understanding; so too are 
freedom of the press and freedom of assembly,” (p. 170), he writes.
Neither of these statements is especially surprising, and in the United States, there 
are few citizens or theorists who would seriously contest them. Indeed, there is a general 
understanding “that the first amendment is primarily designed to ensure citizen 
deliberation about public affairs. Under this view, the citizenry must have a significant 
role in government decisions, and the guarantee of freedom of expression is intended 
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above all to promote that role” (Sunstein 1986, pp. 889-90). While it is has been rare for 
American courts to confront secrecy willingly and directly (“Keeping Secrets” 1990, 
Cooper 1986), it was this reasoning that carried the day in the Pentagon Papers case (New 
York Times Co. v. United States 1970), in which Justice Hugo Black wrote:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press 
the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. 
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. ... The press was 
protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the 
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose 
deception in government (p. 717).
If it is held that the free expression is intended to ensure deliberation, then free 
expression is valued not for a direct contribution to democracy, but because of its 
contribution to an intervening factor, that in turn promotes democracy. In other words, 
free expression is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the creation of a well-
informed public. It is important, but upon further examination, it is apparent that the 
potential for “enlightened understanding” depends on other factors, as well. Benjamin R. 
Barber (1998) cites technological development as holding the potential to enhanced 
citizen knowledge and efficacy.
[D]emocracy is a form of government that depends on information 
and communication. It is obvious then that new technologies of 
information can be nurturing to democracy. They can challenge passivity, 
they can enhance information equality, they can overcome sectarianism 
and prejudice, and they can facilitate participation in deliberative political 
processes (p. 582).
The operative word here is “can.” There is no guarantee new information technology will 
create these outcomes, and in fact Barber recognizes it is unlikely to unless technological 
development is specifically guided and subsidized with these outcomes in mind. In short, 
new technology is neither necessary nor sufficient to create an informed public, but it has 
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the potential to be a valuable contributing factor. This is just one example of a factor 
above and beyond free expression that might be valued by democratic theorists because 
of its contribution to a potentially informed public.
Publicity is another, and that being the case, official secrecy obviously becomes a 
major concern. By no means does publicity guarantee that citizens will become informed. 
However, official secrecy guarantees that they will not, at least in the areas in which there 
are secrets. Openness, then, is another necessary but not sufficient condition for an 
informed public, and as Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) note: “In short, the informed 
opinions, participation, and consent of citizens is by definition the best measure of what 
is in the public’s interest. And the opportunities provided citizens to make such informed 
choices is the best measure of how democratic a system is” (p. 6). And in preventing the 
formation of informed opinions, official secrecy actually makes the state less democratic. 
Uncomfortable compromises must be made in the name of security and even national 
survival, but those compromises are more likely to minimize the attendant damage to 
democracy if they are made with a full awareness of their impact. It is the task of 
democratic theory now to explore and explain that impact and to create that awareness.
The information environment has changed radically since the 19th century, and 
democratic theory can no longer afford to ignore the importance of state-held information 
and the pernicious effects of official secrecy. It can no longer be taken for granted that by 
guaranteeing free speech and a free press that citizens’ need for information can be 
satisfied. Much larger amounts of information are held by the state than historically has 
been the case. Paradoxically, while this truly is an information age, it is also an age in 
which conditions of scarcity prevail, due to the phenomenon of official secrecy. There is 
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a great deal of information in official hands that can be found nowhere else, and access to 
it is limited. Those who control access to information wield a great deal of power, and it 
must be recognized that this power has the potential to distort, if not stifle democratic 
outcomes. Even under the most felicitous of conditions, official secrecy subverts 
democratic citizenship. When abused — and the nature of secrecy encourages abuse —
official secrecy’s impact can be even greater. As part of a greater understanding of the 
role information must play in self-government, democratic theory must take into account 
the destructive effect official secrecy has on the democratic project.
That secrecy has been ignored for so long is likely attributable to simultaneous 
events in the development of democratic theory. The rise of elitist democratic theory has 
run historically parallel to the rise of the state as a vital collector of repository of 
information, due to doubts about to capacities of the mass public, doubts that were 
understandable in the wake of World War II and new evidence about citizens’ political 
knowledge. For elite democratic theory, official secrecy is not such a great concern: As 
long as the right, competent experts can be found to handle secret information, its harm is 
not so great. Certainly, its negative impact on mass participation is not to be feared if 
participation is not especially desirable to begin with. For citizenship theorists, the 
challenge of elitist theory has been pressing, and it seems understandable that 
incorporating a theory of official secrecy would not be the most immediate priority.
However, the importance of state-held information, including secret information, 
seems exceedingly unlikely to diminish. At the moment, official secrecy is casting a 
longer and longer shadow. A realistic democratic theory must work with the 
understanding that citizens’ access to access to state-held information will never be 
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perfect. At the same time, democratic practice must minimize the obstacles to open 
access and recognize that official secrecy is one of the greatest of these obstacles. It is 





There is a certain irony in a discussion of official secrecy such as this one. For all 
the real dangers its practice poses for democracy, official secrecy tends to be fleeting and 
is always difficult to maintain. As Benjamin Franklin (1974) noted, “Three may keep a 
secret if two of them are dead.” Truly keeping a secret is a formidible task, and it is no 
less difficult to keep a state secret than it is to keep any other kind. Examples used 
throughout this dissertation were at one time treated as secrets by the U.S. government. 
All eventually were revealed, through voluntary action of the agencies involved, by leaks 
or investigations or by some combination of these methods. The idea of an “open secret” 
— something that is treated as though it were secret although it is widely known — is 
hardly unusual. The CIA traffics in open secrets when it wastes time and resources 
declassifying transcripts from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which records 
and distributes material that was openly broadcast over foreign airwaves; for that matter, 
the ruse actually starts in classifying these transcripts to begin with (Herring 1997). The 
open secret is a recurring theme in recent, particularly where nuclear weapons are 
concerned, although certainly not limited to that realm.
Despite stringent measures intended to keep its existence a secret to the maximum 
extent possible, the Manhattan Project was well-known among Washington elites well 
before Aug. 6, 1945. “Most senior officials in the national security process — including 
many who did not qualify as having a ‘need to know’ — had at least a general awareness 
of the bomb’s existence, usually gained through private conversations with their 
colleagues. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes, 
and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau all learned of the project this way” (Sigal 
196
1975, p. 75). According to Sigal, word of the secret (and unauthorized by Congress) 
bombing campaign in Cambodia of 1969-1970 also got out in a similar manner and was 
well-known through Air Force ranks in Vietnam, as well as by at least eight members of 
Congress.
When Howard Morland (1979) explained the mechanism by which a hydrogen 
bomb achieves fusion, his objective was not to provide a blueprint to would-be bomb 
makers but to demystify the weapon and demonstrate that the physical principles 
involved were not truly secret at all. The federal government’s reaction, which provides 
American jurisprudence with a rare example of prior restraint of communication, 
demonstrated the lengths to which it was willing to go not only to protect secrecy, but to 
protect even the appearance of secrecy.
Along with the theme of open secrets, there is also the recurring theme of the 
damage they cause. Morland’s ultimate argument is not that the specific mechanisms of 
the H-bomb are particularly important for public discourse. Rather, he claims that by 
acting as if those mechanisms are secret, citizens mystify the entire area of nuclear 
policy, ceding it as a realm properly inhabited solely by experts. In short, acting as if 
there is a secret stifles debate in almost the same manner as true secrecy does. Avner 
Cohen (1998) makes a similar point about the Israeli nuclear program. Israel has adopted 
a posture of nuclear opacity. If is generally accepted that Israel has nuclear weapons, but 
the state refuses to acknowledge or deny a program for strategic reasons. This posture has 
had the side effect of creating a taboo against talking about issues of nuclear policy in all 
but the vaguest terms, so that even in the early days of the its program there was no real 
debate about Israeli nuclear policy, even among policy-making elites.
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For those few who did insist on debating the issue in public, the efforts of 
the military censor made it difficult to state the case properly. The taboo, 
however, was more self-imposed than imposed by law. It is among the 
most powerful societal sources of opacity, and it has endured to the 
present (Cohen 1998, p. 3).
The examples cited by Sigal (1975), too point to damage caused by acting as if a 
known fact were secret. Granted, knowledge about the Manhattan Project and the 
bombing of Cambodia was not widely dispersed. However, even for those officials who 
had received information through informal channels were constrained by the apparent 
secrecy of what they had learned. In the case of the Manhattan Project, “official secrecy 
did not eliminate informal communication about the bomb, but it did limit formal 
discussion in official forums where knowledgeable participants might raise and evaluate 
options for its use” (p. 88). The decision to drop the bomb on Japan may have partly been 
to demonstrate to Congress the money the project had received had not been wasted. In 
the case of Cambodia, “a preoccupation with keeping secret operations secret led to new 
operations of dubious legality, which then had to be kept secret too” (p. 89).
In short, efforts to keep official secrets, even when they are not totally successful, 
have serious consequences. In the preceding chapters, the consequences for democracy 
are outlined. As explored at length in Chapter 2, official secrecy has a great deal of utility 
as a tool of statecraft. Indeed, at times, it can be indispensable for concerns up to and 
including the very survival of the state. Therefore, despite the significant and indisputable 
harm that it causes to democracy, the simple and obvious answer of eliminating official 
secrecy altogether is just not tenable. This leaves the tasks of minimizing the use of 
official secrecy as much as possible and mitigating the harm when there is no alternative 
to keeping secrets from citizens. This burden falls on both policy makers, who have no 
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choice but to deal with official secrecy, and on democratic theorists, who would be well-
advised to engage this pressing issue that has such enormous implications for their field. 
A coherent, complete account of what it means for democracies to keep secrets will 
provide a deeper understanding of democracy itself and will offer guidance on how the 
inevitable tension between the needs of democracy and statecraft can be managed. This 
dissertation begins the process of developing that understanding, particularly with its 
account of the damage official secrecy causes.
That damage goes across the board, affecting citizens, the society at large and 
even the state itself. In cutting citizens off from the information they may need for 
effective political action, official secrecy diminishes their autonomy and hamstrings their 
ability to hold the state accountable. This lack of accountability, in turn, provides cover 
for incompetence and corruption. While it is certainly not the case that every secret hides 
a corruption or abuse, it is certainly the case that corruption and incompetence seek to 
cloak themselves in secrecy. And all too often they succeed, at least for a time. 
Revelations of past abuses further compound the damage, at best making citizens 
suspicious and draining the reservoir of trust on which the state depends and at the far 
extreme encouraging paranoid-style discourse and conspiratorial thinking, at a cost for 
both the individuals involved and the society at large. For the state, too, this loss of trust 
creates problems as it loses legitimacy and authority.
Recognizing these consequences is the first step toward minimizing and 
mitigating them, and this recognition should be reflected in policy, not just in the 
arguments of democratic theorists. It is one thing to create new secrets left and right when 
to do so is viewed simply as enhancing security. It is quite another to do so when taking 
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the broader perspective of understanding the costs as well as the benefits involved. And 
while their existence tends to be ignored today, the costs of official secrecy are every bit 
as real as the benefits claimed by secrecy’s defenders. Understanding the tension between 
official secrecy and democracy will not likely lead to its resolution, for although they 
must lead an uneasy coexistence, the conflict between them is fundamental and 
unresolvable. However, understanding that tension can lead democratic governments to 
different, better policies than a partial understanding that treats secrecy solely as a 
security issue. The following principles stem from a more complex understanding of 
official secrecy in tension with democratic values. They are intended as exemplary, 
minimal guidelines, not as an exhaustive list.
• Democratic states should have a presumption of openness or transparency for 
state-held information. If information is kept secret, it should be because of a positive 
determination that releasing that information is likely to cause greater harm than secrecy 
will. This determination must be made with a full understanding of the deleterious impact 
of secrecy.
Theoretically, Western industrialized democracies fall somewhere along a 
continuum between Great Britain, which historically has had a presumption of secrecy 
established by the Official Secrets Act, and the United States, which, in general has a 
presumption of openness as established by the Freedom of Information Act. Great 
Britain’s situation will change somewhat with the 2005 implementation of the U.K. 
Freedom of Information Act. However, this new law does not replace the 1989 Official 
Secrets Act but exists alongside it, a situation that is not unheard of in countries moving 
toward freedom of information (Tant 1990).
200
In practice, the continuum between secrecy and openness is much narrower than 
these statutory differences would suggest, for it is the exceptions to FOIA and the 
restrictive terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 that define American policy toward 
official secrecy. A traditional deference by the courts (Harvard Law Review 1990) and 
the broad construction of the national-security exemption to FOIA (Cheh 1984) have 
combined to offer the American executive virtual carte blanche to keep secrets. When in 
May 2002, the court established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act rebuked the 
Justice Department for abuses and refused to grant it new powers for counterintelligence 
investigations, it was only the second loss by the government in the court’s 23-year 
history (Eggen and Schmidt 2002), and even that decision has been described as not 
much of a loss. According to Fein (2002), “The FISA Court balked, but then largely 
capitulated.”
Through the years, various reforms have been proposed (Halperin and Hoffman 
1977, Harvard Law Review 1990, Commission on Protecting and Reducing Official 
Secrecy 1997) to correct the American tendency toward overclassification through 
stronger judicial review or congressional mandate. The specific details of a reform are 
less important than its ultimate success at creating a presumption of openness and 
removing incentives for overclassification. Indeed, the ultimate goal is for statutory 
changes to blaze a trail for changes in the official culture so that openness is seen as 
valuable. One thing is certain: The recent renewed tendency toward greater secrecy is 
unworthy of any state that calls itself a democracy.
• Secrets must have shelf lives. The British 30-year rule is a step in the right 
direction and is certainly worth emulating. In the United States, various executive orders 
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on classification have also set up guidelines for declassification, and the 1997 report by 
the Moynihan commission on official secrecy recommended adopting a “life-cycle” 
approach. Regardless, a tendency toward overclassification, inadequate funding and an 
official culture than emphasizes secrecy over openness have led to a situation in which 
secrets are essentially immortal and absurdity abounds. The CIA is currently has 
successfully defended a lawsuit to avoid releasing not only its total current congressional 
appropriation, but also its appropriation from 1947 on the ground that its release would 
endanger intelligence sources and methods. The same agency also won a lawsuit to avoid 
disclosing a recipe for invisible ink used by Germany in World War I (“Judge Upholds 
Secrecy of Invisible Ink Formulas” 2002). In 1997, the Moynihan commission discovered 
that weather reports used for the D-Day invasion were still classified. While this 
information is less likely to be of public interest than something like the CIA’s total 
budget, there is something pathological about keeping this kind of secret. Even granting 
the very remote possibility that Nazi Germany could somehow still pose a threat to 
American national security, surely the weather report from June 6, 1944, would no longer 
be helpful.
• Accountability mechanisms must be especially strong when secrets are involved.
Ordinarily, policy is made with accountability mechanisms in mind. While they may fail 
or be coopted, oversight committees, regulatory agencies, etc. are designed to ensure that 
laws are followed and the public interest maintained, with citizens themselves being the 
ultimate source of accountability. Secrecy removes citizens from this role, and while it is 
impossible to fill this void entirely, the nature of secrecy makes other sources of 
accountability more important, not less. Practically, this must include outside 
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consultations when the use of disinformation or covert action is contemplated, in order to 
obtain at least some semblance of an independent evaluation of a policy. In the American 
system, this also means that Congress must also be kept informed. The ultimately 
unsuccessful move by the Bush administration in 2001 to limit classified briefings to just 
eight members of Congress (Milbank and Slevin 2001) was a step in exactly the wrong 
direction.
• Operational secrecy must be carefully distinguished from other types. Classic 
examples of operational secrets include the movement of troop ships during wartime or 
the exact time and location of a planned military offensive. Operational secrets typically 
do not have a great deal of political content and do not require concealment for a great 
deal of time. Very little harm to democracy is likely to come from keeping an operational 
secret, and the state may benefit a great deal. However, it is crucial that this category be 
narrow in scope and not be allowed to extend to matters that are properly political 
concerns deserving of deliberation and citizen input. The planned location of the Allied 
invasion of France was a secret on June 5, 1944, and properly so. On June 7, it was not a 
secret, nor did it need to be. On the other hand, a secret decision to go to war, rather than 
limited-purpose secrecy regarding how the war was to be prosecuted would have been 
most troubling indeed.
• Scientific secrets deserve special consideration, and scientific secrecy must be 
recognized as appropriate only under the most extraordinary circumstances. Scientific 
information is uniquely vulnerable to discovery. The most carefully constructed 
classification system is no match for someone with the proper equipment and expertise. 
No one would think to attempt to keep the principles of gravitation secret. The principles 
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of atomic energy are analogously discoverable, and in fact at this point are similarly well 
known. Currently, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 employs and archaic and restrictive 
classification scheme in the hope of preventing nuclear proliferation through the control 
of information, a policy that has enormous negative impact on public discourse and at the 
same time does nothing to counter the larger threat, which is the distribution of materials. 
Fortunately, nuclear weapons require fairly exotic, difficult-to-obtain materials and a 
great deal of specialized equipment and expertise to construct, and controlling access to 
those materials and equipment hold much more promise for nonproliferation than does an 
effort to control information that is doomed from the start.
Because of the nature of science, most efforts at scientic secrecy are doomed to de 
facto failure. However, there are rare instances in which perhaps it is worth an effort. 
Preventing potential terrorists from learning how to make the toxin ricin is a lost battle. 
That horse is already out of the barn, and even the most draconian measures could not 
bring it back. Any half-competent amateur chemist can make a batch with readily 
available materials, certainly a matter of concern, but not an appropriate area to be 
addressed by information policy. On the other hand biochemists who have succeeded in 
fabricating the polio virus using chemicals available through mail-order have created 
knowledge that is not yet widely dispersed and has the potential to cause great harm. In 
situations such as that one, there is certainly a professional responsibility to use care in 
how that information is disseminated. And in those rare instances in which both 
conditions — narrow dispersal and the potential for great harm — are met, it may even 
be appropriate to address legitimate public-safety concerns by policy or statute. Outside 
of those narrowly defined circumstances, however, scientific secrecy should be 
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recognized for what it is, a fruitless effort that has negative implications for democracy 
and for scientific innovation.
• Care should be exercised in what information is collected to begin with. This is 
an area where concerns over secrecy and privacy rights overlap. Briefly, official secrecy 
is only a concern for information that the state holds to begin with. With an 
understanding of the full implications of official secrecy, it becomes important to 
evaluate what kinds of information the state really needs to collect to begin with and what 
kind of obligations it incurs in collecting and holding information.
These principles are departures from previous practice, particularly in the United 
States, and they certainly break with prevailing notions about the importance of secrecy 
in the age of global terror. However, they are not radical, and they are not inappropriate 
for the times. At their core, these principles recognize the importance of citizens —
without whom democracy is an empty shell of a word. At the same time, they are 
realistic, recognizing that the world remains a hostile place and that uncomfortable 
compromises are sometimes necessary for survival.
While the United States has certainly taken large steps backward in recent years 
in its use of official secrecy, the news is not altogether bad worldwide. In 1990, just 14 
countries had freedom of information laws. Today that number has grown to more than 
50, although those laws certainly vary in quality and application, but in general this is a 
promising trend.
And it is a trend that should be of great interest to democratic theory. Ad hoc 
movements toward openness are fine as far as they go, but the deep understanding that 
democratic theory can contribute is also vital, as only that kind of analysis can 
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demonstrate how inimicable are the values of official secrecy and democracy, and only 
that deep understanding can ensure that the inevitable tensions between citizenship and 
security are managed as well and carefully as possible. There is more work to be done, 
avenues not explored here, and areas worthy of further study. A few are especially 
noteworthy:
• This dissertation is situated in democratic theory, but in its examples it primarily 
focuses on the American experience with official secrecy. The United States is far from 
being the world’s only democracy, and the the experiences of other states, perhaps from a 
comparative perspective, or extended case studies, would be worthy of examination.
• The issue of secrecy and paranoia discussed in Chapter 4 is especially intriguing and 
deserves extended study.
• While issues of privacy do not receive a great deal of attention here — due to clear 
conceptual differences between what is conventionally termed privacy and the forms of 
official secrecy discussed here — both privacy and official secrecy involve concerns 
about what might be termed information policy.
• The line between official secrets and privately held information is also blurring, with 
and increasing reliance on quasigovernmental agencies and nongovernmental contractors 
performing what have traditionally been state functions. The need for citizens to hold the 
state accountable is not diminished by this development at all, but an examination of how 
to handle information under these new arrangements would be a valuable contribution.
Official secrecy is here to stay, at least for the forseeable future, and democratic 
theory must address to this reality. As a matter of survival, democracy must 
accommodate itself to the undemocratic virtues of force and fraud in order for them to 
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create a secure perimeter within which democratic life is possible. To the maximum 
extent possible, citizens themselves must decide how that accommodation is to be made. 
That process begins with a full account of what official secrecy means for democracy.
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